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DIRECTORY
Chapter 5. Confidential information is also a secret. Spy things 5.1. Devices and methods for obtaining information All information, according to the degree of security, can be divided into secret, for official use and unclassified. Any serious undertaking begins with collecting information for further analysis and decision-making. For example, in business - this is market analysis, information about competitors, their strengths and weaknesses, information about the latest developments in the business field, etc. Thus, if you are a businessman, you definitely have the information that your competitors need. Sooner or later, you will encounter industrial espionage (all companies do this to one degree or another). Industrial espionage involves the collection of open and closed information about you and your company. In our turbulent times, you may be the target of blackmail if your competitors have surpassed you in espionage and do not respect the law. Naturally, blackmail implies the presence of secret compromising information. Remember the story of citizen Koreiko A.I., who lived in the city of Chernomorsk in 1928 (“The Golden Calf” by Ilf and Petrov). You may be wiretapped out of simple curiosity - other people's personal lives are still the object of close attention of some people. A modern business person cannot brush aside the problems of accessing classified information and hiding his information. Naturally, it is not recommended to use criminal ways to achieve your goals - to engage in espionage for blackmail and invasion of the privacy of citizens. But it is imperative to imagine how others can do this to you. Many entrepreneurs turn their houses and apartments into offices where they hold business meetings, work with a computer, fax, naively believing that their home is a reliable fortress. With modern espionage tools that are easy to acquire, infiltrating a computer database or bugging an unprotected office is easier than you think. Let's look at the main methods of collecting information and how to deal with it. The creation and improvement of modern electronic spying devices has led to the fact that even the most advanced and secret hiding place is not able to protect you from leakage of information contained in stored documents. As an example, let's remember the famous Soviet action film "New Adventures of the Elusive". Colonel Kutasov kept a secret map of the deployment of White Army units in his safe. In order to look at it, division commanders were forced to come to headquarters personally to Kutasov every time. It was believed that this guaranteed 100% safety of classified information. However, if the “Elusive” had used modern technical means, for example, Yashka Tsygan, under the guise of an electrician, would have mounted a television camera in the lampshade above Kutasov’s desk, or Danka would have taken photographs from the roof of a neighboring house, and Valerka would have attached a “bug” to the epaulettes of Staff Captain Ovechkin, then classified information would have been stolen even without the knowledge of the chief of counterintelligence. As can be seen from the above example, a cache is not able to protect information if the owner regularly uses it. 5.1.1. Ways to get information Here is a list of ways to obtain information about competitors, published by Dr. Worth Wyde in the journal "Chemical Engineering" back in 1965. However, this list has not lost its relevance today. The first seven methods are legal, the rest are illegal. 1. Competitor publications and process reports obtained through conventional means. 2. Information given publicly by former employees of a competitor. 3. Market reviews and reports of consulting engineers. 4. Financial reports. 5. Fairs and exhibitions organized by competitors and brochures published by them. 6. Analysis of competitors' products. 7. Reports of salesmen and purchasing departments. 8. Attempts to invite specialists working for a competitor to work, and the questionnaires they filled out for this purpose. 9. Questions carefully asked to competitor specialists at special congresses. 10. Direct covert surveillance 11. Pretending to offer employment to a competitor's employees without the intention of hiring them in order to extract information from them 12. Pretending to negotiate with a competitor to allegedly acquire a license for one of the patents 13. Using professional spies to obtain information 14. Luring a competitor's employees away from work to obtain information 15. Infringement on the property of a competitor. 16. Bribery of a competitor’s purchasing department or its employees 17. Sending agents to employees or specialists of a competitor. 18. Eavesdropping on a competitor's conversations. 19. Theft of drawings, samples, documents, etc. 20. Blackmail and various methods of pressure; of course, the competitor resorts to the same means. In order to competently carry out measures to detect leaks of official and other information and install special means of protection, it is necessary to clearly establish through which channels it is generally possible to obtain information We list them:
radio microphones Currently, radio microphones or, as they are also called, radio microphones, which are microtransmitters, are widely used. Their range, as a rule, does not exceed several hundred meters Modern element base allows you to create these devices even at home Hearing control Auditory monitoring can be carried out with highly directional microphones that have a needle-shaped polar pattern. Using such a microphone, you can listen to a conversation at a distance of up to 1 km within line of sight. Listening to telephone conversations Wiretapping of telephone conversations can be carried out using several methods:
Use of laser technology If the window glass in your office is not protected, then the conversation behind such windows can be listened to by detecting a laser beam reflected from the glass. Sound vibrations in the room lead to synchronous vibration of the glass, and they, in turn, modulate the laser beam reflected from it. Continuous observation It is important to remember that if you have a business meeting at a hotel or inn, the room in which you are staying can be listened to from the neighboring one using sensitive equipment. Sockets, central heating radiators, ventilation shafts, thin partitions - these are your enemies. A moving vehicle can only be monitored if it previously had a radio microphone installed. During long stops, the conversation can be listened to with a directional microphone, provided there is direct visibility and the car window is down. You can also use a laser microphone. In cafes and restaurants, listening can be done with a directional microphone or a radio earpiece. In such cases, loud music, as well as the noise of flowing water, does not help, since the directional microphone has a very narrow directional pattern. Getting information from a computer Those individuals who seek to gain unauthorized access to computer data banks are equipped with the most serious equipment. This requires special equipment with digital processing. The most reliable implementation can be achieved by directly connecting to a computer network. This is only possible if the computers in the building are connected to a common local network. You can capture information with subsequent processing by recording emissions from the computer and its peripherals, as well as computer lines. While the computer is operating, signals are induced in the power supply network; by registering which, after appropriate processing, one can obtain complete or partial information about the processes occurring in the computer’s memory and its peripherals. To remotely obtain information due to stray radiation from a computer and its peripherals, highly sensitive broadband receivers are used, followed by digital processing of the received information. Carry out a small experiment: turn on your computer and tune the radio receiver in the UV range. Almost the entire range will be clogged with interference from a running computer, and if your IBM-compatible or any other computer is without appropriate protection, no one can guarantee that it is not being monitored. Computer information acquisition systems are incredibly complex and require special analog and digital processing equipment using computers and certain software. 5.1.2. Technical means of unauthorized access to information Acoustic control Acoustic monitoring systems include a wide range of various radio microphones, the purpose of which is to collect information and transmit it over a radio channel. radio microphones - these are special information retrieval devices, which in their design are:
It should be noted that recently special information collection devices have appeared that use so-called “non-traditional channels” to transmit acoustic information. These channels include the following:
Information retrieval devices using “non-traditional transmission channels” are extremely expensive and difficult to operate, so their use by private individuals is unlikely. In cases where it is impossible to install devices for collecting information directly at the object, stethoscope microphones are used, which allow you to listen to conversations through a solid barrier (wall, glass, car body, etc.), and the harder and more uniform the barrier, the better they are are working. A stethoscope is a vibration sensor with an amplifier and headphones (or a device for automatically recording sound on magnetic tape). Using a stethoscope microphone, you can listen to conversations through a wall 1 m or more thick. The main advantage of such a system is the difficulty of its detection, because The stethoscope microphone can be installed in an adjacent room. Information retrieval devices are installed with or without the consent of the owner of the premises in specially prepared places with their subsequent camouflage, or are built into household items, interior decoration or free cavities of the premises. Control and listening of telephone communication channels Recently, one of the main methods of unauthorized access to private and commercial information has become wiretapping. To listen to telephone conversations, the following connection methods are used:
A telephone radio repeater can be connected either directly to a telephone set or on any part of the line from the subscriber’s telephone to the telephone exchange. Currently, there are telephone radio repeaters that allow you to listen to the room through the microphone of the handset. To do this, a signal from a high-frequency oscillation generator is supplied to one wire of the telephone line, and an amplitude detector with an amplifier is connected to the other. In this case, high-frequency vibrations pass through the microphone or elements of the telephone set that have a “microphone effect” and are modulated by the acoustic signals of the listening room. The modulated high-frequency signal is demodulated by an amplitude detector and, after amplification, is ready for listening or recording. The range of such a system is due to the attenuation of the RF signal in a two-wire system. the line does not exceed several tens of meters There are systems for listening to telephone conversations that do not require a direct electronic connection to the telephone line. These systems use an inductive method (using coils) for collecting information. They are quite cumbersome because they contain several stages for amplifying a weak low-frequency signal and a mandatory external power source. Therefore such systems have not found widespread practical application To receive information from telephone radio broadcasters, the same receivers are used as in acoustic devices for collecting information via a radio channel Currently, systems for intercepting fax and modem communications have appeared, which, when using a personal computer with special software, make it possible to decrypt information. However, such systems are very expensive and have not yet found widespread use in our country Ways in which telephone lines can be wiretapped Direct connection to telephone line Direct connection to a telephone line is the easiest and most reliable way to obtain information. In the simplest case, a telephone repairman's handset is used, connected to the line in the distribution box where the cables are laid out. Most often, this is the handwriting of “specialists” at the lower echelon of the criminal world (the upper echelon is equipped with equipment no worse than the state secret services). It must be remembered that the telephone exchange switches the line to conversation when it is shunted with a resistance of about 1 kOhm. The use of eavesdropping equipment with a low-impedance input impedance can be detected fairly quickly. If you hear clicks in the line or volume changes, there is a possibility that they are trying to listen to you in a less than professional manner. Bribery of PBX personnel Bribing service personnel at a PBX is a very common way of revealing your secrets. This is especially true for small cities where old decade-step automatic telephone exchanges are still used. Most likely, criminal groups or competing firms can use this method. Listening through an electromagnetic bell Telephone sets that use an electromagnetic bell as a ringing device are still widespread in our country. The bell has the property of duality, that is, if the electromagnetic bell is acted upon by sound waves, it will begin to produce an appropriately modulated current. Its amplitude is sufficient for further processing. Experiments have shown that the amplitude of the EMF induced in the line for some types of telephone sets can reach several millivolts. The body of the device is an additional resonating device Listening through the microphone of a telephone set This method is not synonymous with direct connection to the line. It's much more complicated. The microphone is part of the electronic circuit of the telephone: it is either connected to the line (through individual circuit elements) during a conversation, or disconnected from it when the telephone is ready to receive a call (the handset is on the device). At first glance, when the handset is on the device, there is no way to use the microphone as a source of information. But this is only at first glance. Fig. 1 A diagram of listening to a room using a method called high-frequency imposition is shown. The essence of this method is as follows. One of the wires of the telephone line, going from the telephone exchange to the TA-2 telephone set, is supplied with oscillations with a frequency of 150 kHz and higher from generator G. A detector made of elements C1, C2, VD1, VD2 and R1 is connected to the other wire of the line. The transmitter housing (generator G) and the receiver housing (detector) are connected to each other or to a common ground, for example, to a water pipe. High-frequency vibrations through the circuit elements of the TA-2 telephone set are transmitted to the microphone (even if the TA-2 handset is lowered) and are modulated by speech. The receiver detector selects speech information, which is amplified to the required level and processed. Due to the significant attenuation of the RF signal in a two-wire line, the range of information collection using this method does not exceed several hundred meters. To protect the telephone from reading information in this way, it is enough to connect a capacitor with a capacity of 0,01 - 0,05 μF in parallel with the microphone. In this case, the latter will shunt the microphone at a high frequency and the depth of modulation of HF oscillations will decrease by more than 10 times, which makes further demodulation of the signal almost impossible. Interception of computer information, unauthorized entry into databases The standard of architectural principles for constructing equipment and software determines the relatively easy access of a professional to information located in a personal computer (PC). Restricting access to a PC by entering codes does not provide complete protection of information. Turning on the computer and removing the system access code does not cause any particular difficulties - just disconnect the battery on the motherboard. Some motherboard models have a special switch for this. Also, each manufacturer of the BIOS program (AMI, AWARD, etc.) has codes that have priority over any user ones, by typing which you can gain access to the system. As a last resort, you can steal the computer system unit or remove the hard drive from it and gain access to the necessary information in a calm environment. It's another matter when you can't get into the room where the computer is installed. In this case, remote methods of collecting information are used. Naturally, they are only effective when the computer is turned on. There are two ways to read information remotely: The first method is based on receiving RF interference into the power network, and the second is based on receiving side electromagnetic radiation from PC connecting circuits. The spread of collateral electromagnetic radiation beyond the controlled territory creates the preconditions for information leakage, since it can be intercepted using special technical means of control. In a personal computer, the main sources of electromagnetic radiation are the monitor and connecting circuits (information input and output devices). Information leakage in a PC is facilitated by the use of short rectangular video pulses and high-frequency switching signals. Research shows that the radiation of a monitor's video signal is quite powerful, broadband and covers the range of meter and decimeter waves. The reason for the powerful radiation is the superposition of the radio signal on the image scanning pulses generated by the horizontal transformer. Despite the apparent complexity of the problem, the equipment for this type of commercial intelligence is quite simple and is made on the basis of an ordinary small-sized TV. Such devices allow you to receive a stable picture at a distance of 50 m - a copy of the image currently displayed on the monitor screen of your PC. To reduce the level of spurious electromagnetic radiation, special information protection means are used; room shielding, filtering of power supplies, additional grounding, electromagnetic grounding, as well as means of attenuating levels of unwanted electromagnetic radiation and interference using various resistive and absorbing matched loads. Lately, there has been more and more talk about unauthorized entry into databases. This type of piracy is developing very quickly due to the rapid development of computerization in information processing in commercial circles with the access of information networks to the public telephone network. Computer burglars, “hackers,” are not limited to issues of obtaining commercial information for free - there are enough cases of opening and transferring money accounts from one bank to another through a public information network. Hidden photo and video shooting using special optics One does not need to look back at the history of intelligence to conclude that visual observation is the oldest and most effective method of collecting information. Currently, miniature hidden and special (camouflaged as ordinary objects) photo and video cameras can be used to collect information:
Equipment for covert photo and video recording is usually equipped with special lenses and attachments:
The use of the JT-241s television camera is most effective in security systems, television surveillance systems, covert audio-video protocol systems, etc. The ultra-miniature pupil of the lens allows observation through a hole with a diameter of 0,3-1,2 mm at a field of view angle of 110°, and high sensitivity (0,04 lux) allows you to see in the dark better than the human eye. The small dimensions of the television camera (39x39x20 mm) allow it to be installed in any interior element: clock, book, picture, front door, wall, etc. The camera may be equipped with other lenses with a different field of view. The list of photography and video recording equipment could be extended, but the likelihood of its use by private individuals is very low due to the complexity of operation and high cost. 5.2. Reader detection In 1915, the Germans installed an electric barrier along the border between Belgium and Holland. Having quickly realized that it was very expensive to constantly pass current through a barrier of this length, they began to turn on the current from time to time. Many spies and prisoners who tried to pass through the barrier at random were electrocuted. Eventually, rubber clothing was made to protect against electric shock. The clothes were black, and therefore those who wore them were practically invisible after dark. There was only one inconvenience: several sets of such clothing were obtained by the German police, and subsequently anyone wearing such clothing found themselves in the vicinity of the fence, or who had similar clothing found during a search, was almost certainly shot. Subsequently, the Allies were forced to resort to industrial espionage to find out at what point the current was turned off. In our time, undoubtedly, in such a case special indicators would be used. It is well known from detective literature that a criminal always leaves traces. Likewise, any technical device makes some changes to the surrounding space. And if the task of reconnaissance is to make these changes as unnoticeable as possible, then the task of those who are engaged in the search for such equipment is to detect and neutralize technical devices and reconnaissance systems using subtle traces of changes in the physical parameters of space. The task of technical counterintelligence is complicated by the fact that, as a rule, it is not known what specific technical information control device is used. Therefore, work on the search and neutralization of technical means of surveillance gives an encouraging result only if it is carried out comprehensively, i.e. simultaneously examine all possible ways of information leakage. Let us give a fairly conditional classification of devices for searching technical means of reconnaissance: I. Devices for searching for active mud, i.e. studying the response to any influence:
II. Passive search devices:
For various reasons, not all of the listed technical means have found practical application. For example, X-ray equipment is very expensive and cumbersome and is used exclusively by special government organizations. The same, but to a lesser extent, applies to magnetic resonance locators. Thermal imagers, devices that can detect differences. temperatures measured in hundredths of a degree can record thermal power of the order of 1 μW. These relatively cheap devices, which include a computer, could become very effective and versatile from the point of view of searching for technical means of commercial reconnaissance, since any technical means during its operation releases heat into the surrounding space. Most likely, the appearance on the market of such devices is not a thing in the distant future. Let us dwell in more detail on devices that are relatively widely represented on the domestic market. First of all, these are passive search devices based on the study of electromagnetic radiation, receivers, scanners, sound level meters, infrared radiation detectors, spectrum analyzers, frequency meters, measuring panoramic receivers, selective microvoltmeters, etc. P. 5.2.1. Special radio detection equipment In order to check your apartment or office for the presence of any radio equipment installed unauthorized, or to make sure that your phone, computer, TV and other household appliances do not have side, and therefore unwanted, radiation channels in the radio frequency range, it is not at all necessary to contact specialists. This work can be done independently; it is enough to have a small device - a high-frequency radiation recorder, or a detector scanner. Such devices are widely represented in trade organizations and on radio markets, but their prices are quite high. The high-frequency radiation recorder is a scanning receiver-detector of signals from low-power transmitters with the implementation of an algorithm for recognizing and selecting signals from powerful radio and television broadcasting stations, as well as communication stations of various services. The scanner is designed to detect and localize the installation site of acoustic, telephone and television miniature transmitters of domestic and foreign production, checking objects suspected of having installed camouflaged microtransmitters. The presence of the ability to automatically recognize communication and broadcast stations allows you to maximize the relative sensitivity of the scanner, which, in turn, allows you to increase the reliability of detection of listening devices. Back (Methods and means of detecting caches) Forward (Cashes in cars)
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