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Part I. Philosophy of Science

Topic 1. Subject and methodology of the philosophy of science

The problem of correlation between the rational and the irrational in cognition. Every science has its own object and subject of study. There is a difference in these concepts: the object can be common to a number of sciences, the subject is specific. What is the object and subject of philosophy? How are they related? What is the place of philosophy in the system of sciences? And is philosophical knowledge reducible to scientific if philosophy finds it difficult to concretize its subject and claims to be universal? All these questions require detailed consideration.

As is known, the subject matter of the special sciences is the individual specific needs of society - in technology, economics, art, etc. - and each of them has its own object of existence. Scientific thinking, by thought G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), immersed in the final material and limited by the rational comprehension of the final. Philosophy is interested in the world as a whole, it is striving for a holistic comprehension of the universe. It is looking for the beginning and the root cause, while the private sciences are turned to phenomena that exist objectively, outside of man, independently of him. They formulate theories, laws and formulas, taking into account the personal, emotional attitude to the phenomena under study and the social consequences that this or that discovery may lead to.

A man who thinks, as he wrote Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), is able to formulate unity in the realm of experience. Kant distinguished two levels of this thought process: reason, which creates unity through experience, and reason, which creates unity of the rules of reason according to principles. In other words, the mind organizes not sensory material, not experience, but the mind itself. Thus reason seeks to reduce the diversity of the knowledge of the understanding to the smallest number of principles, or to achieve their highest unity. Reason, on the other hand, can only lead to the unity of cause, i.e. natural regularity. But the highest task of science is to penetrate into the very depths of nature, to the root causes, primary sources, first principles!

The main principle of unity is unity of purpose. Philosophy is a science that cognizes the goal for which everything develops and moves, and hence the good (moral criteria). Thus, philosophy is primarily a worldview. From this property of philosophy arises the problem associated with the ratio of the rational and the irrational in cognition, i.e. with the relationship between philosophy and science.

Science is rational, it is rationalization; theoretically conscious, universal knowledge of the subject in its epistemological aspect. But science is also an object, a phenomenon, an action, the existence of which is based on a law: shaping, rule, order, expediency. At the same time, there is also the phenomenon of the irrational, i.e. powerful, unknown impulse; some desire that has no reason yet; unconscious power. The highest step in the series of objectification of the will is man: a being endowed with rational knowledge. Every ignorant individual is conscious of himself by his will to live. All other individuals exist in his view as something dependent on his existence, which serves as the source of man's boundless egoism. Social organization, being only a system of balanced partial wills, does not destroy egoism: the overcoming of the egoistic impulse is carried out in the sphere of art and morality.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) defined the irrational as the will to live. According to Schopenhauer, the basis of morality is a sense of compassion, irrational. A person can experience both suffering and happiness, rooted in the very will to live.

The irrational is unknowable. Mysticism is an attempt to penetrate where neither knowledge, nor contemplation, nor the concept penetrates. But the mystic can communicate nothing but his own sensations. He has to take his word for it, he cannot convince anyone: this knowledge is, in principle, not communicated. Philosophy, on the other hand, must proceed from objective knowledge common to all, from the fact of self-consciousness. She, according to Schopenhauer, is between rationalism and irrationalism and must be communicated knowledge, i.e. rational. Philosophy uses concepts, categories to express general knowledge. Its main task is to build a unified picture of the world in which everything is interdependent. However, the irrational is objective! Blind faith in the cult of scientific and technical reason (positivism), in the logical and deductive means of comprehending the truth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. led to an underestimation of the irrational beginning. And this played a fatal role in the history of mankind: the bias towards the rational did not give the human race either happiness or peace.

It is generally accepted that the problem of the correlation between the rational and the irrational was born in the era of modern times and is associated with the name Rene Descartes (1596-1650). The main thesis of Descartes is reduced to the following: "I think, therefore I am"[1] . Hence the underestimation of the role of the irrational, and the exaggeration of the role of the reasonable. A kind of stereotype was also born: if it's irrational, then it's negative. But everything is not so simple. Reason often finds itself on the border of morality: you can take a piece of bread from a person in order to get enough of yourself and not die of hunger. The act is reasonable, but immoral.

What is the specificity of philosophical knowledge? In reflection! Reflection is understood as thinking and consciousness, turned on themselves, on the awareness of their own forms and premises. Philosophical reflection differs from the reflection of science. The latter is self-contained, often proceeding from the position of scientificity as the only guideline for human existence (this was especially characteristic of the XNUMXth - XNUMXth centuries).

Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) spoke about the insufficiency of a purely cognitive exploration of the world. The field of knowledge about the world is facts and their logical transformations. But there are aspects of the world that do not lend themselves to a cognitive type of statement. Here the world is comprehended holistically, a feeling of common participation in the world and life arises, the problems of God, happiness, the meaning of life, etc. become significant. Wittgenstein considered the goal of philosophical studies to be the achievement of clarity, which had for him the meaning of an ethical principle as a requirement of honesty and sincerity in thoughts and statements, an honest awareness of one's place and purpose in the world. According to Wittgenstein, all knowledge must be reduced to a set of elementary propositions, as in mathematics. On this principle, his doctrine of logical atomism is built, which is a projection of the structure of knowledge prescribed by the logical-structural model onto the structure of the world. Thus, philosophical reflection presupposes doubt, creative thought.

The problem of the methodology of philosophical knowledge. The method is a form of practical and theoretical development of reality, based on the laws of motion of the object under study. Methodology - the doctrine, or science, of the method (methods) and principles of cognition - consists of two parts: a) the doctrine of the basic foundations, principles of cognition (this part is directly related to philosophy, worldview) and b) the doctrine of the methods and methods of research ( here particular methods of cognition are considered, a general research methodology is developed). But there is a problem of the gap between philosophical and scientific methodology. So, for example, positivism believed that science is a philosophy in itself, and not only in the field of studying objective reality, but also in the field of self-awareness of its conditions and prerequisites. In other words, classical positivism of the XNUMXth century replaced philosophy with concrete scientific knowledge about the world. Logical positivism replaces the philosophical method with concrete scientific methods, philosophical reflection on science - with concrete scientific reflection. What does positivism deny? Firstly, objective reality as a subject of philosophical analysis, and secondly, scientific knowledge as a subject of philosophical research. Thus, we are talking about the complete elimination of the subject matter of philosophy in general.

Science as an object of philosophical research is studied by many branches of knowledge, but this does not negate the need for its philosophical consideration. Science is analyzed by philosophy, as it were, from two perspectives - methodological and worldview. The methodological analysis of science touches on such problems as the dialectics of the relationship between the object and subject of science; internal logic, continuity, patterns of development of science; correlation of empirical and theoretical levels, categories and laws, forms and methods of cognition (private, general, universal); scientific picture of the world, style of thinking; objectivity of knowledge (theory, scientific truth). The ideological analysis of science focuses on the problems associated with the factors of socio-cultural determination of science - material production, equipment, technology, scientific and technological progress; economic relations; socio-political, philosophical, moral-aesthetic, ideological factors.

Untenable are attempts to turn philosophy into a "special" science, a "science of sciences" that rises above all other knowledge. The basis of such views is the human desire for holistic knowledge. In the absence of developed scientific knowledge, this tendency is satisfied by the fabrication of missing connections and the speculative-speculative construction of a picture of the world. So, even G. W. F. Hegel wrote that any science is only applied logic. But to raise above the positive sciences also a special science of the universal connection of things is a useless thing. This would turn it into weights on the legs of science, would prevent science from moving forward.

Philosophy has its own main question - about the relation of consciousness to being, which determines its approach to the world and underlies the methods and logic of cognition that it develops. Philosophy should not oppose itself to scientific knowledge. It implements ideological attitudes along with all other sciences (natural and social).

Science as a subject of philosophical reflection. Science is a basic concept that does not have an exhaustive formal definition. So, on the one hand, science is understood as the development and systematization of objective knowledge. On the other hand, science is an institutionalized (social institution) reasonable principle (common sense). At the same time, science is a community within which a complete (without individual differences) and voluntary agreement based on beliefs of different people on a certain issue is possible. A quasi-science is the form that science takes in a hierarchically organized scientific community; a certain scientific theory that denies a similar world science. Such a contradiction is a characteristic diagnostic sign of the analysis of science. Quasi-science includes both scientific theories and the relationship between scientists, i.e. it is a tool that allows any group of scientists to hold or seize power in the scientific community. Finally, there is pseudoscience - a kind of doctrine that is in a state of mutual negation with a world science of a similar name (for example, Michurin biology, which opposed world science from 1948 to 1964). A quasi-science is a social, collective phenomenon that exists in the scientific community. Pseudoscience is an individual phenomenon, a mistake of an individual, caused by a low level of his education, intellect, mental illness. From a historical point of view, the concept of "science" has two meanings: firstly, this is what is understood by science in the modern methodology of science; and secondly, this is what was called science in different periods of human history.

Concepts of science have changed over time. Initially, this word meant knowledge in general or simply knowledge about something. For a long time, the concept of "science" was applied to a method of knowledge characterized by discursive thinking (rational, conceptual, logical, as opposed to sensual, contemplative). But astrology and alchemy are also characterized by discursive thinking, and therefore were considered sciences for many centuries. In the Middle Ages, theology was the "queen" of sciences, and in the era of Descartes and Leibniz, metaphysics was considered the "foundation" of science and the first of the sciences.

How to research science? If we take for science what scientists of different eras gave out for it, then we lose the subject of the history of science. So, Pierre Ramus in the sixteenth century. defined the subject of physics as the study first of all of the sky, then of meteorites, minerals, plants, animals and man. And even in the eighteenth century. physics remained still a unified science in which there was no clear division between the inorganic and organic areas. What criterion for delimiting epochs can be singled out in the history of science? The type of rationality can serve as such a criterion. We can consider the type of rationality by describing the various reflections of Aristotle, Plato, Bacon, Descartes, and so on. But most of these reflections are ideologemes (that is, false ideas about real science). So, if we follow this path, then our work will be reduced to a description of this kind of ideologemes. It is better to focus on the following aspect: how certain features of science, scientific activity and its results (truths) were rationally reflected within the framework of philosophical and metaphysical concepts. Then the type of rationality will mean a certain form and degree of correspondence of the philosophical and epistemological ideologeme to the real historical situation in science. For example, one can compare the ideal of constructing geometry, which Plato and Aristotle had in mind, with the realized practice of geometers - the "Principles" of Euclid. We can critically analyze those rational aspects that are embedded in the concepts of the past, and these concepts can be correlated not only with science, but also with culture as a whole, with the problems of the beginning (genesis) of a particular science, the prerequisites for its formation (myth, religion, magic, philosophy, etc.). Thus, if one investigates the genesis of arithmetic or geometry, then one cannot do without studying the pre-rational forms of these sciences - the practice of measuring land plots, counting on fingers, etc. The problem is to comprehend the historical types of rationality in science, and this is often expressed in terms of scientific or intellectual revolution. In this case, we are talking about a change in global assumptions and paradigms (T. Kuhn), "reform of the intellect" (A. Koire), a complete change in the "intellectual wardrobe" (S. Tulmin). How do these processes manifest themselves? As a rule, in the sudden victory of one of the competing theories, its rapid and unexpected acceptance by the scientific community and public opinion.

How does non-rational knowledge become rational? There are several points of view or approaches to this. Representatives of the first (O. Comte, G. Spencer, E. Taylor, J. Thompson and others) believed that philosophy and science arose from myth. According to the second approach (which was followed, in particular, by A.F. Losev), already at the first stage of development, science had nothing in common with mythology[2] . A third option is also possible: the myth served as a bifurcation point for the two historically first types of rationality - the formal logic of the Eleatics[3] and the dialectical logic of Heraclitus.

Thus, the focus of our attention is the problem of rationality. What caused such an interest in her? The fact is that the question of rationality is not only theoretical, but also vital and practical. Industrial civilization is a rational civilization, science plays a key role in it, stimulating the development of new technologies. The relevance of the problem of rationality is caused by the growing concern about the fate of modern civilization as a whole, not to mention the further prospects for the development of science and technology. Thus, the basis of interest in the problem of rationality is the crises generated by technotronic civilization.

Philosophy explores the historical forms of scientific knowledge, stating their fragmentation, while human knowledge needs unity. But on what basis is it possible? It is believed that the way of thinking for Europe is hermeneutics. It is she who must act as a "universal science" (scientia universalis) and take the place that once belonged to metaphysics. Hermeneutics (from the Greek hermeneuo - to interpret, interpret, interpret) - it is an art and a theory of interpretation. It aims to reveal the meaning of the text, based on its objective (the meaning of the words) and subjective (the intentions of the authors) grounds. Interest in the hermeneutic arises where there is misunderstanding, disagreement, misunderstanding. In the era of Hellenism, hermeneutics were called interpreters of messages, the meaning of which was closed to the uninitiated, whether it be Homer's poems or the sayings of oracles. In the Middle Ages, hermeneutics was revived due to the need to interpret the meaning of the word of God. The origins of its emergence as a special discipline - the doctrine of the methods of interpretation - can be traced back to the middle of the XNUMXth century, when "profane" hermeneutics appeared, which explores texts of various kinds. The merit of substantiating hermeneutics as a science belongs to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who defined it as the doctrine of "the interconnection of the rules of understanding", and it does not matter what kind of text it is - "sacred", "classical" or simply "authoritative". Schleermacher offered empathy for the subject of knowledge, taking into account the text and the psychology of the author. In his opinion, this allows a better understanding of the author, the conscious and unconscious side of his work. Thus, the understanding of the text is made dependent on the knowledge of the author, i.e. the philosopher, in essence, reduces the philosophy of science to grammatology and psychology, emasculating proper philosophy. Born a year before Schleiermacher's death Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) continued research in this area. His credo: we explain nature, but we understand spiritual life. Dilthey understood life as the interaction of personalities: the fullness of life is manifested in the experiences and empathy of personalities given to them from the very beginning.

Age of the century Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) in his book "Truth and Method" (M.: Progress, 1988) developed the concept of hermeneutics not only as a method of the humanities, but also as a kind of anthology, collecting "under the roof" of hermeneutics all significant landmarks: practice, life , art, word, dialogue, declaring hermeneutical experience the fundamental principle of all philosophy. Art, according to the philosopher, is an organon: having abandoned it, philosophy pays with its internal devastation. The essence of hermeneutics is revealed in the study of science in the system of culture, although it is problematic to derive it directly from culture.

Philosophy and science correlate as scientific and dialectical types of rationality. If dialectics - the art of argumentation - is used as a method of conceptualizing the principles of development, then the scientific type of rationality is based on the recognition of: a) the law of conservation; b) the principle of correspondence, which affirms continuity in knowledge; c) the principle of cyclicality, the rhythm of development processes; d) the principle of relativity and symmetry, identity, etc. As a type of rationality, dialectics is not reduced to the scientific type of rationality, it is not replaced by it. Dialectics, as a science of the laws of development, has heuristic resources that allow it to formulate the idea of ​​the sources and mechanisms of development, to model the principles of the movement of reality on the basis of its own laws and categories. Of course, the laws of dialectics can reveal their lack of content in physics, as the creator of classical electrodynamics and the theory of the electromagnetic field noted. James Maxwell (1831-1879). But the heuristic resources of dialectics are incommensurably higher than physics! Being the science of the laws of development, dialectics aims to create such heuristic resources that allow at the theoretical level to work out the idea, source and mechanism of development, to model the principles of movement of the "current", "becoming" reality with its diversity and non-formalizability. All laws and categories of dialectics are subject to this.

Particular sciences are turned to phenomena that exist objectively, i.e. outside of man, independently of man or of humanity. Science forms theories and formulas, taking into account the personal, emotional attitude of the scientist to the phenomena being studied and the social consequences that this or that discovery can lead to. The figure of a scientist, the structure of his thoughts and temperament, the nature of confessions and life preferences in the context of scientific research are of no particular importance. The law of gravity, quadratic equations, the Mendeleev system, the laws of thermodynamics are objective. Their action is real, it does not depend on the desires, moods and personality of the scientist. The philosopher's world of ideas is not just a static layer of reality, but a living dynamic whole, a variety of interactions in which cyclicity and spontaneity, orderliness and destruction, forces of good and evil, harmony and chaos are intertwined. The philosophizing mind must determine its attitude to the world. Therefore, the main question of philosophy is formulated as the question of the relation of thinking to being, of man to the world. Thus, dialectics is a kind of heuristic, a way to achieve new results.

Branches of science proceed from certain ideas that are accepted as something given that does not require justification. None of the narrow specialists in the process of direct research activity asks the question of how his discipline arose, what is its specificity and difference from other disciplines. If these problems are touched upon, the natural scientist enters the realm of the history and philosophy of science.

Features of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy is based on the theoretical-reflexive and spiritual-practical relation of the subject to the object. It has an active impact on social life through new ideals, norms and cultural values. Its main, historically developed sections are anthology, epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, anthropology, social philosophy, history of philosophy, philosophy of religion, methodology, philosophy of science, etc. The main trends in the development of philosophy are associated with understanding such problems as the world and place in man, the fate of modern civilization, the unity and diversity of cultures, the nature of human knowledge, being and language.

The specificity of the conceptual apparatus in the philosophy of science lies in the fact that philosophy seeks to find the ultimate foundations and regulators of any conscious attitude to reality. Therefore, philosophical knowledge does not take the form of a rationally ordered scheme, but a detailed discussion, a detailed formulation of all the difficulties of analysis, critical comparison and evaluation of possible solutions to the problem. Hence the well-known maxim: not only the achieved result is important for philosophy, but also the path leading to this result.

"Physics, be afraid of metaphysics!" - This statement is attributed to Isaac Newton. This is his original protest against the ambiguity of the definition of concepts in philosophy. Science implements a rather strict form of organization of the utterance. But philosophy every time is faced with building a variety of options for justification and refutation, guided by the saying: "Doubt everything."

For science, traditionally, cumulative forward movement, i.e. movement based on the accumulation of already obtained results (the scientist will not rediscover the multiplication table or the laws of classical mechanics!). It can be compared to a piggy bank in which, like coins, grains of true knowledge accumulate. Philosophy, on the other hand, cannot be content with borrowing results already obtained. One cannot, for example, be satisfied with the answer to the question about the meaning of life, proposed by a medieval thinker: each era solves this question in its own way.

The specificity of philosophy is manifested in the fact that it uses its own special method of reflection: the method of turning on itself, the shuttle movement, which involves a return to the original premises and enrichment with new content. Philosophy is characterized by a rethinking of the main problems throughout the history of mankind, and this is evidence of its reflexivity. Philosophy, as it were, distances itself from everyday life, moving into the world of intellectual, conceivable entities. As wrote Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), philosophy is something intermediate between theology and science; it is a "no man's land" between science and theology, but open to criticism from both sides. Insoluble questions from the point of view of theology and science turn out to be the subject of philosophy. The language of philosophy is something between the language of everyday life, equipped with categories, and the language of poetry.

Philosophy is not science! However, it claims to be present in every science - with its own concepts, objectivity, the idea of ​​causality, the laws of development, a set of concepts about regularities, etc. Its scientific nature is relegated to the background. That's not what it's about! It determines the value values, the social consequences of cause-and-effect relationships, determines the place of a person in the world.

Philosophy is a kind of intellectual activity that requires constant communication with the great minds of the past and present, has a national certainty, is enriched by world philosophical experience, and therefore, like any science, it is international, has a universal unity.

Topic 2. The emergence of science and the main stages of its historical evolution

2.1. Pre-science and science. The formation of the first forms of theoretical thought

The main problem of this topic is the problem of the genesis of rational thinking. No matter how rationality is interpreted, it is obvious that in the early stages of human history and in the future, it bore the deep stamp of mythological thinking. A natural question follows from this: what is the criterion of rationality? Perhaps the number of mythological elements, associations, images, etc., that this or that doctrine contains? No. What is important here is the very deep way of thinking, which is an indicator of the degree of rationality of a particular doctrine. In other words, we must proceed not from the content, but from the logical form (structure) of the historical text under study. In this regard, we are interested in the problem of the transition from myth to logos.

Greek mythos (myth) means speech, word, conversation, conversation, idea, plan. However, the myth and the word are not identical. The myth goes far beyond verbal expressions, narratives, plots. Myth, as it existed in the primitive community, is not a story to be told, but a reality to be lived; it is not an intellectual exercise or the imagination of an artistic fantasy, but a practical guide to primitive beliefs and behavior. It cannot be understood outside the context of the entire life of the primitive community.

Primitive thinking does not know abstraction. The myth, being the "keeper" of the collective experience of the tribal community, was the regulator of behavior. He was organically connected with the ritual, and they often performed together. Rituals and myths passed down from generation to generation were unquestioningly observed. In this sense, the faith of primitive man is not a religious faith, but trust through suggestion (suggestion). Hence the feeling of belonging of the individual to the collective of the community and the perception of oneself through "We", and hence the possibility of "belief in the word", delusions, absurdities. Collective power in myth and ritual was exercised over the individual in a symbolic-authoritarian form. This determined the important role of the ancestor - the totem. The function of the myth was to mobilize the forces of the collective for cohesion, on which the survival of the community, the clan depended. The myth was intended to subordinate the life of the individual to the interests of cohesion as much as possible. The words of the myth are identical to the forms of behavior: any change in words leads to chaos.

Primitive mythology has its own historical periods: 1) the totem period (in the center of mythological attention is the act of eating an animal); 2) the birth period (the motive of the productive act dominates: sowing, reaping, etc.). But in both the first and second cases, the worship of fetishes, totems and deities is not yet religious worship. Gods in the mythological consciousness perform other functions than in religion. Fetishes, totems, taboos are signs that regulate behavior ("shouts", "commands", etc.). Attitude towards deities in this period is not yet sacred. There are countless descriptions in myths of acts of tearing and devouring one's totem (the founder of the clan) or god (for example, the Greek Dionysus, the Papuan gods). The gods behave like humans, and the humans feel on par with the gods, showing little respect for them. A person can become a god, get his power, only by absorbing the totem, eating it. And God can become a man, and a dog, and a shark.

Claude Levi-Strauss (1908-2000) argued that the archaic myth has a cognitive function. Is it so? The fact is that the vital activity of primitive society is syncretic (undivided), integral. Primitive labor activity, everyday life, and the manufacture of labor tools are imbued with a mythological consciousness. The productive activity of primitive man has not yet isolated itself into an independent area and exists as a moment of an integral way of life; it is so routine and simple that it does not require reflection; it is not the subject of reflection, which is impossible due to the absence of abstract thinking. The instrumental activity of primitive man is not perceived by him as something special and is not separated from such actions as walking, running, swimming. Minor technical improvements in everyday life were carried out over the centuries so slowly that the public consciousness was not able to single them out, stop their attention on them. Of course, primitive man skillfully makes household items: baskets, fabrics, jewelry, amazing in subtlety and precision of execution. But this is nothing more than dexterity, skill, which was formed as a result of the exercise. On the whole, the individual of the primitive epoch does not separate himself from the genus, does not reflect upon himself. An example is research A. F. Losev (1893-1988) structures of the Koryak, Aleut and Chukchi languages. It turned out that here thinking has difficulty dissecting things; mythology is either absent or in its infancy.

But the primitive community also does not separate itself from the surrounding world, nature. Mythological consciousness does not know the doubling of "the world - man." J. J. Frazier (1854-1941) in the well-known work "The Golden Bough" says that primitive man does not know the causes of many phenomena, although in the course of a thousand-year history he achieved certain successes, for example, he made fire by rubbing a piece of wood against a piece of wood. Thus, the author describes how shocked the Christian missionary priests were by the arrogant arrogance of sorcerers, confident in their ability to influence nature, to force her to act as they need. Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) also speaks of the steady and constant denial of the phenomenon of death by myth, i.e. nature does not exist in the mythological consciousness as an external world opposed to man. Hence the question: how is knowledge possible in this case if its object is absent? Here it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of "thinking" and "cognition". Thinking is broader than knowledge. Primitive man thinks, and the result of his thinking is expressed in objective activity. But knowledge still exists in an implicit form. Cognition is the next stage in the development of thinking, which must necessarily create a moment of its verbalization, which means a critical attitude towards oneself (reflection). For primitive man, however, knowledge does not exist as something objective, i.e. regardless of its subjectivity. Ideas about knowledge are formed only in ancient culture. (Thus, Socrates said: "I know that I know nothing," but then he added: it is much sadder to realize the fact that "his judges do not even know this.")

English philosopher, one of the founders of postpositivism Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) introduced the category of implicit knowledge. According to the author, a person possesses both explicit knowledge, which expresses personal experience in words, and implicit knowledge, which is impersonal, holistic, not verbalizable by its nature. Implicit (peripheral) knowledge focuses not on the structure of the object, but on its function. This is uncritical knowledge. In this sense, myth does not know dialogue, which contains the demand for criticism of opposing points of view. Hence the conclusion: since a primitive man has no doubts about ignorance, it means that he knows everything, and this is tantamount to the fact that he knows nothing. Thinking becomes cognition when it begins to reflect on itself. The author proves that a formally trained mind, not attached to the living springs of "personal knowledge", is useless for science[4] .

Mythological thinking does not explain, but inspires. However, one can speak of cognition in relation to primitive society, but only in the sense that it appears in the form of a worldview. The very etymology of the word "know" in Russian and Greek goes back to sensory sensation (perception). One of the meanings of the word "know" in Russian is to experience some kind of feeling, to experience. And, for example, Homer has the expressions "think with the eyes", "think with the diaphragm", "think with the eyes". Consequently, the set of what a primitive person should know is reduced to prohibitions (not to marry within a clan, not to commit incest, not to kill a person belonging to his clan), i.e. the content of knowledge is that which is forbidden. During the period of domination of mythological thinking, the need for special scientific knowledge did not yet arise. But then another question arises: does myth have an ethnological function? Partly yes. So, for example, many thinkers of Antiquity often resorted to mythologems in order to explain social and natural phenomena. This happened when there was no rational interpretation of phenomena (recall the myth of Plato's cave).

But what is the relation of religion to knowledge? Hegel called mythological consciousness "immediate", "natural" religion. But it is very difficult to define the boundary between mythology and religion. Their cult is related, which in both cases is authoritarian and absolute. At the same time, there are many differences between them.

1. Myth is a universal, unique form of social consciousness at a certain stage. Religion, on the other hand, appears along with art, political consciousness, with the separation of mental labor into an independent specialized activity.

2. The bearer of mythological consciousness is society as a whole. Religion arises on the basis of the formation of special groups of clergymen (priests) who are professionally engaged in the production of religious ideology.

3. There are differences in the forms of regulation of behavior. A myth exists when individuals do not separate themselves from each other, and behavior is regulated directly through prohibitions. Religion exists in conditions of community differentiation, the emergence of private property. Behavior in this case is regulated indirectly through the impact on the spiritual world. Religion is already operating along with political and legal regulators. It grows into a special social institution.

4. Unlike myth, religion splits, doubles the world into the sacred (sacred) and worldly (profane) worlds. In religion it is no longer possible to communicate with God on an equal footing.

5. In religion, there is another doubling - the natural world and the supernatural (wonderful) world. Mythological consciousness knows no such distinction. Thus, the evangelists emphasize the ability of Christ to work miracles in order to distinguish him from those who are involved in the natural course of life and death; his actions are exceptions to the rule.

6. The function of God changes in religion. Mythological gods do not know morality; ethical assessments are inapplicable to them. The God of religions is anthropomorphic. At the same time, he is sacred, for he is the bearer of the highest ethical principles. Religious ethics elevates moral imperatives to the absolute, as it believes that relativism in morality inevitably leads to immoralism, self-destruction of mankind. So, for example, Moses measures his activity in accordance with the ten commandments, formulated as universal "categorical imperatives" and forming the basis of autonomous morality.

Hegel considered religion to be a form of knowledge, but this is a mistake. Religion in its genesis is not subordinated to the function of producing knowledge in an objective form; it does not have cognitive functions. Religion is the successor of mythology and does not produce knowledge in a systematic, let alone theoretical, form. (The weakest point of even the most representative religions - Christianity, Buddhism, Islam - is their understanding of nature and human thinking.) The natural, plant and animal world for early Christianity, for example, is not of independent interest, but serves as an allegory for describing human behavior and human morality. The functions of religion are predominantly regulatory, achieved on a psychological suggestive and sacral basis. As for science, it can be defined as the production of knowledge. But the problem is that rational knowledge, which is based on the opposition of the object and the subject, brings a lot of negative things into the world. Does science believe that only a person (human community, culture) brings meaning to the world? The consequence of this kind of approach is the deprivation of nature of its ontological significance. This, in particular, is expressed in the transformation of nature by technotronic civilization into a kind of "raw material". But how to solve the problem of rationalization and the various crises it generates, for example, the ecological one? The ecological crisis is not mainly a product of industrial civilization in its material form (in the form of machines, factories, factories, electric and nuclear power stations, etc.); it is a product of a special type of mentality characteristic of the New Age, which determines both our current attitude to nature and our understanding of it. The concept of the New Age boiled down to the fact that nature is an object used by man for his own purposes. Man is a transducer, a rapist. In this case, the "target cause" is withdrawn from nature. That is why the philosophical rethinking of the problem of rationality is so important.

2.2. The formation of experimental science in the new European culture

Universities, schools, the rational autonomy of scholasticism, gradually undermining the foundations of the Middle Ages, began to "fit" into the conditions of the industrial development of modern times. Universities gradually became "people's", anyone could go there to study. Corporations of students and masters arose without distinction of class. The oldest universities in Bologna (1158), Paris (1215), Oxford (1206) gradually got rid of the Roman papal bans on teaching natural science and philosophy. Oxford University, which has traditionally been a favorable environment for the development of the natural sciences, was at the forefront of the renewal process. The so-called quadrium was taught at the universities of that time, combining arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. During this period, the role of experiential knowledge was rethought. Works began to be published without mentioning God. The scientific heritage of Aristotle was restored in rights. The motto of the era was the words of Roger Bacon "Truth is the child of its time, and science is the daughter of not one or two, but of all mankind." The methods of scientific research have also changed: Aristotelian deduction has given way to induction. But the Inquisition still continued to fight for its principles. So, the scientific feat of R. Bacon, who was engaged in optics, astronomy, alchemy, anticipated many later discoveries, was "appreciated" by her at 15 years in prison, and the works of the scientist were burned.

A similar fate befell the Italian scientist, one of the founders of exact natural science, professor of mathematics at the University of Pisa Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). Galileo laid the foundations of modern mechanics: put forward the idea of ​​the relativity of motion, established the laws of inertia, free fall and the motion of bodies on an inclined plane, the addition of motions; discovered the isochronism of pendulum oscillations; the first to investigate the strength of beams; built a telescope with 32x magnification and discovered mountains on the Moon, four satellites of Jupiter, phases near Venus, spots on the Sun. He actively defended the heliocentric system of the world, for which he was put on trial by the Inquisition (1633), which forced him to renounce the teachings of N. Copernicus. Until the end of his life, Galileo was considered a "prisoner of the Inquisition" and was forced to live in his villa near Florence.

Another major feat in the development of science was accomplished by a contemporary of Galileo, an English statesman and philosopher, the founder of English materialism. Francis Bacon (1561-1626). In his treatise "New Organon" (1620), Bacon proclaimed the goal of science to increase the power of man over nature. He put forward the thesis "Knowledge is power" and created a program for generalizing the entire intellectual world, proposed a reform of the scientific method: clearing the mind of delusions, turning to experience and processing it through induction, the basis of which is experiment. The Baconian classification of sciences, which represented an alternative to the Aristotelian one, has long been recognized as fundamental by many European scientists and philosophers. In his work On the Dignity and Multiplication of the Sciences, based on a psychological criterion, Bacon divided the sciences into historical, poetic and philosophical. At the same time, Bacon recognized the right to the existence of a religious interpretation of truth. Errors in knowledge he called "idols of knowledge."

French mathematician, physicist and physiologist Rene Descartes (1596-1650) became the founder of rationalism in philosophy. In the treatise "The Rule for the Guidance of the Mind", he formulated the rules of scientific knowledge, which constituted the essence of Descartes' method of knowledge:

1) accept as true only that which does not give any reason for doubt;

2) decompose complex problems into simple components;

3) arrange simple elements in a strict sequence;

4) make complete lists and images of the available elements to be sure that there are no assumptions.

Descartes considered the beginning of knowledge to be intuition, the natural light of reason, evidence of cognitive ability; deduction seemed to him intuition in action. Descartes entered the history of the philosophy of science as a representative of dualism, recognizing the existence of two independent substances - extension and thought.

The emergence of new European science became possible thanks to the use of the experimental method and its combination with mathematical description. An outstanding role in this was played by G. Galileo, F. Bacon and R. Descartes.

The main achievement of the New Age in science was the formation of a scientific way of thinking, characterized by the combination of experiment as a method of studying nature with a mathematical method, and the formation of theoretical natural science. All this had a positive impact on the dynamics of the new European culture. During this period, the legal status of science was also significantly strengthened. In 1662, the Royal Society of Naturalists was established in London on the basis of the Royal Charter, and its charter was adopted. In the same year, the Academy of Sciences was created in Paris.

2.3. The formation of technical sciences and the formation of the philosophy of technology

The term "technology" (from the Greek. techne - art, craft, skill) combines two main aspects: 1) tools, tools created by man; 2) a set of skills, abilities, techniques, methods, operations, etc., necessary to activate the tools of labor (sometimes they are defined by the term "technology"). The philosophy of technology as a direction in the philosophy of science began to attract attention in Russia only at the end of the 150th century. This was due primarily to the devaluation of Marxist philosophy. Another reason for such a late interest in this area of ​​philosophical thought is related to the specifics of the development of technology. According to some estimates, until the end of the XNUMXth century, the gap between theoretical research and their implementation was at least XNUMX years, although the history of the development of technology testifies to the increasing speed of the technical development of the world. In this regard, the situation that developed in the twentieth century is indicative. During this period, discoveries followed like an avalanche: the flight of the first aircraft, the invention of a refrigerator, a tank, the discovery of penicillin, the creation of a radio telescope, the emergence of the first computer, the discovery of DNA, man's spacewalk, cloning, etc. - these are evidence of the effectiveness of human activity. And here are its costs: technology enslaves a person, destroys his spirituality, leads to the death of civilization. In order to avoid the negative consequences of the technical development of the world, technology and engineering activities need precise guidelines that take into account the scale and severity of the problems of interaction between the natural world and the artificial world.

Questions of instinctive and conscious in human activity were of interest to scientists long before the first experiments of the great Russian physiologist IP Pavlov. Thus, the ancient Greek philosopher Anaxagoras (500-428 BC) believed that man surpasses all other animals with the use of hands. The Arab historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), rejecting the idea of ​​the creation of man by God, considered nature as a great interconnected and developing whole, where the world of minerals leads close to the plant world, and this latter - to the animal kingdom. And all this is based on the principle of causality. A man, possessing reason and a hand, masters crafts in order to make tools, to protect himself. These arguments of the thinker formed the basis of the tool concept of human formation, which, following Ibn Khaldun, was developed by Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), Adam Smith (1723-1790) and others. This problem was studied in detail in the works Ludwig Noiret (1827-1897). In his works "The Origin of Language", "The Tool and Its Significance in the Historical Development of Mankind", he adhered to the conviction that only with the appearance of tools does true human history begin. Noiret associated this phenomenon with human thinking, highlighting two of its features. Firstly, tools serve the will of man, his intellect. They themselves are the creation of rational thinking. In other words, the human hand is an "organ of the brain", a tool of tools! The process of labor under the influence of tools most directly affects the functioning of the brain and its development, including the development of the entire human body: "The hand gives instructive lessons to the eye and mind." Secondly, and this follows from the previous judgment, the hand undergoes significant changes in the process of tool activity, due to which it becomes a powerful factor in the development of the mind due to its organic connection. But what about thinking? According to Noiret, thinking only later reaches what was already developed much earlier thanks to work that goes ahead of thinking, precedes thinking [5].

But the true founder of the philosophy of technology is the German philosopher Ernest Kapp (1808-1896). Not satisfied with the Hegelian philosophy, he begins to materialistically rework Hegel's heritage on the basis of the anthropological concept of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). Kapp was the first to take a bold step - in the title of his work, he combined together two previously seemingly incompatible concepts "philosophy" and "technique". At the center of his book "Basic Directions in the Philosophy of Technology" lies the principle of organ projection: a person in all his creations unconsciously reproduces his organs and himself knows himself, based on these artificial creations. Like Noir, Kapp focuses on the hand as a special organ ("the organ of all organs"). The "mechanical" continuation of the hands are the eyes, which Kapp calls semi-limbs, intermediaries between the external world of things and the inner world of nerves. Such an organic projection manifests itself in the fact that a person who creates in his own image and likeness turns the body into scales and standards for nature, in accordance with which he measures its various phenomena. Foot, finger, its joints, especially the thumb, hand and arm, span, the distance between the walking legs and between the outstretched ends of the arms, the width of the finger and hair - as a measure of length; a handful, a full mouth, a fist, a head, the thickness of an arm, leg, finger and hips - as a measure of capacity and volume; instant (blinking) - as a measure of time. All this was and remains everywhere among the young and the old, among the savage and cultured man, invariably used by natural measures. According to Kapp, organ projection can be clearly traced not only in primitive or simple hand tools, but also in very complex mechanisms and technical structures, such as, for example, steam engines, railways, etc.

Kapp's theory of organ projection was further developed in the studies of the French sociologist and philosopher Alfred Espinas, German philosopher Fred Bona, considering technology as a means of achieving human happiness. An important contribution to the development of the domestic philosophy of technology was made by a Russian mechanical engineer Petr Klimentievich Engelmeyer. His report at the IV International Congress on Philosophy in 1911 in Bologna was devoted to substantiating the right of the philosophy of technology to exist as a special important area of ​​science. Revealing the essence of technology, Engelmeyer writes: “Technology is the ability to expediently act on matter. Technology is the art of producing desirable phenomena. the real basis of the entire culture of mankind" (cited by: Al-Ani N. M. Philosophy of technology: textbook / N. M. Al-Ani. St. Petersburg, 2004).

Topic 3. The structure of scientific knowledge

3.1. Science classification

Classification (from Latin сlassis - category, class and facio - I do) is a system of subordinate concepts (classes, objects) in any field of knowledge or activity. Scientific classification captures regular relationships between classes of objects in order to determine the place of an object in the system, which indicates its properties (for example, biological systematics, classification of chemical elements, classification of sciences). A strictly and clearly carried out classification, as it were, sums up the results of the formation of a certain branch of knowledge and at the same time marks the beginning of a new stage in its development. Classification contributes to the movement of science from the stage of empirical accumulation of knowledge to the level of theoretical synthesis. In addition, it allows you to make reasonable predictions about yet unknown facts or patterns.

According to the degree of significance of the bases of division, natural and artificial classifications are distinguished. If essential features are taken as the basis, from which a maximum of derivatives follows, so that the classification can serve as a source of knowledge about the objects being classified, then such a classification is called natural (for example, the Periodic Table of Chemical Elements). If insignificant features are used for systematization, the classification is considered artificial (for example, alphabetical subject indexes, nominal catalogs in libraries). Classification is supplemented by typology, which is understood as a scientific method based on the division of systems of objects and their grouping using a generalized model or type. It is used for the purpose of a comparative study of essential features, relationships, functions, relationships, levels of organization of objects.

The classification of sciences involves the grouping and systematization of knowledge based on the similarity of certain features. So, for example, Francis Bacon based his classification on the features of the human soul, such as memory, imagination and reason. He attributed history to the category of memory, poetry to imagination, philosophy to reason. Rene Descartes used the metaphor of a tree to classify. The "rhizome" of this tree forms metaphysics (the root cause!), the "trunk" symbolizes physics, and the "crown" includes medicine, mechanics and ethics.

The author of the book "Russian History from Ancient Times to the Present Day" created his own classification. V. N. Tatishchev (1686-1750), who under Peter I was in charge of education. In the sciences, Tatishchev singled out ethnography, history and geography. He considered the main thing in the classification of sciences to be self-knowledge and the principle of utility, according to which sciences can be "necessary", "dandy", "curious" and "harmful". To the "necessary" sciences, Tatishchev attributed logic, physics, and chemistry. Art he attributed to the category of "dandy" sciences; astronomy, palmistry, physiognomy - to "curious" sciences; divination and witchcraft - to "harmful".

French philosopher, one of the founders of positivism and sociology Auguste Comte (1798-1857) based the classification of sciences on the law on the three stages of the intellectual evolution of mankind. He built his classification according to the degree of decrease in abstractness and increase in the complexity of the sciences: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology (social physics). As a classifying feature, he identified the actual natural connections that exist between objects. According to Comte, there are sciences related, on the one hand, to the external world, and, on the other hand, to man. Thus, the philosophy of nature should be divided into two branches - inorganic and organic; natural philosophy covers three branches of knowledge - astronomy, chemistry, biology. Comte considered it possible to continue structuring, extending his principle of systematization of sciences to mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and sociology. He substantiated the allocation of the latter to a special group by its development on its own methodological basis, which cannot be extended to other sciences.

German cultural historian and philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) in the book "Introduction to the sciences of the spirit" proposed to separate the sciences of the spirit from the sciences of nature, external to man. He considered the subject of the sciences of the spirit to be the analysis of human relations, inner experiences, colored by emotions, about which nature is "silent". According to Dilthey, such an orientation can establish a connection between the concepts of "life", "expression", "understanding", which do not exist in science, although they are objectified in the institutions of the state, church, and jurisprudence.

According to another German philosopher, Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), the opposition between the sciences of nature and the sciences of culture reflects the opposition of interests that divide scientists into two camps. In his classification, natural science is aimed at revealing general laws, history deals with unique individual phenomena, natural science is free from values, while culture reigns in them.

Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) considered the forms of motion of matter in nature to be the main criterion for the classification of sciences.

The experience of classifying the sciences of the academician is curious V. I. Vernadsky (1863-1945). At the center of his natural-science and philosophical interests was the development of a holistic doctrine of the biosphere - living matter that organizes the earth's shell - and the evolution of the biosphere into the noosphere. Therefore, he based his classification on the nature of the sciences. Depending on the nature of the objects being studied, he singled out two types of sciences: 1) sciences covering the whole of reality - the planet, the biosphere, space; 2) sciences related to the globe. In this system of knowledge, he gave a special place to logic: it covers all areas of science - both the humanities and the natural-mathematical ones.

Soviet philosopher, chemist, historian of science, academician B. M. Kedrov (1903-1985), proposed a four-tier classification, including: a) philosophical sciences (dialectics, logic); b) mathematical sciences (mathematics, logic, cybernetics); c) natural and technical sciences (mechanics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, geography, biochemistry, biology, physiology, anthropology); d) social sciences (history, archeology, ethnography, economic geography, statistics, etc.).

Regarding the classification of sciences, the discussion continues today, while the principle of further splitting them according to grounds, applied role, etc. is dominant. It is generally accepted that the most fruitful method of classification is that which is based on the differences in the six basic forms of matter: subatomic physical, chemical, molecular physical, geological, biological and social.

The classification of sciences is of great importance for the organization of research, teaching, teaching and library activities.

3.2. The structure of empirical and theoretical knowledge

Problem of Methods of Scientific Cognition. Scientific progress is not conceivable outside the cognitive development of objects of increasing complexity (small systems, large systems, self-developing, self-learning, etc. types of systems). The cognitive process is associated with methods of cognition. In this case, we are interested in a complex of issues related to changes in the methods of scientific knowledge. This problem has two aspects: 1) improvement of already existing methods in order to adapt them to new objects; 2) construction of fundamentally new methods of cognition. The historical trend in this regard is that philosophical and methodological reflection on the methods used in science has always lagged behind (lag behind) the scientific practice of using methods. On this occasion, the English physicist and public figure J. D. Bernal (1901-1971) wrote: "The study of the scientific method is slower than the development of science itself. The doctrine first finds something, and then reflects on the methods." At present, the same trend is taking place: discussions continue about the problems of modeling, the role of experiment in the study of the microworld, the essence of a systematic approach, etc. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, metaphysical ideas about the epistemological status of the scientific method (its supra-historical, timeless nature), thoughts about the independence of the method from the socio-cultural conditions of scientific knowledge and especially the phenomena under study still dominate. Secondly, the development of problems of scientific methods does not include a wide range of representatives of the scientific community. Meanwhile, there are many research tasks that require collective efforts (dialectics of absolute and relative truth, the problem of objective method; substantiation of new methods; criteria of the scientific method; the relationship between scientific criteria and the criterion of the truth of knowledge, etc.).

In philosophy, the method is considered as a way of building and substantiating a system of knowledge, as a way (the right way) of cognition. But such an interpretation is more suitable for metaphors than for scientific definitions. The words "means", "method", "reception", explaining the concept of a method, also do little to clarify its essence, since they identify the method with an independent component of cognitive activity (means). The most preliminary is the group of definitions that define the method as normative knowledge - a set of rules, norms, principles that regulate the cognitive action (operations, procedures) of the subject.

The structure of the method contains three independent components (aspects): 1) conceptual component - ideas about one of the possible forms of the object under study; 2) operational component - prescriptions, norms, rules, principles that regulate the cognitive activity of the subject; 3) a logical component - the rules for fixing the results of the interaction of an object and means of cognition.

The method is influenced by several factors: a) historical types of rationality, reflecting the peculiarities of subject-object relations in practice and cognition; b) creativity, sharpness of observation (perception), power of imagination, development of intuition; c) the foundations of scientific research (this includes the scientific picture of the world, the ideals and norms of scientific activity, the philosophical foundations of science); d) specific scientific knowledge, reflecting the degree of scientificity of the object under study; e) subjective factors associated with the so-called problem of understanding, with personal knowledge.

Features of the Empirical Method of Cognition. This method of cognition is a specialized form of practice closely related to experiment (from Latin experimentum - test, experience). The emergence of the experiment had an impact on the development of scientific and theoretical thinking, which is a type of communication carried out through the logical and mathematical apparatus. Thanks to this, an important form of scientific and theoretical thinking in modern times (XVII - XIX centuries) became a thought experiment, which was reflected in the works of G. Galileo, M. Faraday (1791-1867), J. Maxwell (1831-1879), L. Boltzmann (1844-1906), A. Einstein (1879-1955), N. Bohr (1885-1962), W. Heisenberg (1901-1976) and others.

An experiment is a test of the phenomena under study under constructed and controlled conditions. The experimenter seeks to isolate the phenomenon under study in its pure form, so that there are as few obstacles as possible in obtaining the desired information. The setting up of an experiment is preceded by appropriate preparatory work: if necessary, its program is developed; special instruments and measuring equipment are manufactured; the theory is refined, which acts as a necessary tool for the experiment. Such an experiment is most often carried out by a group of experimenters who act in concert, measuring their efforts and abilities. A scientifically sound experiment assumes the presence of:

- the experimenter himself or a group of experimenters;

- laboratories (objective world of the experimenter, set by its spatial and temporal boundaries);

- objects under study placed in the laboratory (physical bodies, chemical solutions, plants and living organisms, people);

- devices, objects that are directly influenced by the phenomena being studied and designed to fix their specificity;

- auxiliary technical devices designed to enhance the sensual irrational capabilities of a person and contribute to their activation (computers, micro- and telescopes, various amplifiers).

However, an experiment is not an isolated event, but an integral part of exploratory research programs; it contributes to the future of the scientific program by charting new paths of research and closing dead ends. One experiment does not lead to a theory. It must be repeated, varied in order to identify possible subjective errors in the organization of the experiment or shortcomings in the equipment (instruments, tools). It is also extremely important to take into account the results of other experiments that reveal other points, for example, physical processes.

So, one of the features of classical physics was that it had an anthropomorphic character in the structure of the organization (M. Planck). The division of physical knowledge into areas was determined by the characteristics of the human senses (the system of "devices" obtained by him in the process of biological evolution). As for modern physics, it is generally accepted that it arose with the development of such fundamental theories as the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. At the same time, the development of experimental knowledge had a huge impact on its formation. So, in 1895, V. K. Roentgen (1845-1923) discovered a new type of rays; in 1896, A. A. Becquerel (1852-1908) discovered the phenomenon of radio electronics, and a year later, J. J. Thomson (1856-1940) experimentally recorded the first electron particle. These discoveries led to two consequences: firstly, it was necessary to create new complex equipment, and secondly, to divide special research activities into theoretical and experimental.

But the experiment was not formed in a theoretical vacuum: in isolation from theory, it turns into a kind of activity consecrated by magic with instruments (like medieval alchemy). However, theory without experiment is just a formalized game of symbols and categories. A dialogue between experiment and theory is needed, and for this, firstly, theory and experiment must be relatively independent and, secondly, they must have effective contact, felt with the help of intermediary models.

Methods of Theoretical Knowledge. Theory (from the Greek theoria - consideration, research) in a broad sense means a type of activity aimed at obtaining reasonable, objectively true knowledge about natural and social reality for the purpose of its spiritual and practical development. In a narrow sense, theory is a form of organization of developing scientific knowledge. "Theory is nets: only the one who casts them catches" (Novalis). Theory performs very important functions in science: informative, systematizing, explanatory, prognostic. To reveal the essence of the theory, binary oppositions are used: "theory - practice", "theory - empirical", "theory - experiment", "theory - opinion", etc. Theoretical knowledge is endowed with the properties of universality and necessity, orderliness, system integrity, accuracy, etc.

Traditionally, there was nothing more practical than a good theory. The practice of theorizing was born in ancient Greece. The thinkers of that era were unanimous in that the key to the knowledge of reality is theoretical thought (episteme) as opposed to opinion (doxa). The initial philosophical premise of all further natural-science theories is the doctrine of cosmic harmony. Aristotle's ideas about the inherent value of theoretical sciences develop into ethical prescriptions, into an ideal. Later, the mechanics of Galileo - Newton becomes a model (paradigm) for experimental and mathematical natural science of the XNUMXth-XNUMXth centuries.

The theorist cannot address nature directly. He creates his inner image of the world from impressions, details of someone else's experiment, writes them down in the language of logic and mathematics. This is thought experimentation. Its product is an ideal model, a fragment of reality.

The theory is subject to historical dynamics. For example, in mathematical research up to the twentieth century. the so-called "standard" approach prevailed, according to which theory and its relationship with experience were chosen as the initial unit of analysis (cells). Later it turned out that empirical research is intricately intertwined with the development of theory, and it is impossible to imagine the verification of the theory by facts without taking into account the previous influence of theory on the formation of the facts of science. In other words, the empirical and theoretical levels of knowledge differ in subjects, means and methods of research. In a real study, these two levels always interact.

Thought experiment as a method of theoretical knowledge associated with the development of logical technology (symbols and the technique of recording calculations). Signs and symbols are an essential part of the methods of comprehension of reality (physical, chemical, etc.). The main function of signs is that they are built: at a certain stage of development, the sign models composed of them become independent and independent of the word and act as a form of the birth and existence of thought, as a means of its flow, a means of a thought experiment. Thus, a thought experiment integrates two levels of reflection of reality: sensory-objective and conceptual-sign.

System (structural-functional) method - another method of theoretical knowledge. A system is an integral object, consisting of elements that are in mutual relations. The relations between the elements of the system form its structure, so sometimes in the literature the concept of a system is equated with the concept of structure. Traditions of system research developed in the second half of the 1820th century. Etiologically, the concept of a system means a composite whole, an assembly. The concept of a system, which implies consideration of an object from the point of view of the whole, includes the idea of ​​a certain association of some elements and the relationship between these elements. The theory of the system is revealed through the concepts of "integrity", "element", "structure", "connections", etc. The concept of system research was used in the works of G. Spencer (1903-1858), E. Durkheim (1917-1908), K. Levi-Strauss (2000-1926), M. Foucault (1984-1901), J. Lacan (1981- 1910), R. K. Merton (2001-1902), T. Parsons (1979-XNUMX) and others.

The central place in the logic of systemic thinking is occupied by the categories of part and whole, the principle of splitting the whole into parts (analysis) and the synthesis of parts into integrity. Analysis - splits, synthesis - integrates, but this is still not enough to reveal the essence of cognizable phenomena. Modern scientific thinking is forced to separately describe and study some of the fundamental aspects of material movement: stability and variability, structure and change, being and becoming, functioning and development. It is here that the main logical and mathematical difficulties and collisions of the cognitive process are concentrated. The basic concepts in this case are "system", "functions", "structure", "autonomy", etc.

A set of components become a system if their interconnection is expressed in the emergence of such properties that are not inherent in each individual element, and functions that cannot be performed by each of the elements separately. Components can be subject connections, relationships, states, levels of development, etc. (initial units forming the system). The more differentiating nature of the relationship between the elements, the more organic the system (nonlinear). The different nature and different degree of connection of elements are expressed by the concept of "density". Thus, we are talking about a system-component approach. This approach should develop into a system-structural approach, and the latter - into a structural-functional one, i.e. the system at the theoretical level should be considered as a set of relations of functioning and development. In this regard, there are two extremely abstract models: the superdative set (the whole completely determines the properties of the parts) and the summative set (the components have their own essence and do not perform the general functions of the system). However, in reality there is neither ultimate elementarity nor ultimate integrity.

The structure of development is a set of laws of change in related states. In any object, self-development and real development (evolution) are distinguished. Not a single system develops in isolation, not only due to the exchange of information with the surrounding energy (which is carried out through components), but also due to the influence of systems on each other. The basis of the development process, i.e. self-development of systems (the logical system of reality), explores the structural-genetic analysis. Here the researcher is distracted from external influences and shows the direct mechanism of the development of the system, the source of which is its internal contradictions.

It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of absolute and relative development (self-development). One can speak about the absoluteness of development in relation to large systems, since they have nothing external. They talk about the relativity of development in relation to really existing systems, because in relation to them there are other external systems.

The following stages of system development are distinguished.

1. The prehistory of a new integrity: there is an accumulation of "building material for the emergence of another quality ("Things are not yet when it begins", G. W. F. Hegel).

2. Stage of formation (start of a new object, organ, system). System components are brought into line with the new structure; those components that cannot be transformed and subordinated to the new die off and are eliminated; system functions are coordinated.

3. The system functions on its own basis: the functions of the components and structure are coordinated; system capabilities are maximized.

It should be taken into account that system-structural and system-genetic methods are abstract in nature. They are abstracted from the directly "material" characteristics of being, reproduce them through relations and functions. So, energy is considered as a carrier of information, and the material substrate - as its code. However, the problem of distraction from the substrate remains. For example, when adding speeds, we abstract from the differences between a bird, an airplane, a person, a car. Hence the opinion arises that science does not deal with substrates at all. In particular, structuralism puts forward the idea of ​​anti-substantialism: the Universe does not consist of objects or even "matter", but only of functions; objects are points of intersection of functions.

System-structural methodology is a phenomenon of time. She is necessary. However, the focus only on the functional reproduction of reality, without taking into account the inherent value of its components, the specifics of human perception and human measure, leads to the absolutization of the role of science, scientism. The denial of man is always preceded by the denial of things. So, for example, from a functional point of view, life can originate both on a protein, and on a silicon or other other basis. However, we know only terrestrial biological life - our water-carbon version of life. Or another example: a silicon-based electronic-mechanical robot will act like a human. Should it be considered as such? At the same time, if the employee performs his function regularly, makes a profit, then the employer may not be interested in his thoughts, feelings, his “spiritual substratum” at all: “What is that soldier, what is that” (B. Brecht).

3.3. Methodology in the structure of scientific knowledge

Methodology as the doctrine of the method of constructing human activity is traditionally important in the philosophy of science. It is limited by a certain range of requirements, principles, attitudes, standards that have developed in the experience of mankind. There is an interdependence between methodology and knowledge. Thus, methodology can be understood as a set of means of organization (principles, approaches, methods, methods, techniques) of cognitive and subject-practical activities.

The dynamics of cognitive processes has a significant impact on the improvement of not only the methods of cognition, but also philosophy, which, in turn, performs a methodological function in relation to individual sciences. It prescribes the norms and rules of research for scientific disciplines, and with the clarification of the nature of problems and paradoxes that require processing of the cognitive apparatus of individual sciences, clarification of the conditions of cognition, it creates a "methodological tension" that is resolved taking into account everyday life. This situation indicates the incompleteness of the methodology, the need for its constant correlation "after" time, the changing life orientations of people.

The methodology of science combines a set of forms for collecting and processing scientific information subject to empirical, theoretical, metatheoretical processing, including description, generalization, classification, explanation, prediction, understanding, idealization, proof, interpretation, etc. In addition to this, it is possible to use particular scientific methods of cognition, applicable to certain branches of scientific knowledge.

The classification of methods of sciences according to the nature of the resulting product (knowledge) provides for three main classes:

1) methods of empirical knowledge: experiment, description, abstraction, induction, extrapolation, etc.;

2) methods of theoretical knowledge: idealization, thought experiment, mathematical modeling, logical organization of knowledge, proof, interpretation, etc.;

3) methods of metatheoretical knowledge: analysis of the foundations of scientific theories, philosophical interpretation of the content and methods of science, assessment of the social and practical significance of the content of scientific theories, etc.

Among the various concepts of the philosophy of science, there are "leaders" and "outsiders" (VA Kanke). Thus, analytical philosophy is considered more established than, for example, postmodern philosophy. Recognition of the consistency of philosophical teachings is one of the modern problems of methodology. "A theory is inconsistent if it includes both the statement A and its negation of non-A. If contradictions appear in the theory, then they tend to get rid of them. In this regard, new axioms are chosen. The axiomatic system of the theory is complete if all of its propositions are derivable (the axioms themselves do not need to be deduced). If, however, propositions not derivable from its apparatus are found in the composition of the theory, then it is necessary to decide on it "[6] . And further: "The practice of scientific research shows that one should not rush to send the theory to the "waste". They retain their "capacity for work" with the partial dependence of the axioms on each other ... if they do not destroy the theoretical system "[7] .

Topic 4. The dynamics of science and the process of generating new knowledge

4.1. Sociocultural factors in the development of science

Variability is a universal property of all material and spiritual formations. Development as a consequence of the variability inherent in all phenomena is due to factors of the internal and external environment. In the ordinary sense, development is associated with the concept of progress. Science as a special systematized branch of knowledge is subject to this regularity. Changes come when the intellectual environment allows the "survival" of those populations that are most adapted to it. The most important changes involve the replacement of the matrices of understanding themselves, or the most fundamental theoretical standards.

The laws of science tend to adequately reflect the laws of nature. However, as they considered Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) and Nikolai Copernicus (1473-1543), the laws of science should be understood only as hypotheses. In the work "Knowledge and delusion", the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916) sought to prove that consciousness is subject to the principle of economy of thought, and science arises due to the adaptation of an idea to a certain field of experience. Any cognition is a psychological experience that is biologically useful for us. According to the scientist, the disagreement between thoughts and facts, or the disagreement between thoughts, is the source of the problem. Mach saw a way out of this difficulty in the application of a hypothesis that prompts new observations that can confirm or refute it. Thus the meaning of a hypothesis lies in the extension of experience: a hypothesis is a "perfection of instinctive thinking."

The development of science is due to two groups of factors. The first group is intrascientific intellectual factors that determine the emergence of theoretical innovations. The second group consists of non-scientific factors (social, economic) that determine the consolidation or repulsion of one or another conceptual variant.

It often turns out that the leading role in the development of science belongs to the scientific elite, which is the bearer of scientific rationality. The changing nature of science is embodied in the changing conditions of the activities of scientists, which is why the role of leaders and authorities in the scientific community is so important. Successive generations of scientists embody the historical change in the procedures of scientific explanation. The content of science, therefore, appears as the transfer of a set of intellectual ideas to the next generation in the learning process. The development of many areas of science is associated with the activities of scientific schools. In particular, the formation of philosophy was carried out within the framework of specific, distinctive philosophical schools that arose during Antiquity. Often schools were designated by the name of an outstanding scientist - the founder of the school (for example, the Rutherford school, the Bohr school, the Sechenov school, etc.). Scientific schools at all times performed the function of transmitting knowledge.

Among the socio-cultural factors in the development of science, the presence of the scientific potential of society plays an important role - its real opportunities, resources determined by sovereignty for scientific discoveries (which are usually taken into account by the economics of science). At the same time, quantitative indicators of scientific potential should be considered in unity with its qualitative indicators.

The problem of scientific potential arises as a result of self-knowledge of science, its awareness of its social significance, the prerequisites and possibilities for its development, which, in turn, is associated with the development of society itself. This latter, being interested in the practical application of science, is also interested in the fact that science has the potential for its further development and application in social practice. The dialectic of the relationship between society and science is such that the realization of scientific potential leads to an increase in the level of economic development, culture and measure of the possibilities of this society in the knowledge of the laws of nature, the development of society and man.

4.2. Formation of theoretical knowledge and their justification

The formation of theoretical knowledge in the philosophy of science is one of the important aspects of its development. Obviously, science cannot exist without the correlative existence of factual and theoretical knowledge, individual and general, perceptual and cognitive (mutual accompaniment of feelings and thoughts), individual and universal statements. The correlation of these concepts is manifested at the event-everyday, perceptual-cognitive, logical-linguistic levels.

Classification plays a significant role in the formation of scientific knowledge: it facilitates the transition of science from the stage of empirical accumulation of knowledge to the level of theoretical synthesis. Based on scientific foundations, the classification is not only a detailed picture of the state of science, but also its fragments; allows you to make reasonable forecasts regarding still unknown facts and patterns.

The foundations of science include fundamental principles, conceptual apparatus, ideals and standards of scientific research. The maturity of a particular science can be judged by its correspondence to the scientific picture of the world. According to the modern classification, sciences are divided, on the one hand, into natural, technical and social, on the other hand, they distinguish between fundamental and applied, theoretical and experimental sciences. When people talk about "big science", about "the science of the cutting edge", they emphasize its hypothetical nature. Modern science is developing taking into account deep specialization, as well as at the junctions of interdisciplinary areas, which indicates its integration. Common to all sciences are their integrating properties: a) ideals and norms of cognition, characteristic of a given era and concretized in relation to the specifics of the area under study; b) scientific picture of the world; c) philosophical foundations. Thus, integrating properties imply the functioning and development of science as a whole, as well as its various branches, on common axiological (value) and methodological principles.

Primary Theoretical Models And Laws. In the process of cognition, the formation of primary theoretical models and laws has a certain significance. The concept of "model" (from Latin modulus - measure, sample) means the norm, sample (standard, standard). In the logic and methodology of science, a model is understood as an analog, structure, sign system, which serves to determine the social and natural reality generated by human culture - the original, expanding knowledge about the original, constructing the original, transforming it. From a logical point of view, such distribution is based on the relations of isomorphism and homomorphism that exist between the model and the fact that with its help an isomorphic or homomorphic image of an object is modeled. These relations are relations of equality. The model can acquire the status of a law - a necessary, essential, stable, recurring relationship between phenomena. The law expresses the connection between objects, the constituent elements of a given object, between the properties of things, and also between the properties within a thing. There are laws of functioning, laws of development. They are objective in nature, they are characterized by statistical, dynamic patterns. The action of laws is determined by the conditions of functioning: in nature they act spontaneously, in social practice, the regulating influence of a person is possible.

Analogy. In theoretical studies, analogy plays a certain role (from the Greek analogia - correspondence, similarity). When considering an object (model), its properties are transferred to another, less studied or less accessible object. The conclusions drawn by analogy are, as a rule, only plausible; they are one of the sources of scientific hypotheses, inductive reasoning and play an important role in scientific discoveries. The term "analogy" is also considered in the meaning of "analogy of being", "analogy of being" (lat. analogia entis). In Catholicism, this is one of the principles of scholasticism, substantiating the possibility of knowing God from the being of the world he created. Analogy played a great role in the metaphysics of Aristotle, who interpreted it as a form of government of a single principle in single bodies. The meaning of the analogy can be understood by referring to the reasoning of the medieval thinkers Augustine the Blessed and Thomas Aquinas. Augustine wrote about the similarity of the Creator and his creation, and Thomas Aquinas considered "analogues of beings" that testify to the unequal and ambiguous distribution of perfection in the universe.

Modern researchers distinguish the following types of analogies: 1) the analogy of inequalities, when different objects have the same name (celestial body and earthly body); 2) analogy of proportionality (physical health - mental health); 3) analogy of attribution, when the same relationships or qualities are assigned to different objects (healthy lifestyle, healthy body, healthy society, etc.).

According to researchers, the analogy between the motion of an abandoned body and the motion of celestial bodies played an important role in the formation of classical mechanics. The analogy between geometric and algebraic objects was realized by Descartes in analytic geometry. The analogy of selective work in pastoralism was used by Darwin in his theory of natural selection. The analogy between light, electrical and magnetic phenomena proved to be fruitful for Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field[8] . Analogies are used in modern urban planning, architecture, pharmacology, medicine, logic, linguistics, etc.

Thus, reasoning by analogy allows us to liken a new single phenomenon to another, already known phenomenon. With a certain degree of probability, analogy allows you to expand knowledge by including new subject areas in their scope. Hegel called analogy the "instinct of reason".

Often, the inventor (writer) of the concept, the terms arise by intuition, by chance. To confirm the correctness or incorrectness of the proposed concepts, you can use the concept of the logician and the historian of knowledge Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997). Here is the essence of his concept.

1. Theoretical terms either perform or do not perform their function.

2. If theoretical terms do not fulfill their functions, then they are not needed.

3. If theoretical terms perform their functions, then they establish connections between observed phenomena.

4. These connections can be established without theoretical terms.

5. If empirical connections can be established even without theoretical terms, then theoretical terms are not needed.

6. Consequently, theoretical terms are not needed both when they perform their functions and when they do not perform these functions.

In 1970, Hempel, using modern logical and mathematical means of research, first showed the incorrectness of Popper's definition of credibility. Against skepticism Karl Popper (1902-1994), expressed in his maxim "We do not know - we can only guess", irrefutable counterarguments were found. A hypothesis - a specific form of comprehension of objective truth - becomes a reliable theory when such conclusions are drawn from its main assumption that allow practical verification. Are the negative results of individual experiments the final "verdict" on this hypothesis? Hempel believed that no, because:

a) an erroneous interpretation of these experiments is possible;

b) it is possible to confirm other effects predicted by this hypothesis; c) the hypothesis itself allows its further development and improvement.

Relationship between the Logic of Discovery and the Logic of Justification. In form, the theory appears as a system of consistent, logically interconnected statements. Theories use a specific categorical apparatus, a system of principles and laws. The developed theory is open to the description, interpretation and explanation of new facts, and is also ready to include additional metatheoretical constructions: hypothetical-deductive, descriptive, inductive-deductive, formalized using a complex mathematical apparatus. Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), listing the most important characteristics of a theory, argued that it should be accurate, consistent, widely applicable, simple, fruitful, have novelty, etc. However, each of these criteria separately does not have self-sufficiency. From this fact, Popper concludes that any theory is, in principle, falsifiable, subject to the procedure of refutation. Based on these arguments, Popper advances the principle of fallibilism. He concludes that there is no error only in the statement that "all theories are erroneous."

It is easy to see that the development of scientific concepts is repeatedly mediated by linguistic conceptual definitions. In his research on this issue, the Russian scientist T. G. Leshkevich writes: “Language does not always have adequate means of reproducing alternative experience, certain symbolic fragments may be absent in the basic vocabulary of the language. Therefore, for the philosophy of science, it is fundamentally important to study the specifics of language as an effective means of representation, coding of basic information, the relationship of linguistic and extralinguistic mechanisms for constructing a theory"[9] .

4.3. Classical, non-classical, post-non-classical theories

Classical, non-classical and post-non-classical theories characterize the stages and types of philosophizing. The starting point in this series is the concept of "classical", since it is associated with ideas about the patterns of philosophizing, their corresponding names, personalities and texts, as well as the patterns offered by philosophy to people as guidelines for their life and work. From a historical point of view, each era presents its own philosophical patterns that retain their cultural significance to this day. In this sense, we should talk about the philosophical classics of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, etc. In a narrower view, philosophical classics can be limited to the XNUMXth-XNUMXth centuries, and mainly to the space of the European region, since it was in this chronotope that the idea of ​​classicism received a detailed justification and development. Such a narrowing of the "field" of philosophical classics makes the comparison of classics, non-classics and post-non-classics more clear. The end of the classical stage is fixed in the middle of the XNUMXth century, the non-classical stage - from Marx to Husserl - unfolds until the middle of the XNUMXth century, the post-non-classical stage takes shape in the second half of the XNUMXth century. with a view to continuing into the next century. At this stage, the "narrow" meaning of the classics is practically lost, because the inclusion of the classics in new methodological, cultural and practical contexts turns out to be significant.

The classical type of philosophizing presupposes the presence of a system of samples that determine the commensuration and understanding of the main aspects and spheres of being: nature, society, people's lives, their activities, knowledge, thinking. The corresponding mode of implementation of samples is also implied: their deduction, distribution, consolidation in specific forms of spiritual, theoretical, practical activity of people. So, for example, a generalized idea of ​​a person is included in specific descriptions of human individuals, explanations of their actions, assessments of their situations. In this model, the form of description and explanation is predetermined, and when it comes into contact with "human material", it singles out certain qualities in it and measures them. Accordingly, some qualities of people and things are not taken into account by the model, remain in the "shadow" or are simply cut off by it. This aspect of the work of a generalized idea of ​​a person as a methodological model indicates its relationship with the canons of traditional common sense. Like traditional ideas about human nature, it can be transmitted as an existing scheme of experience from generation to generation, move in social time, maintain its continuity, serve as a means of reproduction and organization of social ties. But in one essential point it differs from traditional schemes: it is not "attached" to a certain zone of social space, it is no longer associated with the peculiarities and restrictions of an estate character. Here, the historical background of his logical "insight" (and seeming universality) is revealed. By the very process of history he is cut off from concrete soil; religious, legal, economic, technological, scientific changes, it is abstracted from the ethical, social, cultural characteristics of human communities.

This feature of the classic pattern is reinforced by its reliance (which is often just a reference) on scientific justifications. Classical philosophy uses the authority and arguments of science to give its models a special social significance. The similarity of these models with traditional canons and scientific standards indicates that they "claim" for the very role that the traditional canons of behavior and thinking played. However, the displacement of traditional schemes and the occupation of their functional "cell" by samples is carried out by philosophy based on scientific standards and by comparing philosophical samples and scientific standards as tools of human activity.

The connection of classical philosophy with science is, first of all, the connection with logic, which initially developed as part of philosophy itself, and then functioned within the framework of individual sciences, mainly natural ones, where it provided classifications, generalizations, reductions, comparison and measurement procedures. As for the generalization itself, in classical philosophy very sophisticated, methodologically promising concepts for deploying general concepts into specific characteristics of being were developed. It suffices to recall Hegel's position on singularity as a true realization of the universal, his reasoning about individuality as the spiritual center of tribal life and its living concrete incarnation. Note that Hegel formulated these propositions on the "margins" of his main works (in particular, in such a clearly non-methodological work as "Aesthetics"). Eastern classics do not provide examples of such a severe break between philosophy and the forms of everyday experience (and, accordingly, such mutual influence of philosophy and science) as the European philosophy of the XNUMXth century. The latter is especially important for understanding the soil on which postclassical philosophy grows.

The impact of science on the philosophy of the XNUMXth century, on its models and methods of use, was explicitly and implicitly corrected by the development of the economy, industry and technology. A special social significance was attached to the schemes of activity and thinking that served the expanding production, mass production of things devoid of individual characteristics. The stability of these schemes was given by the corresponding image of a person, which is quite consistent with the samples available in the philosophical classics. The abstractness of the model stimulated the consideration of human subjects, their qualities and relationships through the summation, calculation and division of their forces. Moreover, these forces, in essence, turned out to be abstracted from their individualized carriers.

In the generalized image of a person, not only the individual characteristics of people were lost, but also the actual process of their being, the dynamics of their self-change, self-realization, self-development. The generalized image of a person as a measure of people's activity in the characteristics of human interactions revealed the significance of the norm. In fact, it was in this function that he joined the legal and moral regulators of social relations. Its abstraction from individual characteristics and processual life created reliable conditions for measuring the behavior of people as abstract individuals. The abstractness of the pattern made it possible to use it in evaluating a variety of human situations: no matter how far people go in their actions and misdeeds, a pattern (set of patterns) already existed to characterize and evaluate their actions.

The generalized image of a person acted in philosophy and beyond in explicit or indirect coordination with the generalized images of nature, history, culture, activity, science, law, politics, etc. All these concepts (and instruments of action) were formed according to the same type. Therefore, they constituted an agreed classical picture and carried out the methodology corresponding to it, or rather, they were clear and rather rigid means of its implementation. In this sense, the samples of philosophical classification were in full accordance with the canons of classical aesthetics; they were quite clear, stable in relation to the individual originality and dynamics of the phenomena of natural and social life. Their stability is akin to the colonnade of a classical temple, setting the invariable order of passage through space, turning an ordinary walk of people into a cultural action, ritual or its imitation; wayward and assertive time thus acquired a canonical measure.

The seemingly natural stability of classical models (their totality) became one of the important prerequisites for their collapse, because it was precisely the impossibility of using the classical picture of the world in working with peculiar and dynamic systems that made people doubt its reliability, and then betray it to criticism and revision. Started in the second half of the nineteenth century. The crisis of classical models also revealed another important, previously hidden feature: as their methodological limitations became clear, their role in the reproduction of cultural forms, the transmission of human experience through space and time, was revealed. The collapse of classical forms was not only a crisis in the knowledge of nature and man, it threatened the existence of fundamental structures for the storage and transmission of human experience. The classical models revealed their importance as forms of social reproduction and their inability to continue to fulfill this purpose. According to an American sociologist, journalist, professor at Columbia and Harvard Universities, one of the authors of the concepts of "de-ideologization" and "post-industrial society" Daniel Bell (p. 1919), "the new theory changes the system of axioms and establishes new connections at the junctions, which changes the topology. When two sciences are combined into one, the new network is richer and clearer than just the sum of the two parts" [10] .

Non-classical philosophizing is not a direction, but a type of thinking and action associated with a reaction to classical models, with the crisis of the classics and overcoming it. This is a reaction to the disproportion between the abstract subject of classics and specific individuals, the abstract object - the evolution of nature, its methodology - the search for resources of intensive activity in all areas of practice. The situation that is customarily called "non-classical" is not initially revealed in philosophy. It finds itself on the borders of philosophy and science, when the classical theories of knowledge collide with objects that do not "fit" into the usual cognitive forms. At the end of the nineteenth century. such objects are perceived as exceptions to the rules, exotic representatives of micro- and mega-worlds. However, the number of such objects is steadily increasing, and it is already necessary to put up with the fact that until recently "simple and clear nature" (which should be "imitated") surrounds a person with an intricacies of unobservable and clearly not fixed objects. Moreover, by the middle of the twentieth century. it turns out that society, the system of people's lives with its conditions, means, products, also belongs to the world of non-classical objects and cannot be reduced to things, to tools, mechanisms, machines that work with things. The classical attitude towards stable natural and mental patterns and the positivist orientation toward the "logic of things" that followed it in this regard turn out to be untenable.

The non-classical situation grew from the periphery, i.e. from the boundaries outlined by the problems of science and practice, to the center, to the focus of worldview and methodological forms, concentrated around classical philosophical models. The stability of patterns seemed to be the last stronghold of culture, and therefore of science, and morality, and, in general, a normally functioning sociality. Tradition firmly linked the existence of samples with their inviolability and immutability, so the threat to their stationary state was almost always perceived as a threat to their destruction. But it was precisely the regime of the stationary existence of samples that came to an end. And the point here is not even that they were subjected to more and more massive criticism from different positions and points of view, but that the mastery of a non-classical situation became possible only if the mode of "work" of the samples changed. However, under the pressure of a powerful critical mass, these conditions were noticeably simplified and interpreted in terms of the rejection of samples as methodological and worldview norms.

Classical models, having lost their privileged position, moved to the position of ordinary means of human activity; they were placed at the complete disposal of their individual subjects, whose behavior they had previously regulated and directed. The generalized image of a person, previously placed above the concrete existence of people, turned into one of the methodological forms for solving certain particular problems of cognition and practice. Now separate subjects, independently determining the orientations of behavior, modeling various interactions, adapted various schemes to the implementation of their individual projects. As the field of action of classical models was reduced, the zone of manifestation of human subjectivity became more and more widespread.

Subjectivity was freed from epistemological assessments, which brought it closer to distorted knowledge, and revealed the ontological aspects of the life and actions of human individuals. This shift in the manifestations of human subjectivity was initially recorded by psychological research. Psychology actually "rehabilitated" subjectivity and at the same time itself shifted the focus of interests from the characteristics of a person's cognitive capabilities to the interpretation of the emotional-volitional and non-rational spheres of his being. In terms of cultural and philosophical change in the status of subjectivity for a long time (until the middle of the twentieth century) was assessed in accordance with classical models, i.e. negatively, as the onset of subjectivism, irrationalism, nihilism. In connection with these, the space of culture seemed to be more and more fragmented, losing its stable dimensions and correspondences. From this point of view, the field of society was seen as a set of interactions of different subjects, kept from complete arbitrariness only by rigid structures of sociality. Approximately from the second quarter of the twentieth century. the question of subjectivity enters into "resonance" with the problem of finding the actual human resources for the development of society. The extensive path, in principle, turns out to be a dead end; the productivity of the economy, the prospects of technology, the renewal of science and culture turn out to be dependent on the energy and quality of the activity of individual subjects. The problem of subjectivity is gradually turning into the problem of the subjectivity of individuals as a force and form of development of sociality.

Individuals "enter" the consideration of this problem first as carriers of physical and nervous energy, i.e. mainly as natural bodily objects equated to other resources of social reproduction. Difficulties are encountered with the modeling of society. As Howard Becker wrote, "We're all on the road, but we don't know where we're going..." There is no convincing theory about what the internal cohesion forces of the social mechanism are. But this move does not promise qualitative changes. There is a need to include in economic, technological, management schemes and chains of individuals in all possible fullness of their social subjectivity, i.e. with all their possibilities of self-realization and productive interaction. At the same time, models as a means of organizing social activity, communication (ontologized models) inevitably turn into elements of the structures of social life itself.

The field of sociality appears to be divided among many subjects, and these are no longer individual subjects with their psychologized subjectivity, but "composite", for example, group subjects, realizing their images of the world, their models of activity. These are subjects that accumulate in themselves the energy and organization of social communities, branches of activity, cognitive disciplines, using their means and resources, affirming their subjectivity and egoism. In the limit, these are social machines that not only occupy important positions in social production, but also reproduce this space, ontologizing their models and tools, forming the objectivity of social life and the types of behavior of the people themselves. This production, in fact, turns out to be an ontologization of models embodied in schemes and technologies. The space of society is gradually filled with such ontologized models. From a point of view that accepts the usual logic of things, there seems to be nothing strange in this. However, the fact of the matter is that such modeling comes into conflict with the logic of things, since it substitutes one-sided schemes (and their ontologizations) for the own existence of natural objects with their inherent rhythms and laws. This, in fact, gives rise to, and then makes more and more threatening the environmental problem and a number of other problems of modern society associated with the enormous social inertia of extensive types of activity. The problem arises not only of limiting this type of activity, but also of coordinating different models of the world, determining the mode of their interaction, the needs and conditions for their processing.

The theme of the interaction of different models that shape the positions and behavior of social subjects grows out of the theme of their collisions. Conflict situations just reveal the fact that subjects have different images of the world and models of activity. The crisis forms of relations between people and natural systems in a sense say the same thing: the ways people act are not commensurate with the ways (which can be interpreted as a kind of model) of the reproduction of natural components. Thus, a group of methodological tasks is revealed to detect models, their deontologization, limitation and processing, and above all the task of deautomation of models that have "reborn" into large-scale production, management structures, institutionalized forms of scientific activity, "capturing" huge natural and human resources into the orbit of their functioning. . The solution of these problems involves the choice of a strategy aimed at removing ontologized models from the automatic mode of operation, determining their boundaries and capabilities; their adjustment according to the control results for people. However, this kind of strategy is not immediately formed, in fact, it - as an ordinary detailed concept - does not exist until now. It "hints" at its still latent existence as a set of scientific-methodological, philosophical, ideological, socio-political movements, manifested in different spheres of public life, but united by the type of tasks being solved. In the course of the solution, the necessary means are divided and become independent ends: one group of movements insists on the dismantling of automated models until they are eliminated; the other - on the construction of new models of interaction, corresponding to the context of their use. For the first - supporters of methodological and ethical anarchism, extreme deconstructivism and postmodernism - it is important to show the regressive function of models, social and technological forms masked by them, to make the very process of their "disassembly" a means of freeing the being of people, things and texts. For the second - these include supporters of the concept of "small science", phenomenological and microsociology, ethnomethodology, social history, developmental upbringing and education, unifying (ecumenical) religious trends - the fundamental question is the formation and reproduction of normative and regulatory models by specific social subjects in certain spatial and temporal conditions, about the forms of fixing the socio-spatial and temporal organization in the interactions of the people themselves.

In various variations, the implementation of these goals leads to the gradual formation of a principle that characterizes this type of task. It can be called the "other" principle. "Other" turns out to be a conventional designation of that potential multidimensional object, according to the standards of which models of interaction of people with each other and with natural systems are built, and the measures of the object do not depend on the subject, but on the mode of existence of the object, its state, the specific nature of the interaction. In the classical situation, when the privileges of objectivity (and objectivity), its significance, the need to reckon with it and comply with it were emphasized in every possible way, the peacekeeping function, in fact, remained entirely in the hands of the subject. In the postclassical situation, there is no, as D. Bell writes, "any convincing theory about what are the forces of the internal social mechanism, the possibilities of modeling are reduced"[11] .

When, it would seem, the image of an object is completely lost, it is the mode of existence of the object (objects) that becomes the most important factor in determining the models that build interaction with it. Accounting for this factor turns out to be an important moment in the reproduction of the subject itself, its self-preservation and construction. The subject in this situation can be neither abstract nor "monolithic"; its identity is confirmed by the constantly renewed ability to develop and reproduce models of interaction. The image of the “other” is at first anthropomorphic and personalological, therefore, the models of interaction with the “other” are characterized in accordance with the ideas about interpersonal communication between people (it is enough to recall the first attempts to justify the methodology of humanitarian knowledge, “sciences about the spirit”, “understanding procedures”, V. Dilthey) . But the continuation of these attempts gradually leads to the conviction that personal sympathy, co-understanding, co-action is not enough to understand the “other”: the task lies in this, and this is the difficulty, that it is necessary to go beyond the existing personal subjective, subjective representations and concepts, transform and reformulate them in order to determine a productive order of interaction. For philosophy (and for everyday consciousness), understanding the situation is given with great difficulty, first of all, apparently, because it is necessary to overcome difficulties not so much of a logical and methodological, as of a moral and psychological nature. In fact, it is necessary to make the practice of going beyond the boundaries of ordinary ideas and concepts, beyond the framework of personal experience, beyond the limits of individual subjectivity, the norm. Overcoming these personal-psychological barriers that are hidden in the philosophical and methodological work, in fact, means the onset of the post-non-classical stage and the formation of the post-classical type of philosophizing. The difficulties and complexities of this transitive situation are expressed primarily through reactions that fix the insufficiency of individual psychological forms for the work of a philosophizing subject. Therefore, the interpretation of overcoming these forms often develops into theses about the destruction or annihilation of the subject, about the disappearance of the author, about the dehumanization of philosophy, etc. Similarly, the multidimensionality of the "other", the "non-classical" nature of objects and ways of fixing them give rise to the idea of ​​the disintegration of objectivity and the destruction of reality. But the reactions are followed by a stage of awareness of the difficulties of methodological work associated with the construction of a new form of subjectivity, with the determination of the mode of operation of interaction schemes, with the technique of reconstructing object situations and forms of their development. In philosophy, there are still many barriers to the transition to this kind of activity. One of them is the orientation of the philosophy of the twentieth century. on the microanalysis of interactions, in which subject-subject relations (and contacts with the "other") are modeled in the spirit of disciplinary-psychological, micro-sociological, linguistic schemes.

The logic of philosophy's transition to the post-classical stage and type of work is determined not only by philosophy, by the "internal systems" of its evolution over the past century and a half. Important incentives are provided by the development of such scientific areas as evolutionary universalism, biology and physiology of activity, synergetics, and the world-system approach. In this sense, we can say that D. Bell, N. M. Moiseev, L. von Bartalanffy, I. R. Prigogine, F. Braudel and some other researchers did no less than the philosophers of the second half of the XNUMXth century Their efforts are connected with a number of practical-environmental, political, economic, technical and scientific problems, often pointing to the need to form patterns, and most importantly, to create a regime for the functioning of patterns that ensure the coexistence of social systems in their event with natural systems. The problem of patterns returns to philosophy, but it returns as a setting to change philosophy itself, the formation of philosophical concepts of development and the functioning of patterns, the corresponding structuring of sociality, subjects of interactions, schemes for the self-development of human individuals. A feature of this regime is the combination of stable patterns as norms with their functions as regulators that ensure the co-change and self-change of human subjects. The dynamics of samples and their stable functioning is, in fact, the task, on the specific solution of which other interpretations of traditional philosophical concepts and procedures depend, such as subject, object, measure, measurement system, generalization, concretization: all of them are rediscovered "from outside "their formation, in the aspect of interaction, in terms of the co-change of social subjects.

Topic 5. Scientific traditions and scientific revolutions. types of scientific rationality

5.1. The interaction of traditions and the emergence of new knowledge

The problems of traditions as the main constitutional factor in the development of science were first considered in the writings of Thomas Kuhn. He owns the idea that traditions are a condition for the possibility of scientific development. Tradition (from Latin traditio - transmission, tradition) refers to elements of social and cultural heritage that are passed down from generation to generation and preserved in certain societies and social groups for a long time. Tradition is the expression of everything that is previous and relatively stable in social life and culture. It includes both the content of various spheres of society and the mechanism of their successive development, the form of consolidation and preservation of sociocultural experience. This is a special kind of behavior, thinking and experience, evaluated positively or negatively, belonging (really or mythologically) to the cultural heritage of a societal group; a special kind of historical consciousness that transforms the ambiguity of the facts of the past into the unambiguous values ​​of the modern. At the same time, both the belittling of the role of tradition in public life and its transformation into the basis of the existing society means an inability to correctly understand the problem of traditions. Such an understanding depends on interpreting them as values. In the life of society, traditions are able to play a regulatory role. This is especially characteristic of the so-called traditional society. The Enlightenment, with its faith based on the identification of a positive beginning in history (reason, civilization, emancipation), endows traditions with the status of a real with a negative sign; qualities of prejudice, delusion, fanaticism. Traditionalism is opposed to the concept of "innovation". Traditionalism received a rationalistic assessment for the first time in philosophy Hegelwho clearly separated the question of the actual dependence of the present on the past. Karl Marx (1818-1883) considered the phenomenon of traditionalism from the positions of revolutionaryism and rationalism. The concept of traditionalism was most fully described in the works Max Weber (1864-1920), although there is a tendency to view his concept as an irreducible duality. In modern philosophy, the problems of traditionalism are considered from the point of view of the stability, immutability and renewability of the structures of public consciousness and social practice, as well as the preservation of their individual elements in modern society, in which the role of artificial design of social relations and relations dominates.

Traditions are constantly being updated. However, despite their ability to adapt to innovation, thus acquiring a second life, there is an option when traditions will suppress innovation, delaying the development process. In this regard, traditions can be considered both primary and secondary. Primary traditions are formed spontaneously and reproduced as fixed forms and a sequence of actions directly and practically, in obedience to ritual and custom, folklore and mythological prescriptions. Secondary traditions are the result of reflexive-rational processing, fixed in professionally created texts, consciously controlled norms of behavior. It is the secondary traditions that are subject to rethinking, development, ensuring social and cultural continuity.

A negative tradition is a pattern of an unwanted or forbidden past, although it may have underlying causal motives and explanations.

Functionally, traditions optimize the form of existence of a social group in a certain natural, ethno-cultural and socio-economic environment, create conditions for self-identification of individuals and society with a particular social structure, act as a system for limiting innovations, control legitimization and positification, carry out social correction and codification, "respond for public immunity.

The emergence of new knowledge is associated with breaking the barriers built by traditionalism. The invincibility of the new is legitimized by the inability of the old to meet the needs of development. Traditional science, as you know, works under the "roof" of a certain, already established paradigm. How does the new assert itself under these conditions? The answer to this question is contained in the studies of T. Kuhn, K. Popper, D. Bell and others. In particular, the American physicist, philosopher and historian of science Thomas Kuhn notes that, acting according to the rules of the dominant paradigm, the scientist accidentally and sideways encounters such facts and phenomena that are inexplicable within the framework of this paradigm. There is a need to change the rules of scientific research and explanation. For example, physicists in a cloud chamber, wanting to see the trace of an electron, suddenly discovered that this trace has the shape of a fork. This did not meet their expectations, but they explained what they saw with experimental errors. In fact, behind the phenomenon seen, the discovery of the positron was visible. Under the pressure of new facts that did not fit into the framework of the old, there was a paradigm shift. Something similar happened when astrophysicists, knowing nothing about "black" holes, tried to explain this phenomenon in terms of ignorance. Later it became known that black holes are cosmic objects, the existence of which is predicted by the general theory of relativity. Unlimited gravitational compression (gravitational collapse) of massive cosmic bodies takes place in them. The radiation of black holes is locked by gravity, so they can be detected only by their gravity or by the bremsstrahlung of gas falling on them from outside.

Karl Popper in the book "Objective Knowledge" (1972) argued: the more new and unexpected problems arise in the process of deliberately comparing alternative hypotheses with each other, the more progress is provided to science. Developing this idea, the American philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) in "How to be a good empiricist" writes: "... a good empiricist will start by inventing alternatives to a theory, not directly testing that theory." He goes on to formulate four conditions for a strict alternative:

1) the alternative must include a certain set of statements;

2) this set must be related to the prediction more closely than just by conjunction;

3) at least potential evidence in favor of the alternative is required;

4) the ability of the alternative to explain the previous successes of the theory being criticized is assumed.

Feyerabend explains: "New facts are discovered most often with the help of alternatives. If there are no alternatives, and the theory seems to successfully explain the facts, then this is just a simulation of success, i.e. "elimination" of facts and alternative ontological schemes that are undesirable for its verification" And further: "The invention of alternatives is precisely the means that scientists ... rarely resort to"[12] Although, let's note, this is not a panacea!

When analyzing scientific revolutions, T. Kuhn, in his works on the philosophy of science, very fruitfully applied the concept of a paradigm developed in the works of ancient, later - medieval philosophy and the philosophy of modern times. He figuratively compared the meaning of this concept with "a duck, which after the revolution turns out to be a rabbit." According to his concept, the change of paradigms is accompanied by a disruption in communications between scientists who adhere to different paradigms, a change in the "technique" of persuasion in scientific communities. Each paradigm substantiates its own criteria (requirements, standards, etc.) for evaluating cognitive actions and their results. This leads to an important philosophical and sociological problem: is science an autonomous, internally closed sphere, and the cognitive activity of scientists is a special type of highly professional entrepreneurship in creating scientific information and developing society's needs for such information, or is science a special field of activity that performs in the system of public labor a specific social function: to provide society with scientific knowledge, arguments?

According to Kuhn, the change of the scientific paradigm, the transition to the phase of "revolutionary break" provides for the complete or partial replacement of the elements of the disciplinary matrix, research techniques, methods and theoretical assumptions; the entire stock of epistemological values ​​is transformed. The scheme for the development of scientific knowledge proposed by Kuhn includes the following stages: pre-scientific stage - crisis - revolution - new normal science - new crisis, etc. Examining in detail the turning points in the history of science, Kuhn shows that the period of development of "normal" science can also be represented by traditional concepts, for example, the concept of progress, which in this case has the criterion of the number of problems solved. For Kuhn, "normal" science involves expanding the scope of the paradigm with increasing precision. The criterion for staying in the period of "normal" science is the preservation of the accepted conceptual foundations. We can say that there is a certain immunity here, which allows you to leave the conceptual framework of a particular paradigm unchanged. The goal of "normal science," Kuhn notes, is in no way intended to predict new kinds of phenomena. Immunity, or immunity to external factors that do not fit with the accepted starts, cannot absolutely resist the so-called anomalous phenomena and facts - they gradually undermine the stability of the paradigm. Kuhn characterizes "normal" science as a cumulative accumulation of knowledge. Revolutionary periods, or scientific revolutions, lead to a change in the structure of science, principles of knowledge, categories, methods and forms of organization of science.

What is the reason for the change of periods of calm development of science and periods of its revolutionary development? The history of the development of science allows us to assert that periods of calm, normal development of science reflect the situation of continuity of traditions, when all scientific disciplines develop in accordance with established patterns and the accepted system of prescriptions. "Normal" science means research that is firmly based on the past or existing scientific achievements and recognizes them as the foundation of future development. During periods of normal development of science, the activities of scientists are based on the same paradigms, the same rules and standards of scientific practice. There is a commonality of attitudes and a visible coordination of actions, which ensures the continuity of the traditions of one direction or another. Scientists do not set themselves the task of creating fundamentally new theories; moreover, they are even intolerant of the creation of such "crazy" theories by others. In Kuhn's figurative expression, scientists are busy "putting things in order" in their disciplinary fields. "Normal" science develops by accumulating information, clarifying known facts. At the same time, this period is characterized by "the ideology of traditionalism, authoritarianism, positive common sense and scientism."

Each scientific revolution opens up new patterns that cannot be understood within the framework of previous ideas. The world of microorganisms and viruses, the world of atoms and molecules, the world of electromagnetic phenomena and elementary particles, the world of crystals and the discovery of other galaxies are fundamental extensions of the boundaries of human knowledge and ideas about the universe. The "symptoms" of the scientific revolution, in addition to obvious anomalies, are crisis situations in the explanation and substantiation of new facts, the struggle between the old consciousness and the new hypothesis, and the sharpest discussions. Scientific communities, as well as disciplinary and hierarchical barriers, are opening up. For example, the appearance of the microscope in biology, and later the telescope and radio telescope in astronomy, made it possible to make great discoveries. The whole seventeenth century was called the era of the "conquest of the microscope". The discoveries of the crystal, virus and microorganisms, electromagnetic phenomena and the world of microparticles provide an opportunity for a deep measurement of reality. The scientific revolution appears as a kind of discontinuity in the sense that it marks the boundary not only of the transition from the old to the new, but also a change in direction itself. The discoveries made by scientists cause fundamental shifts in the history of the development of science, mark a rejection of the accepted and dominant theory in favor of a new one that is incompatible with the old one. And if the work of a scientist in the period of "normal" science is characterized as ordinary, then in the period of the scientific revolution it has an extraordinary character.

The inter- and intradisciplinary mechanisms of scientific revolutions are very topical. Interdisciplinary interactions of many sciences involve the analysis of complex systemic objects, revealing such systemic effects that cannot be detected within the framework of one discipline. In the case of interdisciplinary transformations, the picture of the world developed in the leading science is transformed into all other scientific disciplines adopted in the leading science, the ideals and norms of scientific research acquire a general scientific status.

5.2. Scientific revolutions as points of bifurcation and the problem of choosing a strategy for scientific development

The revolution is the most noticeable key moment in the process of development, which, in turn, characterizes the qualitative changes in objects, the emergence of new forms of being, the transformation of their internal and external relations. Development is closely connected with the concept of progress, which began to acquire a categorical and ideological meaning during the historical transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. At the turn of the XVIII - XIX centuries. development acquires the criterion of novelty. In the second half of the nineteenth century. against the backdrop of advances in biology, economic theory, socio-historical knowledge, with the advent of schemes about the inconsistency of development, self-development (covering the areas of animate and inanimate nature), as well as thinking developed in German classical philosophy, it became possible to scientifically explain periodically occurring large, large-scale changes, called "revolution".

In the life of mankind, revolutions have happened more than once. One can recall the revolutions in science, in industry, in information, there was even a "green" revolution, and all of them brought with them radical qualitative changes. However, with all the similarities of the revolutions, there was also a noticeable difference, in particular, in their dynamics. In one case, the transformation of the picture of the world took place without changing the ideals and norms of research. In this sense, the revolution in medicine associated with the discovery by William Harvey of the large and small circles of blood circulation (1628) is indicative; revolution in mathematics in connection with the discovery of differential calculus (I. Newton and G. V. Leibniz); the discovery of Lavoisier's oxygen theory; transition from a mechanical picture of the world to an electromechanical one in connection with the discovery of the theory of the electromagnetic field, etc. All these revolutions did not lead to a change in the cognitive attitudes of classical physics, ideals and norms of research. At the same time, in other cases, there were radical changes in the very picture of the world, in the system of ideals and norms of science. So, the discovery of thermodynamics and followed in the middle of the twentieth century. The quantum mechanical revolution has led not only to a rethinking of the scientific picture of the world, but also to a complete paradigm shift that changes the standards, ideals and norms of research. The subjective-objective opposition was rejected, the ways of describing and substantiating knowledge were changed, the probabilistic nature of the systems under study, the non-linearity and bifurcation of development were recognized. The mass introduction of computers into the sphere of material production has become a symbol of scientific and technological progress. Science has become the direct productive force of society. Changes have also taken place in the social division of labor. In particular, the ratio of the elements of the productive forces has changed: the object of labor, the tools of labor and the worker himself; production from a simple labor process has turned into a scientific and technical process. There has been progress in overcoming the contradictions between physical and mental labor; there was a speculative tendency to underestimate mental work in the system of its remuneration. Thus, the prerequisites for the scientific revolution can be considered, firstly, the existence of a fundamental scientific anomaly that cannot be explained by the available scientific means; secondly, the accumulation of these anomalies, the obviousness of the search for alternative solutions; thirdly, the development of a crisis situation; fourthly, the presence of an alternative concept that unites theories (in Kuhn's terminology - paradigms). Revolutions associated with a change of paradigms are a rare phenomenon, since they are too grandiose, complex, and determined by many circumstances, including psychological ones.

Revolutionary periods in the development of science are perceived as particularly significant. Their "destructive" function eventually transformed into a constructive, creative and innovative one. The scientific revolution has become the most obvious expression of the basis of the driving force of scientific progress. However, the problem of choosing a strategy for scientific development is not as simple as it might seem. The number of axioms in this plane varies widely. American philosopher, logician, mathematician and naturalist Charles Pierce (1839-1914) believed that knowledge does not necessarily begin with self-evident truths, it can begin with any provisions, including obviously erroneous ones. Scientific research is a life process, occupied with assumptions, tests, which provoke critical debate. Knowledge is always hypothetical, probabilistic. In the course of the study, the assumptions are adjusted, and the probability of knowledge increases. However, it decreases again when new assumptions are made.

K. Popper argued that science progresses from one problem to another, from a less profound problem to a deeper one. The model for the growth of scientific knowledge, according to Popper, is as follows[13] .

1. Science begins with problems.

2. Scientific explanations of the problem are hypotheses.

3. A hypothesis is scientific if it is falsifiable in principle.

4. Falsification of hypotheses ensures the elimination of identified scientific errors.

5. New and deeper problem posing and hypotheses are achieved as a result of critical discussion.

6. The deepening of problems and hypotheses (theories) ensures progress in science, more precisely, the growth of scientific knowledge.

According to Popper, it is impossible to understand science based on the relation of the second world to the first, i.e. the systemic (artificial) world and the social (natural) world. None of the constituent elements of science (scientific problems, problem situations, theories, hypotheses, rational schemes, criteria, methods of refuting criticism) can be deduced from this relationship. The traditional epistemological concept developed by Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Russell, in his opinion, was defeated because it took this attitude as the basis of the philosophical understanding of science. They did not understand the important role of "theoretical research" and "theoretical science"; failed to understand the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge, i.e. free them from all sorts of subjective intrusions. Popper develops a new epistemology - an epistemology without a knowing subject. With it, the philosopher connects the rationale for the autonomy of science. All of its most important elements, he argues, can be explained without referring either to real subjects in science or to its social function. Science is an internally closed, self-reproducing, self-controlled "third world", in which there are unlimited possibilities for the emergence of new "thinkable objects" and new problems and problem situations associated with it. Popper writes that the "third world" is the main sphere of human activity. Groups of people who develop this world must occupy the main positions in society, remain active groups. But to describe their activities, there is no need to refer to the traditional concept of "the subject of scientific knowledge." Popper in his philosophical concept proposes to shift the focus from the study of man as a subject of knowledge to the study of the initial elements of the "third world" itself as an autonomous world. In this world, the acceptance of results as scientific is based not on clarifying their relationship to the real-life objects being studied, but on the possibility of applying to these results the criteria, standards, principles that form its initial rational structure.

According to Popper, researchers in science do not study objects, but scientific problems. They operate not on the boundaries of "object - subject", but within the framework of the rational foundations of science. The philosopher proposes to develop a three-term structure of scientific research: "a scientific problem - conjectures (hypotheses) - refutations". In science, he believes, there can be no strictly objective and uniform philosophical and methodological foundations. In the history of science, scientists themselves understood in a new way the foundations of science, the goals of scientific research. Science is just a special kind of game, the rules of which can be formulated without relying on any independent parameters of the objects of the first world.

The ideas expressed by Karl Popper were especially actively developed by the English mathematician, logician and philosopher of science. Imre Lakatos (1922-1974). Born in Hungary, the philosopher emigrated from the country in 1956 after the uprising in Budapest was suppressed by Soviet troops. He was a student and at the same time a critic of Popper. Lakatos spoke out against Popper's falsificationism, believing that theories are more stable and not any falsification will lead to the "crossing out" of the science being tested. To explain his ideas, he introduces a number of additional concepts, such as "hard core", "protective belt", positive and negative heuristics in the concept. In particular, Lakatos refers to the "hard core" three well-known laws of Newton and the law of gravitation, which have withstood the test of time and to this day form the basis of modern mechanics. Lakatos believes that a conscientious researcher does not need to be afraid of the principle of falsifiability, but should treat it with respect. Moreover, mistakes are human: "Errare humanum est ..."

5.3. Global revolutions and types of scientific rationality. Classical, non-classical and post-non-classical science

According to Kuhn, any science goes through certain phases (periods) of development in its movement: pre-paradigm, paradigm, and post-paradigm. These three phases can be represented as the genesis of science, "normal" science and the crisis of science. The change of paradigms, overcoming the crisis states acts as a scientific revolution, which makes the established scientific concepts and doctrines unproductive. There are three types of scientific revolutions: mini-revolutions, which refer to separate blocks in the content of a particular science; local revolutions covering a specific science as a whole; global scientific revolutions that capture all of science as a whole and lead to the emergence of a new vision of the world. There are several global revolutions in the history of the development of science:

1) the scientific revolution of the XNUMXth century, which marked the emergence of classical natural science and determined the foundations for the development of science for the next two centuries. All new achievements in a consistent way lined up in a common Galilean-Newtonian picture of the world;

2) the scientific revolution of the end of the XNUMXth - the first half of the XNUMXth century, which led to the disciplinary organization of science and its further differentiation;

3) the scientific revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which is a "chain reaction" of revolutionary changes in various fields of knowledge. This fundamental scientific revolution of the XNUMXth century, characterized by the discovery of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, revised the initial ideas about space, time and motion (the concept of the non-stationarity of the Universe appeared in cosmology, quantum chemistry appeared in chemistry, the formation of genetics took place in biology, cybernetics and systems theory arose ). Thanks to computerization and automation, penetrating into industry, engineering and technology, the fundamental scientific revolution has acquired the character of scientific and technical;

4) the scientific revolution of the late twentieth century, which introduced information technologies into life, which are the harbinger of a new global scientific revolution. We live in an expanding Universe, the evolution of which is accompanied by powerful explosive processes with the release of a colossal amount of energy, with qualitative changes in matter at all levels. Given the totality of discoveries that were made at the end of the XNUMXth century, we can say that we are on the verge of a global scientific revolution that will lead to a total restructuring of all knowledge about the Universe.

Global revolutions cannot but influence the change in the types of rationality. The idea of ​​rationality has been realized in the history of human culture in various ways, and ideas about rationality have changed. The modern crisis of rationality is the crisis of the classical idea of ​​rationality, identified with the norm and rigidly unambiguous correspondence of cause and effect. Classical rationalism never found an adequate explanation for the act of creation. In the process of new discoveries, there is less rational than intuitive and non-rational. The deep layers of the human "I" do not feel completely subordinate to the mind, desires, instincts, affects are merged in the bubbling element of the unconscious. The classical concept of rationality is closely connected with the ideal of scientific objectivity of knowledge. It proclaimed the need for an elimination procedure aimed at the maximum possible exclusion of subjective elements from the cognitive process. The classical ideal of pure reason did not want to have anything to do with a real person, a bearer of reason. In the model of classical rationality, the place of a real person, thinking, feeling and experiencing, was occupied by an abstract subject of cognition.

If the problem of the rational is considered from the point of view of historical retrospective, then in addition to the ancient universal-philosophical type of rationality, it is necessary to single out the religious type of rationality that prevails in medieval Europe, subordinate to the rational justification of faith and a reasonable explanation of religious dogmas. The culture of medieval disputes prepared the apparatus of logical evidence and substantiation, the technique of self-examination of thought, the transition from non-formalized to formalized forms of rationality.

Non-classical scientific rationality took shape as a result of the discovery of Einstein's theory of relativity. An important condition in achieving the truth is not the exclusion of all obstacles that accompany research, but the clarification of their role and influence, taking into account the relationship between the nature of the object and the means and methods of research. The non-classical type of rationality takes into account the dynamic relationship of a person to reality, in which his activity becomes important. The subject stays in open problem situations and is subject to the need for self-development when interacting with the outside world. Thus, in classical rationality we are talking about the objectivity of being, in non-classical rationality - about the process of becoming.

Post-nonclassical rationality shows that the concept of rationality includes not only logical and methodological standards, but also an analysis of expedient human actions. The idea of ​​pluralism of rationality arises. In the words of P. P. Gaidenko, many types of rationality arose in place of one mind. Post-nonclassical rationalism is characterized by the correlation of knowledge not only with the activity of the subject and the means of cognition, but also with the value-target structures of activity. A person enters the picture of the world not just as an active participant, but as a system-forming factor. In the context of the new paradigm, the subject is both an observer and an activator. Human thinking with its goals and value orientations carries characteristics that merge with the subject content of the object. In the new rationality, the object sphere expands by including systems such as "artificial intelligence", "virtual reality", "cyber relations" (that is, relations implemented in accordance with the intellectual-value system operating in virtual reality - an imaginary illusory world) , which are themselves products of scientific and technological progress.

Distinguish between open and closed rationality. The latter is implemented in the mode of given goal orientations, but is not universal. What appears to be rational in terms of closed rationality ceases to be rational in terms of open rationality. Thus, the solution of production problems is not always rational in the context of environmental problems. An activity that is non-rational from the point of view of science may be quite rational from the point of view of interpersonal relationships or career considerations. Open rationality allows for a reflexive analysis of alternative cognitive practices, implies an attentive and respectful attitude to alternative pictures of the world that arise in other cultural and worldview traditions than modern science, dialogue and mutual enrichment of various cognitive traditions. Anti-dogmatism is associated with open rationality, but it also contains the danger of relativism, creates a situation of constant tension in search of "solid ground", responsibility for the choice made.

The question arises about the relationship between different types of rationality. Researchers tend to see the dialectical attraction of open and closed rationality, impersonal rationality of the cosmological type, and human anthropocentric rationality. The ideals of classical rationality should not be replaced by "rationality without shores", which asserts that "everything is rational in everything". According to V. S. Stepin, all three types of scientific rationality (classical, non-classical and post-non-classical) interact and the emergence of each new type does not cancel the previous one, but only limits it, outlining its scope. At present, it is important to distinguish types of rationality, however variable they may be, from pseudo-rationality.

Rationality is associated with articulated programs of activity. The author of the concept of personal knowledge M. Polanyi showed that the knowledge presented in the texts of scientific articles and textbooks is just a part of it, which is in the focus of consciousness. The other part is focused on the half of the so-called peripheral knowledge that constantly accompanies the process of cognition. We can say that rationality sets the main "focus of consciousness", without denying the integrity within which our knowledge is carried out and which we must achieve.

There are three options for the correlation of thinking and speech, which should take into account the modern type of development of rationality. The first option is characterized by an area of ​​implicit knowledge, the verbal expression of which is not self-sufficient or insufficiently adequate. This is the realm in which the tacit implicit knowledge component dominates to such an extent that its articulated expression is not possible here, and which can therefore be called the "realm of the inexpressible." It covers knowledge based on experiences and life impressions. These are deeply personal experiences that are very difficult to translate and socialize. Art has always tried to solve this problem with its own means: the act of creativity and empathy reflected the ability to look at the world and life of the hero of a life drama. The second variant of the relationship between thinking and speech is characterized by a field of knowledge that is quite well transmitted by means of speech. This is an area where the component of thinking exists in the form of information and can be completely conveyed by well-understood speech, therefore the area of ​​tacit knowledge coincides with the text, the bearer of which it is. The third option is the area of ​​"difficult understanding": there is an inconsistency between the non-verbal content of thinking and speech means, which makes it difficult to conceptualize the content of thought. This is an area in which tacit knowledge and formal knowledge are independent of each other. Thus, these nuances, which set the limits of the articulation of thinking, also fall into the scope of the modern type of rationality.

Skills and instrumental actions are rational in nature, but they are largely individual. On the other hand, written rules and instructions may not always be rational, because they do not reproduce all the secrets of mastery, they cannot replace technology that remains unarticulated. In addition to expanding the modern type of rationality, taking into account the potential of the inarticulate, there are also possibilities for its expansion, taking into account the reservoir of polysemanticism. The meaning of scientific provisions is thought of ambiguously, but the meaning of rationality as such depends on the implicit context of knowledge as knowledge-skill, knowledge-power, etc. with articulation "outside". Modern scientists argue that meaning is also inseparable from the personal certainty that is invested in the proclaimed scientific judgment.

It can be concluded that for the modern post-non-classical type of rationality, in addition to its implementation in the mode of structural space, a holistically grasped image of this space is important. Gestalt is important - a mental formation necessary to recreate a single holistic structure that unites and connects various elements and components. Penetration into the modern mentality of the foundations of the Eastern worldview makes it relevant to identify "cosmic rationality". It could include the ideas of harmony, the integrity of man and the cosmos, the ideas of the right path and personal destiny.

The sociocultural type of rationality, which takes into account hierarchy, subordination and other functional standards of behavior, shows how reasonable the norms of the world created by man are. As an innovative type of rationality, scientists distinguish communicative rationality.

The existence of “rationality traps”, when a rational strategy of individual action leads to collective social irrationality, is considered especially relevant for this stage of development of the methodology. It is shown that under certain circumstances a completely rational individual strategy can be destructive and destructive for the individual.

Topic 6. Development of self-developing synergetic systems and new strategies for scientific research

In modern post-non-classical science, the entire potential of descriptive sciences, disciplinary knowledge, problem-oriented interdisciplinary research, etc. is focused on recreating the image of objective reality. The study of self-developing synergetic systems takes place within the framework of interdisciplinary research in several directions: 1) the model proposed by the founder of synergetics G. Haken; 2) I. Prigogine's model; 3) the model of the Russian school headed by S.P. Kurdyumov, and others. theorist Herman Haken (b. 1927) at the first conference on the problems of self-organization. In the modern post-non-classical picture of the world, orderliness, structure, as well as chaos, scholasticism, are recognized as objective, universal characteristics of reality, present at all structural levels of development. The problem of the regulation of the behavior of non-equilibrium systems is the focus of synergetics (from the Greek synergos - lit. "syn" - with and "ergos" - action, i.e. assistance, participation) - the theory of self-organization, which has made it its subject to identify the most general patterns spontaneous structure genesis.

An indicator of progress as a state tending to increase the complexity of the system is the presence in it of the internal potential of self-organization. This latter is conceived as a global evolutionary process, therefore the concept of "synergetics" has become widespread in modern philosophy of science and is most often used in the sense of "concerted action", "continuous cooperation", "sharing". Haken, in his classic work Synergetics, noted that in many disciplines, from astrophysics to sociology, corporate phenomena are observed, which often lead to the emergence of microscopic structures or functions. Synergetics in its current state focuses on those situations in which the structures or functions of systems undergo dramatic changes at the macroscale level. She is especially interested in the question of how exactly subsystems or parts produce changes that are entirely due to the processes of self-organization. Paradoxically, when moving from a disordered state to a state of order, all these systems behave in a similar way.

In 1982, at a conference on synergetics held in the USSR, specific priorities for the new science were identified. G. Haken, in particular, emphasized that in connection with the crisis of highly specialized areas of knowledge, information must be compressed to a small number of laws, concepts or ideas, and synergetics can be considered as one of such attempts. In his opinion, the principles of self-organization of systems different in nature (from electrons to people) are the same, therefore, we should talk about the general determinants of natural and social processes, which synergetics is aimed at finding.

Thus, synergetics turned out to be a very productive scientific concept, the subject of which was the processes of self-organization - spontaneous structure genesis. In the domestic model of synergetics and its interpretation by Russian scientists of the school of S. P. Kurdyumov, attention is focused on the processes occurring in the "with aggravation" mode. Synergetics included new priorities of the modern picture of the world - the concept of an unstable non-equilibrium world, the phenomenon of uncertainty and multi-alternative development, the idea of ​​the emergence of order from chaos.

The fundamental idea of ​​synergetics is that disequilibrium is conceived in line with the sources of the emergence of a new organization, i.e. order (that is why the main work of I. Prigogine and I. Stengers is called "Order out of chaos"). The origin of order is equated to spontaneous matter. The system is always open and exchanges energy with the external environment, depends on the characteristics of its parameters. Non-equilibrium states are caused by energy flows between the system and the environment. The processes of local ordering are carried out due to the influx of energy from outside. According to G. Haken, the processing of energy supplied to the system goes through many stages, which ultimately leads to order at the microscopic level: the formation of microscopic structures (morphogenesis), movement with a small number of degrees of freedom, etc. With changing parameters, the same system can demonstrate different freedoms of self-organization. Under highly non-equilibrium conditions, systems begin to perceive those factors to which they were indifferent, being in a more equilibrium state. Consequently, the intensity and degree of their nonequilibrium are important for the behavior of self-organizing systems.

Self-organizing systems find internal (immanent) forms of adaptation to the environment. Non-equilibrium conditions cause the effect of corporate behavior of elements that, under equilibrium conditions, behaved independently and autonomously. In situations of lack of equilibrium, coherence, i.e. the consistency of the elements of the system increases significantly. A certain number or ensemble of molecules exhibits coherent behavior, which is assessed as complex. In The Philosophy of Instability, I. Prigogine emphasizes: “It seems that molecules located in different regions of the solution can somehow communicate with each other. In any case, it is obvious that far from equilibrium, the coherence of the behavior of molecules increases enormously. In equilibrium, the molecule sees only its neighbors and "communicates" only with them. Far from equilibrium, each part of the system sees the entire system as a whole. We can say that in equilibrium matter is blind, but out of equilibrium it sees. "G. Haken calls these "collective" movements modes. In his opinion, stable modes adjust to unstable ones and can be excluded. In the general case, this leads to a colossal decrease in the number degrees of freedom, i.e. to orderliness.

Synergetic systems at the level of abiotic existence (inorganic, red matter) form ordered spatial structures; at the level of unicellular organisms, they interact through signals; at the level of multicellular organisms, diverse cooperation is carried out in the course of their functioning. The identification of a biological system is based on the presence of cooperating dependencies. The work of the brain is evaluated by synergetics as a "masterpiece of cell cooperation".

New strategies of scientific research in connection with the need to master self-organizing synergistic systems are based on a constructive increase in knowledge in the so-called theory of directed disorder, which is associated with the study of the specifics and types of interrelation between the processes of structuring and chaos. Attempts to comprehend the concepts of "order" and "chaos" are based on the classification of chaos, which can be simple, complex, deterministic, intermittent, narrow-band, large-scale, dynamic, etc. The simplest type of chaos - low-dimensional - is found in science and technology and can be described using deterministic systems; it differs complex temporal, but very simple spatial behavior Low-dimensional chaos accompanies the irregular behavior of nonlinear media In a turbulent regime, both temporal and spatial parameters will be complex, uncoordinated Deterministic chaos implies the behavior of nonlinear systems, which is described by equations without scholastic sources, with regular initial and boundary conditions.The reasons for the loss of stability and the transition to chaos are noise, external interference, disturbing factors.The presence of diverse absolutely random sequences is sometimes considered the source of chaos.Circumstances causing chaos include the fundamental instability of motion, when two close states can generate different development trajectories, sensitively reacting to the scholasticism of external actions.

Modern research significantly complements the traditional views on the processes of chaotization. Chaos entered the postclassical picture of the world not as a source of destruction, but as a state derived from the primary instability of material interactions, which can be the cause of spontaneous structure genesis. In the latest theoretical developments, chaos appears not just as a formless mass, but as an extremely complex organized sequence, the logic of which is of considerable interest. Scientists define chaos as an irregular movement with periodically repeating, unstable trajectories, where the correlation of spatial and temporal parameters is characterized by a random distribution.

In the world of human relations, there has always been a negative attitude towards chaotic structures and a complete acceptance of orderly ones. Social practice is expanding against chaos, uncertainty, accompanying them with negative evaluative formulas, trying to push them beyond the limits of methodological analysis. The latter is expressed in the triumph of the rationalist utopias of totalitarian regimes that want to establish "complete order" and maintain it with "iron necessity." Modern science overcomes this attitude by offering a different, constructive understanding of the role and significance of the processes of chaos in the current synergetic paradigm.

The interpretation of the spontaneity of development as a negative characteristic in destructive terms "arbitrariness" and "chaos" comes into conflict not only with the calculations of modern natural-scientific and philosophical-methodological analysis, which recognizes chaos along with orderliness as universal characteristics of the development of the universe, but also with the ancient historical and philosophical a tradition in which chaos is conceived as an all-encompassing and generative principle. In the ancient worldview, incomprehensible chaos is endowed with a form-forming power and means "yawn", "yawning", the primary formless state of matter and the primary potentiality of the world, which, opening up, spews rows of life-givingly formed entities. More than 20 centuries later, such an ancient worldview was reflected in the conclusions of scientists who argue that the discovery of dynamic chaos is, in fact, the discovery of new types of motion, just as fundamental in nature as the discovery of elementary particle physics, quarks and gluns in as new elements of matter. The science of chaos is the science of processes, and not of states, of becoming, and not of being.

New strategies of scientific research in connection with the need to master self-organizing synergetic systems rethink the types of interconnection between structuring and chaotization, represented by the cyclicity scheme, binary and complementary relations. The binary structure of the interaction of order and chaos is manifested in the coexistence and confrontation of these two elements. Unlike cyclicity, which implies a change of states, the binary opposition of order and chaos is associated with a plurality of effective effects: it is both negation and transformation while maintaining the original basis (say, more order and more chaos), and unfolding the same confrontation on a new basis (for example, times are different, but the orders or vices are the same). The relation of complementarity presupposes the intrusion of unstructured forces and fragmented formations into an organized whole. Here one can observe the involvement in the integrity of alien elements unusual for it, inclusions in the established system of components of secondary structures, often without innovative transformations and changes in the system of complexity.

For the development of self-organizing synergetic systems, a new strategy of scientific search is indicated, based on a tree-like principle (structural-logical diagram, graph), which recreates the alternative development. The choice of the leading development trajectory depends on the initial conditions, the elements included in them, local changes, random factors and energy impacts. At the 1995th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, held in August XNUMX in Florence, I. Prigogine proposed to consider the idea of ​​quantum measurement as applied to the universe as such as the basis. The new strategy of scientific research involves taking into account the fundamental ambiguity of the behavior of systems and their constituent elements, the possibility of jumping from one trajectory to another and loss of memory when the system, having forgotten its past states, acts spontaneously and unpredictably. At critical points of directional changes, the effect of branches is possible, allowing numerous combinations of their evolution in the perspective of the functioning of such systems.

It is noteworthy that a similar methodological approach using branching analysis graphics has been applied A. J. Toynbee (1889-1975) in relation to the general civilizational development process. It does not ignore the right to existence of various types of civilizations, of which, according to the historian, there are about 21. General civilizational growth does not follow a single pattern, it assumes the multivariance of civilizational development, in which representatives of the same type of society react differently to the so-called challenge stories: some die immediately; others survive, but at such a cost that they are no longer capable of anything after that; others are so successful in resisting the challenge that they come out not only not weakened, but even having created the most favorable conditions for overcoming the coming trials; there are those who follow the pioneers as sheep follow their leader. The genesis of independent civilizations is not associated with separation from previous social formations of the same kind, but rather with mutations of sister-type societies or primitive societies. The disintegration of societies also occurs in different ways and at different speeds: some decay like a body, others like a tree trunk, and others like a stone in the wind. Society, according to Toynbee, is the intersection of the fields of activity of individuals, whose energy is the life force that creates history. This conclusion of the historian is largely consistent with one of the leading provisions of post-non-classical methodology, rethinking the role and significance of the individual as the initiator of the "creative leap", makes us perceive the past in a new way, the events of which took place under the influence of a minority, great people, prophets.

The peculiar organizational openness of the world implies a variety of ways of quantizing reality, various scenario-structural linkages of matter. The strategy of mastering self-organizing synergetic systems is associated with such concepts as "bifurcation", "fluctuation", "chaosom", "dissipation", "attractors", "nonlinearity", "uncertainty", which are endowed with a categorical status and are used to explain the behavior of all types systems - deorganic, organismic, social, activity, ethnic, spiritual, etc.

In conditions far from equilibrium, bifurcation mechanisms operate, suggesting the presence of bifurcation points and the non-uniqueness of the continuation of development. The results of their actions are difficult to predict. According to I. Prigogine, bifurcation processes testify to the complication of the system. N. Moiseev argues that, in principle, every state of the social system is a bifurcation, and in the global dimensions of anthropogenesis, the development of mankind has experienced at least two bifurcations: the first occurred in the Paleolithic era and led to the establishment of a taboo system that limited the operation of biosocial laws (do not kill!) , the second - in the Neolithic era and is associated with the expansion of the geological niche (development of agriculture and cattle breeding).

Fluctuations, i.e. perturbations are divided into two classes: those created by the external environment and reproduced by the system itself. Fluctuations can be so strong that they have a systemic density, giving it their own fluctuations and, in fact, changing the mode of its existence. They bring the system out of its inherent type of order, but whether it is necessarily to chaos or to another level of order is a separate question.

The system over which perturbations scatter is called dissipative. In essence, this is a characteristic of the behavior of the system during fluctuations that completely covered it. The main property of a dissipative system is its extraordinary sensitivity to all kinds of influences and, in connection with this, extreme non-equilibrium.

Attractors are called attracting sets that form a kind of centers to which elements gravitate. For example, when a large crowd of people accumulates, a person cannot indifferently pass by it without showing curiosity. In the theory of self-organization, such a process is called sliding to the point of accumulation. Attractors concentrate scholastic elements around themselves, thereby structuring the environment and becoming participants in the creation of order.

The priority direction of the new paradigm - the analysis of unstable, non-equilibrium systems - faces the need to study the phenomenon of ontological uncertainty, which fixes the absence of a real referent of the future. In the middle of the twentieth century. uncertainty has interested a number of Western scientists in the framework of the problems of cybernetics and computer communications. In the works of N. Wiener, K. Shannon, W. Ashby, H. Hartley, information was made dependent on uncertainty and measured by its measure. It was generally accepted that uncertainty (or surprise) is inversely proportional to probability: the more likely an event is, the less uncertain or unexpected it is. Further analysis showed that this dependence in many respects only seems simple: uncertainty is a kind of interactions devoid of a final stable form. It can be derived from the heteronomous nature of the object-event, when it happens, as they say, right before our eyes, ahead of all kinds of forecasts, calculations and expectations. The phenomenon of uncertainty is identified with the potential completeness of all possible changes within the existing fundamental physical constants. Probability assumes a stable distribution of features of the population and is aimed at calculating the continuum of possible changes.

For the new strategy of scientific research, the category of randomness is relevant, which appears as a characteristic of the behavior of any type of system, not only complex, but also simple. Moreover, their further study, no matter how carefully it is carried out, does not in any way lead to liberation from chance. The latter means that the properties and qualities of individual phenomena change their values ​​independently and are not determined by the list of characteristics of other phenomena. In one of the latest interpretations, such randomness was called dynamic chaos. Generated by the action of secondary, irregular, small causes or the interaction of complex causes, randomness is a concrete, special manifestation of uncertainty.

The capability category reflects the future state of the object. The opportunity is aimed at correlating the prerequisites and trends of an evolving phenomenon and suggests options for subsequent stages of development and change. A set of possibilities constitutes an existential field of uncertainty. The current situation is often assessed as uncertain due to the presence of many competing opportunities. Uncertainty accompanies the selection procedure and qualifies the "pre-selection" state of the system. Moreover, choice is understood not only as a conscious and purposeful action, but also as an actualization of the scholastic causality of a natural or natural-historical process. Uncertainty potentially contains as equally possible numerous options when "everything is possible" (of course, within the limits of fundamental physical constants). Then it is organized into a situation and in its completed form is the opposite of itself, i.e. certainty.

The statistical regularities necessary in the new strategy for studying self-organizing systems are formed in the language of probability distributions and manifest themselves as laws of mass phenomena based on large numbers. It is believed that their action is found where for a variety of random causes there are deep necessary connections. They do not give absolute repeatability, however, in the general case, their assessment as regularities of permanent causes is justified. Modern synergetics is characterized by the distinction between two evolutionary branches of development: organismic and inorganic. The living world confirms the unique ability to produce ordered forms, as if following the principle of "order from order". The aspiration of inert matter is the approach to chaos, the increase in entropy with subsequent structure genesis. The basis of subtle physical laws is atomic disorder. The main evolutionary feature of living things is the minimum increase in entropy. From the thesis about the minimum production of entropy, it follows that conditions prevent the system from moving into a state of equilibrium, it goes into a state of entropy, which is as close to equilibrium as circumstances allow.

The postulate of modern natural science - "enough is what is overwhelmingly probable" - does not exclude the "piece by piece" analysis of unexpected, unlikely, but because of this, the most capacious events, which is facilitated by such innovative means of the scientific search strategy as situational determination (case stadies), abduction , cumatoid.

Analysis by type of "case stadies" (case studies) involves the study of individual, special situations that do not fit into the established canons of explanation. It is believed that the idea of ​​a situational approach goes back to the ideographic (descriptive) method of the Baden school. There are two types of case studies: textual and field. The advantage of case studies is that the content of the knowledge system is revealed in the context of a certain set of conditions, specific and special forms of life situations, thereby opening the veil over the secrets of the real cognitive process.

The phase of "conclusion to the best explanation of facts" is called abduction. Such conclusions are used in everyday life and in practice. For example, a doctor looks for the cause of the disease by the symptoms of a disease, a detective looks for a criminal by the traces left at the crime scene. Similarly, a scientist, trying to find the most successful explanation of what is happening, uses the abduction method: the significance of the procedure reflected by him and the construction of a new and effective methodological strategy is very significant.

Another innovation of modern scientific and technological strategies is the kumatoid (from the Greek kuma - wave) - a certain kind of floating object, which is characterized by the fact that it can appear, form, or disappear, disintegrate. He does not represent all his elements at the same time, but, as it were, represents them in a peculiar "sensual-supersensory" way. For example, such a systemic object as a people cannot be represented and localized in a certain spatio-temporal area, since it is impossible to collect all the people so that the object is holistically represented. However, this object is not fictitious, but real; Another most simple and easily accessible example is the student group. This is also a kind of floating (sometimes disappearing, sometimes appearing object), which is not found in all systems of interactions. So, after the end of the training sessions, the group as an integral object no longer exists, while in certain, institutionally programmed situations (group number, number of students, general characteristics), it as an object is detected and self-identified. In addition, such a cumatoid is also supported outside of institutions, fueled by diverse impulses - friendship, rivalry, solidarity, support, etc.

The peculiarity of the kumatoid is that it is not only indifferent to spatio-temporal localization, but also loosely attached to the substrate itself - the material that makes it up. Its qualities are systemic, and therefore depend on the presence or absence of its constituent elements, and in particular on the trajectory of their development or behavior. A kumatoid cannot be uniquely identified with one specific quality or with a set of similar qualities fixed in a material way. All social life is flooded with floating objects - kumatoids. Another characteristic of this phenomenon is a certain predicativity of its functioning (to be a people, to be a teacher, to be a member of a particular social group, etc.). Some reproduction of the most typical features of behavior is expected from the kumatoid.

New strategies of scientific research point to the fundamental hypothetical nature of knowledge. In particular, in one of the possible interpretations of the post-non-classical picture of the world, such a state of the universe is substantiated when, despite the unpredictability of fluctuations (random perturbations and changes in initial conditions), the set of possible trajectories (paths of system evolution) is defined and limited. Random fluctuations and bifurcation points change the trajectory of the system in a difficult predictable way, however, these trajectories gravitate towards certain attractor types and, as a result, bring the system, which is unstable with respect to the smallest changes in initial conditions, into a new unstable state.

Topic 7. Science as a social institution

7.1. Institutionalization of science and its philosophical problems

In a broad sense, a social institution is interpreted as an element of the social structure, the historical form of organization and regulation of social life - a set of institutions, norms, values, cultural patterns, sustainable forms of behavior. Numerous definitions of science available in the literature agree on one thing: they all interpret science as a peculiar form of activity. When defining science, reference is most often made to its genetic links with culture, which is the most solid foundation of science. At the same time, the claims of science to the status of a social institution are justified by two circumstances. Firstly, the boundaries of its functioning are so extensive that it certainly touches culture and enters into communication with it. Secondly, science itself is capable of becoming a truly solid foundation for culture, both in terms of activity and technology. Therefore, it is quite appropriate and legitimate to call science a sociocultural phenomenon, which is why its applied role is significantly expanding. The commonwealth of science and culture is capable of making a civilization.

Of course, the role of science is not limited to its contacts with culture. The possibilities of science are much wider. Included in the social context, it can influence the policy of society, satisfy its ideological needs. There are various models of the relationship between science and ideology: condemnation, indifference, apologetics, exploitation, etc. Science can be in bondage, fulfilling a "social order". This practice is especially characteristic of the military (defense) industry. The humanities are the most dependent on ideology, and the natural sciences are the least. Technical sciences are limited by applied goals, demand from the production side, and the degree of implementation. But science cannot be absolutely freed from the influence of society, although it strives for this. The socio-psychological factors that determine science require the introduction into the context of science of ideas about historical and social consciousness, reflections on the types of behavior of scientists, cognitive mechanisms of cognition and motivation of scientific activity. They oblige science to be subjected to sociological research, especially since, being a socio-cultural phenomenon, science has not only positive, but also negative consequences of its development.

Modern science depends on many factors that determine its development, among which, in addition to the demands of production and the economy, one can name state priorities, and their own intellectual, philosophical, religious and aesthetic factors, as well as mechanisms for social support for scientific research. Together, all these factors impose ethical requirements on the scientist: disinterestedness, objectivity, scientific conscientiousness, a sense of duty to intellectual traditions that determine his moral guidelines.

Science, understood as a socio-cultural phenomenon, involves correlation with the type of civilizational development. According to the classification of A. J. Toynbee, 21 types of civilizations are distinguished. A more general approach involves a general civilizational division, taking into account two varieties of civilizations: traditional and technogenic. There are some differences between them. In particular, the rethinking of traditional conservative concepts is dictated by the need to use not only internal, but also universal reserves of thinking. The technogenic type of development implies an accelerated change in the natural environment in conjunction with the active transformation of the social ties of the human factor. The cultural matrix of technogenic development goes through the stages of pre-industrial, industrial, post-industrial development. The tercentenary of the life of a technogenic civilization has demonstrated its activity, bordering on aggressiveness, which indicates the presence of deep consequences of human intervention in the secrets of nature and its responsibility to society.

The personality of a scientist, his movement towards the truth is a traditional object of interest of the scientists themselves. For example, Max Weber (1864-1920) saw the duty of a scientist in the constant overcoming of himself, the inertia of his own thinking. And those who are not capable of this should not engage in science! Intellectuals are a special scientific environment. Its most prominent representatives make up the so-called elite (from the French elite - the best, choice). According to some estimates, bursts of scientific activity of the elite have two peaks: the first at the age of 32-36 years, the second - at the age of 42-46 years. Such scientific fruitfulness is inherited in rare cases. According to some observations (V.P. Kokhanovsky, T.G. Leshkevich, and others), with age, the elite loses its “eliteness”, formally preserving its image and slowing down the advancement of the young. Note that the authors' reasoning about elites in science has no empirical evidence, but it is assumed that there may be. So, for example, V.P. Kokhanovsky considers five signs as conditions for belonging to the elite, the presence of which, as he believes, is the basis for promotion to the category of elites:

1) election of a scientist as a full member, corresponding member, honorary member of academies, scientific institutions and societies;

2) awarding prizes and medals for scientific activity;

3) inclusion of biographical information about the scientist in special reference books and encyclopedias;

4) participation in the work of editorial boards, publications with a high scientific qualification;

5) a high citation index of a scientist by members of the world scientific community.

An institutional approach to science in Russia has not yet taken shape, but it promises a positive outlook. The ancestor of this approach is the American sociologist Robert King Merton (b. 1910). As is known, the concept of "social institution" reflects the degree of fixation of one or another type of human activity and informal relations by the type of agreements and negotiations to the creation of organizational structures. In this regard, there is a word usage about political, social, religious institutions, as well as the institution of the family, school, institution. But the philosophical basis of this phenomenon in Russia has not yet developed.

Institutionality in relation to an individual subject has a coercive force. The Institute, according to Weber, unites people, including them in collective activities, systematizes educational processes. In their infancy, these norms existed in medieval monasteries and universities, in the system of professional scientific activity. The effectiveness of education is determined by the goals set by the participants in the process; it depends on what they want to realize through education. And the problem of professional and social orientation is connected with this, i.e. how a person determines his place in life, in the system of social relations.

Professional and social orientation are largely interconnected. So, if professional orientation implies the existence of a set of professions in which the subject can realize his available opportunities, then social orientation is understood as the determination by a person of his place in the system of social relations, his choice of his social position. Society does wrong if it does not support people's desire for social advancement. This desire creates competitiveness, and accordingly, society has more opportunities to choose candidates for certain positions, including in science. Market transformations in Russia have significantly increased the orientation of young people towards education. There are more people who want to get a financial, economic, legal education, and there are fewer and fewer people who want to become workers. People want to be not an object, but the subject of their destiny, they want to take an active position in life. They do not now expect favors either from nature or from the authorities. As Zh. T. Toshchenko writes, when studying the professional orientation of secondary school students, it turned out that only one of the respondents wished to become a worker - a prospector (it seems that he dreamed of finding a gold nugget!).

7.2. Development of knowledge transfer methods and dynamics of scientific knowledge

Each country is interested in the progress of science due to its obvious advantages for its development. In human society, there are several ways to transfer knowledge from generation to generation: synchronous, diachronic, translational, etc. The essence of synchronous transmission is the assimilation of knowledge in contact communication between generations when they exist together. The diachronic method involves the transfer of knowledge between generations through the transmission of knowledge. There is no impassable line between these forms, they mutually intersect and complement each other. Modern society is constantly improving the methods of transferring knowledge both horizontally (territorially) and vertically (from generation to generation). The most significant way of transmitting knowledge - writing - characterizes the level of development of society, connects the past with the present and future, making it timeless. The mass spread of writing contributed to the formation of the so-called information society.

It is believed that the spoken language is closest to the signified. Words, a voice, are closer to reason than a written sign. Such a two-layer structure of the language was first studied by the famous Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). He proposed to consider language as a system, distinguishing between linguistics of language and linguistics of speech, synchrony and diachrony, and singled out such properties of language as objectivity and operationality. Scientific knowledge has its own requirements for language: neutrality, lack of individuality and an accurate reflection of being. The language of science should be a copy of the object of study, although it always turns out to be a prisoner of the mentality, containing the traditions of expression, habits, superstitions, the "spirit" of the people. Writing was originally conceived as a way of depicting speech and as a way to replace personal participation, but at the same time it limited free reflection, suspended the flow of thought.

The methods of transmission of scientific knowledge are connected with the type of social system. In a traditional society, an important place is occupied by the figure of a teacher, a teacher who transfers knowledge to his students. The student must grasp and reveal meanings, deobjectify the content of knowledge, applying it to his own individual actions. Today, information technology has a great influence on the transmission of scientific knowledge. They have significant advantages: they have a much larger amount of information, a higher speed of translation and processing. The intensification of information technologies increases the level of development of people's education, the intellectualization of society, and expands its computerization. The new reality offers a person virtual ways of interaction: anonymously, impersonally, without moralization. The Internet blurs strict learning criteria, making it difficult to select meaningful information. He is "on the other side of good and evil."

7.3. The problem of social regulation of science

Social regulation of science is a process of development by society and the state of value orientations, strategic priorities, legal norms governing the activities of the scientific community, research organizations and specific scientists. The need for such regulation is due to the fact that science, being a social institution, performs important functions related to the growth of new knowledge, the development of scientific and technological progress, etc. Therefore, society, the state cannot be indifferent to the problems of scientific development. Meanwhile, there are many controversies in this area. The American philosopher of technology E. Layton, who studied the problem of social regulation of science on the example of 700 technological innovations, came to the conclusion that it is impossible to obtain momentary benefits from innovative capital investment. As you can see, empirical practice does not contribute to the introduction of scientific innovations in industry. The inhibitory mechanisms of the latter hold back technical progress, "work" in favor of preserving the existing technology, protecting it from abrupt change and deconstruction. This practice does not benefit the accelerated introduction of technical innovations into production and does not guarantee that innovations will find their technological application. At the same time, scientists come to the conclusion that if scientific activity for the production of fundamental knowledge and its application are suspended for at least 50 years, they will never be able to resume due to the depreciation of existing knowledge.

The problem of the interaction of the artificial world with the natural world still remains unsolvable. So, for example, low-frequency generators used in household appliances change the usual environment of everyday human existence. But the study of the consequences of their influence is not organized, although preliminary experiments have proved the detrimental effect of this effect on the psyche and human health. The absence of a co-evolutionary strategy in the state regulation of technological developments introduces disharmony of a psychological and medical nature into the structure of a healthy lifestyle.

The social status of a modern scientist is alarming: one can state the presence of numerous social, economic, logistical, financial, psychological, axiological and other problems that negatively affect his social and legal status.

All of these problems can be addressed to the system of relationships that have developed between science and government. The French philosopher M. Foucault tried to find out the relationship between power and knowledge. It seemed to him that science is a synonym for power, and he formulated the idea "Knowledge is power" (Russian version: "Knowledge is power"). The relationship between power and science in Russia has always been complex. In particular, the Soviet government, under the guise of social demagogy about the gradual convergence of physical and mental labor during the period of the so-called "full-scale construction of communism", led a political line to reduce the wages of scientific workers to the level of the wages of workers engaged in manual labor, in order to thus create the appearance of realizing his propaganda venture. Gradually, as a result of this adventuristic policy, the prestige of mental labor fell. The Soviets have sunk into oblivion, but the tendency lives on by inertia, stimulating migration to where human thought is worth something - to the West. According to some estimates, the number of people who emigrated from the country by the beginning of this century exceeded ten million. True, the human losses of this time were compensated by the tide from the South, the return of compatriots home to their historical homeland and the influx of unskilled labor, the unemployed, from the former fraternal republics. Truly, totalitarianism and science are incompatible!

7.4. Costs of Technological Progress and Problems of Overcoming Global Crises

Modern changes in the world associated with technological progress have occurred mainly due to a significant increase in employment in the service sector and, on the contrary, a significant reduction in the number of workers in the production system. For example, in the United States by the end of the last century, 22% of workers were employed in industry, 3% in agriculture, and 75% in the service sector. The release of labor in the sphere of production and its redistribution in favor of services was facilitated by such factors as the growth of labor productivity, automation of labor operations, etc. The service sector is not only household services. The category of services includes information services, business, professional, legal, organizational, advertising, medical, educational, trade, transport, communication services, etc.

A similar alignment in the distribution of labor resources is typical for most developed Western countries that have reached the level of post-industrial society in their development. The introduction of advanced technologies in industry and agriculture turned out to be so significant that it became possible for a significant amount of labor resources to be "redistributed" into the service sector and marketing. Such is the specificity of the post-industrial society, which is often also called the information society. The meaning of such a bifurcation of this concept is that this kind of society is associated with increased human activity, and it is impossible to imagine it without information support, without the ability of a person to quickly respond to a changing life situation, his initiative, sociability; without his education and awareness, upbringing and competence. People in this society are not so divided along the lines of class; these signs are erased, although they have not completely disappeared.

In a post-industrial society, the division of workers along class lines gives way to income differentiation. Thus, employees in such a society are not only workers (as it was in an industrial society), this category includes both specialists and managers of enterprises, each of whom can have his share in production in the form of shares. Another, no less common, social stratum of the post-industrial society is the so-called middle strata, which, as a rule, form the basis of society. At the top of this division are the high and very high income strata. On the other hand, at the bottom, there are extremely low-income strata who receive subsidies from society, and even lower are the marginalized, who are a "reserve" for drug addiction and crime. This division is not immovably stable. On the contrary, it is unstable, which is considered in sociology in terms of vertical mobility. Social justice in a post-industrial society is achieved in civilized forms, through negotiations, through the mediation of trade unions between the employer and the employee.

The connection between science and economics is a special problem of post-industrial society. On the one hand, the specificity of this problem lies in the fact that its solution, along with energy intensity, is also financially costly and requires large investments with uncertain profitability. In many cases, scientific projects are supported by private entities such as the Club of Rome. On the other hand, the development of technology, divorced from humanistic goals, can have devastating consequences: threats of environmental disasters; unpredictable consequences of the development of genetic engineering and cloning; scientizirovannoe worldview, etc. This kind of danger can be considered in two aspects: natural (earthquakes, floods, snowfalls, avalanches, etc.) and man-made (mistakes in planning, calculations, design, etc.). At the same time, forecasting is one of the important and responsible tools in science. The environment, socio-cultural components, market dynamics, government priorities are all important components of the forecasting process.

In the "science - technology" system, the problem of the scientist's responsibility becomes important. Today, a scientist who is successfully engaged in scientific research realizes the significance of his discovery and puts it into practice himself. However, the current stage in the development of science is characterized by multifaceted, branched, complex scientific and technical collective developments, united not around a leader, but around a concept, an idea. The principle of a scientist's personal responsibility for the consequences of his discoveries is being replaced by the principle of collective responsibility, which is often depersonalized. From this fact, an increase in the role of the state in regulating the processes of scientific and technological progress necessarily follows.

7.5. Problems of social regulation of scientific and technological progress

Entering the XNUMXst century, Russian society suddenly felt the need for spatial and temporal self-determination and the development of a socio-political scientifically verified development strategy. Among the many possible paradigms (modernization, postmodernization, globalization, virtualization), preference was given to globalization with a slight bias towards modernization and a hint of postmodernization. In this regard, the works of I. Wallerstein, S. Eisenstadt, J. Alexander, R. Robertson, W. Beck and others turned out to be in demand in social philosophy. Philosophers on this issue were mainly with revelatory publications addressed to foreign authors. Certain aspects of the typology of social changes were touched upon in the works of N. E. Pokrovsky, A. F. Filippov, V. F. Shapovalov and others. Nikolai Berdyaev, although it is obvious that the philosopher of the XNUMXth century could not look so far. V.P. Kokhanovsky and his co-authors, noting the role of power in the development of science, write about its dual function: either it oversees science or dictates power priorities. The latter depends, as we believe, not on the government, but on the specific person representing it, his authoritarianism or democracy, culture or lack thereof.

In the most detailed form, the dynamics of scientific progress is presented in the work of Thomas Kuhn. For him, scientific activity is an event that has an axiological, sociological and psychological character. The paradigm concept developed by him most clearly characterizes the process of development of scientific activity. In the birth of paradigms, the role of intuition, a way of interpreting innovations, is great. The change of paradigms is vaguely reminiscent of the change of socio-economic formations through social revolutions (according to Marx), however, fortunately, with less human losses. Ideally, the natural change of paradigms in science makes state regulation of the latter redundant, especially since the state is not a scientific, but a political, administrative entity, the methods of which are contraindicated for science. In this regard, science is interpreted through the concept of ethics.

Ethics (Greek ethika, from ethos - custom, disposition, character) is the science of ways for a person to overcome his shortcomings. For the first time this term was introduced into scientific use by Aristotle. In his "Nicomachean Ethics", this encyclopedia of morality, he developed the foundations of rules - the laws for the implementation of good deeds. Immanuel Kant put forward the principle of the categorical imperative - a universal law for all people: act as all people should act, increasing the good of society. Ethical systems were created in different eras. The most promising ethical system is value-oriented conventional ethics, organically correlated with the pragmatic method of science. It protects against speculation due to its bright value, axiological content, eliminates the danger of slipping towards mercantilism and naturalism.

Prominent figures of science have always had an interest in the problems of ethics. For example, the great Dutch materialist philosopher Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677), a follower of the teachings of D. Bruno, R. Descartes, T. Hobbes, acted as one of the radical representatives of determinism, opponents of teleology. In the theory of knowledge, he relied on the mind, which he considered as an infinite property of man - part of nature. Spinoza's main philosophical work is Ethics Proven in Geometrical Order (1675). Spinoza's ethics is the doctrine of substance and its modes.

In the book known to the world of scientists "Last Thoughts"Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) developed the mathematical consequences of the postulate (from Latin postulatum - requirement).

1. The principles of science, the postulates of geometry, are expressed only in the indicative mood, experimental truths are expressed in the same mood, and there is and cannot be anything else at the basis of the sciences.

2. In science, one cannot get a sentence that would say: do this or do not do that, which would correspond or contradict morality.

3. Science excites us, that delight which makes us forget even ourselves, and in this it is highly moral.

4. The harmony of the laws of nature gives the ideal, and this is the only ground on which morality can be built.

5. The passion that inspires the scientist is the love of truth, and is not such love the most moral?

6. Science leads to the subordination of private interests to common interests, and there is morality in this again.

7. Science gives us a sense of the necessary cooperation, solidarity of our labors with the labors of our contemporaries, our predecessors and our followers.

8. Science does not tolerate lies, insincerity.

9. Science, broadly understood, taught by teachers who understand and love it, can play a very useful and important role in moral education.

For Poincaré, morality is outside science, but above science. His sayings are contradictory in places, they are discussed, analyzed, but it is impossible not to recognize their utilitarian significance in science. Poincare was the founder of conventionalism, consistency (as applied to mathematics and physics). Later, Rudolf Carnap (USA) used this method in developing the principle of logical positivism and inductive logic.

A. Einstein characterizes the relationship between ethics and science in a peculiar way. He does not believe that science can teach people morality, ethics of behavior. Does not believe that moral philosophy can be built on a scientific basis. A scientific theory, according to Einstein, does not yet provide a basis for moral behavior, but it cannot contradict morality either. People want too much from ethics. The basic ethical questions that the scientist wants answered are: what can be? what should I do to reach the possible? what is the difference between one possible and another possible? Without answering these questions, some consider ethics unscientific.

So ethics is a pragmatic science. A clear understanding of the status of ethics is the key to understanding the ethical dimension of science as a whole.

7.6. Scientific and technological progress, public control and public administration

Public administration is the organizing and regulating activity of various public and state branches of government acting on behalf of the basic laws of society (V. E. Chirkin). Social management involves the impact on society in order to streamline it, preserve its qualitative specifics, improve and develop. There is also a system of spontaneous control, the impact of which on the system is the result of the intersection of various forces, masses, random individual acts (for example, the market), as well as conscious control carried out by state organizations. The boundaries, content and goals of management depend on the nature of the state system.

Scientific and technological progress has a significant impact on the nature of public administration, and its role is by no means diminished in a market economy. Management on the scale of a state like Russia is, one might say, an inevitability, an objective necessity. The implementation of current economic interests within the framework of a market economic model makes innovative projects very conflicting, based on unnatural decisions that do not take into account the possibilities of the environment. The scale of technical innovation, the conquest of nature, the depletion of its resources often testify to the shortsightedness of people, miscalculations and arbitrariness that will harm many generations over many decades. Therefore, for the current stage of development of the economy and production, the requirements of state regulation of technological developments are relevant, and the improvement of the co-evolutionary strategy is no less important. It requires an organic interweaving of the laws of the technical environment and natural reality, a harmonious convergence of all types of systems.

N. A. Berdyaev wrote with concern about the costs of state administration: “The fatal consequence of technology, subject only to its own law, which gives rise to technical world wars, is an exorbitant increase in etatism. The state becomes omnipotent, more and more totalitarian, and not only in totalitarian regimes; it does not wants to recognize no limits to its power and considers a person only as a means or tool" [14] .

The classic of management in the market conditions Henri Fayol at the beginning of the 15th century. wrote: "To manage means to organize, dispose, coordinate and control; to foresee, that is, to take into account the future and develop a program of action; to organize, that is, to build a double - material and social - organism of the institution; to dispose, that is, to force the staff to work properly; to coordinate, that is, to connect, unite, harmonize all actions and all efforts; to control, that is, to take care that everything is done according to the established rules and given orders"[XNUMX] .

In the theory of public administration, two types of it are distinguished. Direct management is carried out in the system of security, life support, orderliness of the economic and social system. The promising goals of management include improving the quality of life of the population, guaranteeing its rights and freedoms, ensuring social justice and social progress. The volume and complexity of solving these problems can be imagined if we take into account how much material resources and resources were spent on building communism and pushing a third of humanity to "develop" in this direction. Unfortunately, during the Soviet period, Russia did not comprehend the optimal methods and forms of economic management.

The concepts of the so-called technocracy, or the power of technology, being developed in Europe (in Russia, A. A. Bogdanov used the concept of "technological determinism" as a synonym, providing for the management of the country by technical specialists), had the main goal of achieving a revolutionary transformation of the living standards of the population through the implementation of scientific and technical revolution (T. Veblen, A. Berl, A. Frisch, J. K. Gilbraith and others). The weak link of the technocratic concept of social development lies in its underestimation of the spiritual component in the life of society. This concept misses the problems of public self-government at the middle level of the administrative system, the cultivation of democratic forms of recruitment to power, the development of civil society institutions and human rights. This concept does not provide for guarantees that protect society from crises, risks, terrorist acts and natural disasters.

Renowned sociologist and philosopher Carl Manheim (1893-1947) noted that the main problems of the modern West are the problems of achieving national unity, the participation of the population in public administration, the inclusion of the state in the world economic order, as well as social problems. Some of these problems are relevant for modern Russia. For example, Russia needs to create a single information space. We have many problems in the economic sphere as well. Russia occupies a leading place in the world in terms of the level of differences between the poor and the rich, whose wealth needs to be legalized and legitimized. The principle of justice in solving social problems has not yet become the main one for our country. The problems of a decent standard of living for the population are the subject of concern for trade unions, the media, public associations and organizations. "Discovering" the twentieth century, humanity looked at the world optimistically. There was hope that science would save the world and bring people happiness. Entering another, twenty-first century, humanity was concerned about the lack of its rights. With the advent of the human rights movement, the world began to be divided depending on the wealth or lack of this phenomenon. Respect for the rights of another has become the basis of communication not only for people, but also for states. Russia, having made a historical transition from totalitarianism to democracy, stood on a par with civilized countries. Having adopted the Constitution in 1993, the Russian Federation proclaimed itself a legal state built on the basis of civil society.

The development of the personal principle for a modern person turns into a loss of the sense of "we" and the acquisition of a sense of "loneliness in the crowd." Human, by definition Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), becomes "one-dimensional", with an atrophied socially critical attitude towards society, and because of this, he is not able to restrain and prevent social changes that may turn out to be objectionable. At the same time, society objectively turns out to be capable of imposing objectionable, "false" needs on it, drawing it into an arms race that is detrimental to it. This trend threatens the working class with the loss of its revolutionary role in history. This traditional place of the working class in modern conditions is passing into the hands of "outsiders" (lumpen, persecuted national minorities, the unemployed, etc.), as well as radical students and intellectuals. In his time, Marcuse wrote about the loss by the Marxist parties of their former revolutionary role and the revolutionary nature of their political programs. On a global scale, the bearers of the revolutionary initiative, in his opinion, are the disadvantaged peoples of the "third world", for the most part "one-dimensional". Describing the features of a "one-dimensional" person, Marcuse noted his sociability, dissatisfaction with life, loneliness in a situation of uselessness. To weaken these features, as the philosopher believed, it is possible by organizing social guardianship: a "helpline", familiarization with art and literature, opposing them to rampant consumer sentiment.

Topic 8. The main directions of the philosophy of science in the world

8.1. Hermeneutics - the philosophical legacy of H. G. Gadamer

The development of the philosophy of hermeneutics as one of the directions of modern European philosophy was started by the Italian legal historian Emilio Betti (1890-1970), and then continued by the German philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) in his works "Hermeneutic Manifesto" (1954), "General Theory understanding" (1955), "Truth and Method" (1960). Gadamer reconstructs the teachings of his predecessors and creates a philosophy of understanding. In its definition, this is a way of mastering the world by a person, in which, along with theoretical knowledge, direct experience (“experience of life”), consisting of various forms of practice (experience of history), forms of aesthetic experience, (“experience of art”) plays a significant role. The repository of experience is language and art. The sources of experience are education, legends, cultural traditions, comprehended by the individual in society. The hermeneutical experience in Gadamer's teaching is incomplete, which, he believes, is the epistemological problem of society. At the same time, the role of self-understanding of the subject and its coincidence with the interpretation, interpretation of one's existence is essential. The philosopher sees the main meaning of understanding someone else's text in "moving into someone else's subjectivity." Truly: it is impossible to understand another without feeling yourself in his place! Gadamer in the book "Truth and Method. The Main Features of the Philosophy of Hermeneutics" continues the metaphysical traditions of Plato and Descartes, defends the idea that the main carrier of understanding traditions is language.

Gadamer considered the so-called understanding psychology as the basis of hermeneutics as a way of directly comprehending the integrity of mental and spiritual life. He formulated the main problem of hermeneutics as follows: "How can individuality make a sensually given manifestation of someone else's individual life the subject of universally valid objective cognition?" Analyzing "pure" consciousness, Gadamer singles out the unconscious background of intentional acts, relegating hermeneutics to the role of the doctrine of being in the traditions of Hegelian dialectics. He comes to the conclusion that the too close connection of being with its past is an obstacle to the historical understanding of the true essence and value. According to Gadamer, the basis of historical knowledge is always a preliminary understanding given by the tradition within which life and thinking take place. Pre-understanding is available for correction, adjustment, but it is completely impossible to get rid of it. Gadamer regarded thought without prerequisites as a fiction that does not take into account the historicity of human experience. The carrier of understanding is language, linguistic understanding, revealed in the works of W. Humboldt.

Consciousness - "non-thematic horizon" - provides some preliminary knowledge about the subject, which constitutes the content of the "life world", which underlies the possible mutual understanding of individuals. According to the philosopher, in any study of a culture far from us, it is necessary first of all to reconstruct the "life world" of culture, in relation to which we can understand the meaning of its individual monuments. The works of poets - connoisseurs of the language - speak about the existence of culture.

The basic concepts of Gadamer's philosophy are "practice", "life", "word", "dialogue". Hermeneutic experience, i.e. moving into someone else's life, is based on the desire to understand the "other". At the heart of the gemeneutic experience lies the legend reflected in folklore; life experience, including lived events in generations, stored in people's memory, in legends, art, culture, in word usage. Art, according to Gadamer, can give a new impetus to the philosophy of life. Cultural traditions contribute to self-understanding and integration of the individual in society, postulating its genetic rootedness. This is how the hermeneutic circle is completed, establishing the connection of generations and their continuity; the epistemological incompleteness of the hermeneutic experience (movement into someone else's subjectivity) is noted.

Gadamer writes: “An experienced person appears to us as a fundamentally adogmatic person, who, precisely because he has experienced so much and learned so much from experience, has a special ability to acquire new experience and learn from this experience. The dialectic of experience receives its final completion on which something of final knowledge, but in that openness to experience which arises from experience itself"[16] .

The main thing that is acquired in experience is the readiness for renewal, change, for a meeting with the "other", which becomes "one's own". The experience of experiences, mistakes, suffering, broken hopes leads to the realization of one's limits and, at the same time, to the openness of the finite human being in the light of the universal, the universal. The openness of experience, the knowledge that one can make mistakes, leads to the search for truth through personal comprehension based on one's own experience. But experience is not only a moral test, it tests our skills "for strength". The experience is practical. It pacifies fantasies, binds the mind to reality. On the path of knowledge, one can come to true knowledge and force nature to serve oneself.

Gadamer divides the process of understanding into its component parts. He singles out pre-understanding, which grows out of addressing the matter in the form of prejudice, prejudice, prejudice. Tradition is involved in pre-understanding: we are always inside the tradition, the philosopher believes. A person in the perception of the text allows him to "speak". If a person wants to understand the text, then he must "listen" to it.

The hermeneutic intrudes into human subjectivity. Understanding is not transference into an alien subjectivity. It acts as an extension of its horizon and a view of another "something" in the right proportions. In Gadamer, things do not speak only because they do not have the ability to speak. In their silence, however, they determine the structure of the language, the environment in which a person lives. The thing preserves itself in the word. Thinking is the explication of the word.

Gadamer pays much attention to the understanding of the beautiful, which for him is Good. The beautiful in itself carries clarity and brilliance, it is a way of the manifestation of the good, the existing, given in an open form, in proportion and symmetry. The beautiful is the crown of understanding, its fullness.

The theoretical heritage of Gadamer is contradictory. His book "Truth and Method" reflected the goal of the philosopher's life. It states the description of two problems - truth and method. On this occasion, critics were ironic: the correct title of the book should not be "Truth and Method", but "Truth, but not Method". In one of his letters to his critic, Gadamer wrote: "In essence, I do not offer any method, but describe what is"[17].

V. A. Kanke, who studied the theoretical legacy of Gadamer, rightly notes: “... Over the years that have passed since the publication of Truth and Method, their historicity has been fully highlighted. This significantly brought together the understanding of the natural and human sciences. The opposition of hermeneutics to the natural sciences has lost its sharpness"[18].

8.2. Philosophy of Martin Heidegger

German thinker who had a huge impact on the philosophy of the twentieth century. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) began his career as an assistant to Professor Edmund Husserl of Freiburg University. After the patron retired, he headed the department. With the coming to power of the National Socialists in Germany, Husserl fell into disgrace for his Jewish origin, and Heidegger was forced to distance himself from him.

Heidegger became famous as the creator of the doctrine of ontology (lit. "the doctrine of being", from the Greek on, gen. n. ontos - being and logos - word, doctrine). The term "ontology" first appears in the "Philosophical Lexicon" by Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Heidegger in his "fundamental ontology" singles out "pure subjectivity" with the help of an analysis of human existence and seeks to free it from "inauthentic" forms of existence. In "Being and Time" (1927), he raises the question of the meaning of being, which, in his opinion, turned out to be "forgotten" by traditional European philosophy. After the publication of this book, Heidegger published a large number of philosophical writings (more than 100 volumes), but forever remained true to the ideas contained in this book. He receives nationwide fame, is elected rector of the Freiburg University. These were the years of the rise of fascism in Germany, and Heidegger was required to dismiss all Jews and socialists, with which he could not agree, so he was forced to leave the post of rector, but continued to remain a member of the fascist party until 1945. Subsequently, the authorities accused him of sympathizing with to Nazism, they demanded public repentance, but this did not happen, and he, offended, leaves the lecture activity.

Taken together, Heidegger's philosophical heritage can be qualified as a preaching of existentialism. For him, man is the only creature that raises the question of being, looking for meaning in it. Comprehension of the meaning of being, in turn, is associated with the awareness of the frailty of human existence. Considering the concept of authenticity-non-authenticity in the system of everyday existence, Heidegger draws attention to the fact that most people spend a significant part of their time in the world of work and society, not realizing the possibilities of individual existence. From Heidegger's point of view, a person's preoccupation with his place in the social hierarchy and interest in his social status determine his subordination to "others": a person must do what "they" (das Man) approve and demand. In the course of this conforming behavior, the individual is subtly and often imperceptibly affected by social norms and conventions and neglects his capacity for independent forms of activity and thought. Subordination and dependence on social norms in everyday life are manifested primarily in the averaging of social behavior to the level of homogeneity and identity, thereby a person is freed from the need for individual existence and responsibility for his individual existence and adapts to society. Meanwhile, writes Heidegger, "existing in these modes, the self of its own presence and the self of the presence of others have not yet found themselves, and accordingly lost. People exist in a way of non-self-standing and non-property"

Heidegger's characterization of the non-authentic way of people's behavior that prevails in their daily existence, in his opinion, had a "purely ontological significance" and is very far from a moralizing critique of everyday presence and from "cultural-philosophical aspirations." The central question for interpreting Heidegger's reflections on authenticity-non-authenticity arises: whether they are purely descriptive or evaluative categories. Although a number of interpreters of Heidegger lean towards the evaluative neutrality and interference of these reasonings of the thinker, there is an opinion that the distinction introduced by Heidegger is completely devoid of evaluative moments. First, these concepts have evaluative connotations both in their everyday use and in the philosophical texts of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Simmel, Scheler, to which the dichotomy considered by Heidegger goes back. Secondly, certain negative connotations are contained in Heidegger's description in the book "Being and Time" of the "fall" from the "I" into non-authentic ways of being, in particular, his description of non-authentic existence as absorption in everyday routine. At the same time, Heidegger's reasoning also has a cognitive, descriptive meaning. Other people with whom the individual lives next door are not only a threat to his individual existence. It is also possible to live authentically in being-with-others, if a person manages to look at them precisely as "others", i.e. perceive them as having their own being (Dasein), just as he has his human being. Another case is also possible: we no longer perceive them as Dasein. Our warm attitude towards them is replaced by the attitude as rivals or as those on whom we depend. When others become "them", the act of communication is broken, the dialogue becomes empty talk, the need for genuine understanding disappears. In this case, the question of how to be is replaced by the question "what to do?". The reaction is conditioned by the norms of class, ethnicity, profession, our income level, etc. Heidegger describes this case as the "fall" of Dasein.

A breakthrough to authentic existence is possible, according to Heidegger, on the basis of the process of release and individualization, during which a person experiences anxiety from leading a meaningless existence, feels the voice of conscience, is afraid of death, etc. Authenticity is life in anxiety and with anxiety, it is life with full understanding our uncertainty, our freedom: knowing that we are going to die frees us from our fall, awakens us. To be authentic, a person must prefer commitment to authentic possibilities, to accept his freedom, uniqueness, finiteness, failure, whereby he has the opportunity to create his authentic "I". The key to this project, according to Heidegger, is determination. The encounter with death reveals the radical individualization of human existence. Death is what isolates individuals: it tears the man out of the anonymous "Das man". In death the individual is indispensable - no one can die for him.

Heidegger interprets the meaning of historicity in a peculiar way. Linking the concepts of "historical past", "human and generational relations", he notes the desire of people to surpass the past, remaining devoted to it; choose a hero from the past as a model. Heidegger offers a way to transform an alienated, scattered existence into an existence on the path of repetition of authentic possibilities, to create an "ethics of liberation through authenticity".

Heidegger's ethical reflections are distinguished by their depth of thought. He is characterized by his own manner, style of philosophizing, which is his dignity and wisdom, his author's style.

8.3. Method of Alternatives by Karl Popper

The Austrian philosopher, logician and sociologist, member of the Vienna Circle, Karl Raimund Popper (1945-1902), who lived in Great Britain since 1994, formulated a method for solving scientific problems by comparing and mutually criticizing competing theories. He put forward the concept of falsifiability (refutability) as a demarcation criterion between science and "metaphysics".

The general idea of ​​Popper's method, called the method of alternatives, was formulated in the works "Objective knowledge", "Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge". According to Popper, it is important to always look for alternatives to the hypotheses we already have, and then push them against each other, identify and eliminate errors. It is expected that the resulting information will be greater than that contained in all hypotheses combined. Thus, the essence of the method consists not so much in the "criticism" of theory by practice, but in the speculative discovery of new problems and ontological schemes. The most interesting in this sense are precisely those theories that have not withstood practical tests - after all, useful lessons can be learned from failures that can be useful later on to create more advanced theories. The more new unexpected problems arise in the process of deliberately comparing alternative hypotheses with each other, the more progress, according to Popper, is provided to science.

However, this raises the question, what kind of criticism can be considered effective? The requirement of consistency of explanations does not imply a rejection of the originality of the sciences. The criterion of scientific character is a concept, but any concept is not tied to only one specific subject. The fact that physics and sociology fit under the concept of "science" does not imply a denial of their originality. The heightened interest in scientific knowledge, the increase in its reliability, to a large extent thanks to the works of Popper, led to the formation of the so-called historical school in the philosophy of science. Popper, the post-positivist founder of so-called critical rationalism, considered the relationship between competing and successive theories. Evolutionary epistemology is interpreted by him on the basis of the critical rationalism he developed.

How do scientists seek to solve problematic scientific situations? First of all, the discovery of rules, laws, theories, the use of which allows you to explain and understand the situation under study, predict new ones and interpret the events that have already happened. It is no coincidence that Popper outlines the path from problems (problem situations) to theories. This path is the main thoroughfare of science. Its development requires the use of a number of terms, the consideration of which may be important. Empiricism as a factual aspect of science is capable of: a) confirming or, as Popper put it, supporting a theory; b) fake it. In fact, demarcation contains both criteria: both confirmation and falsification. Concerned about the problem of confirmation, Popper avoids using the term "truth". Instead of truth, he speaks of reinforcement (confirmation), instead of falsity, he speaks of falsification. He is driven by the desire to draw as clearly as possible the line of demarcation between science and non-science.

According to Popper, science progresses from one problem to another, from a less profound problem to a deeper one. The goal of science is to achieve a highly informative content and a high degree of its possible falsification, refutability. Popper acknowledges that a theory that is less profound is easier to falsify, but that a theory that is deeper must, by definition, withstand encounters with more facts than a theory that is less specialized. A theory is in constant danger of falsification, and in this sense the degree (probability) of its falsification is growing.

A crude theory is harder to disprove, and non-scientific hypotheses, such as those in the arsenal of astrology, are generally not scientifically falsifiable. As the Russian proverb says: "Seven smart people cannot master one fool!"

A scientist, in contrast to a simple layman, constantly meets the danger of falsification, refutation of his views. Knowing perfectly well that man is a mistaken (fillibilistic) being, the scientist strives to get rid of this weakness of his. Yes, scientific life is a run along a strip of problems, here one cannot do without failures, but they must - such is the aspiration of a scientist - be overcome, and this is possible only through the deepening of scientific knowledge. The depth of theory is one of the main concepts of Popper's concept of the history of science.

All Popper's reasoning refers to the hypothetical-deductive sciences. They remain valid for both pragmatic and logico-mathematical sciences. When comparing two theories, there is always the possibility of preferring one theory to the other according to certain criteria. When comparing the pragmatic sciences, the criterion of efficiency comes to the fore. When comparing the logico-mathematical sciences, for example, the criterion of consistency and completeness of the system of axioms is taken into account. Thus, the principle of falsification is not merely an anti-verification principle; it is not a way to test the truth of knowledge on an empirical level. With its help, Popper seeks to solve the problem of critical revision of the content of scientific knowledge. He invariably emphasizes that science is a dynamic process, accompanied by a change of theories that interact, but do not complement each other.

8.4. The concept of scientific paradigms and revolutions by Thomas Kuhn

The American physicist, philosopher and historian of science Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922-1996) gained fame with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in which he outlined his concept of the philosophy of science. Kuhn presented the history of science as a periodical change of paradigms (for details, see Section 5.1). In his theory, this term is used in two senses: firstly, it denotes a set of beliefs, values, technical means that is characteristic of a given community, and secondly, it indicates the solution of puzzles that can replace explicit rules as the basis for solving as yet unsolved problems. puzzles in science. In the first case, the term "works" as a sociological category, here we are talking about a society of scientists, about people with their beliefs and values ​​(subjects of science). Characterizing them, Kuhn writes: "Scientists proceed in their work from the models learned in the learning process, and from their subsequent presentation in the literature, often without knowing and without feeling any need to know what characteristics gave these models the status of paradigms of the scientific community" [20 ] . In the second case, the validity of paradigms is revealed in the process of their application. The dominance of paradigms is the period of "normal science", which always ends with "an explosion of the paradigm from within".

The criterion of scientificity, as is known, is not invariable, unique and arbitrary. According to Kuhn, any science goes through three phases (periods) in its development: pre-paradigm, paradigm and post-paradigm, which corresponds to the stages of the genesis of science, "normal" science and its crisis. The change of paradigms is accomplished through revolutions in science. It occurs through an explosion, through catastrophes, through the destruction of the unproductive doctrinal structures of the intellectual elite. In this regard, Kuhn writes: "Like the choice between competing political institutions, the choice between competing paradigms turns out to be a choice between incompatible models of social life." The incompatibility of paradigms is due to the fact that the new paradigm radically changes the way scientific knowledge is interpreted. A new paradigm is born thanks to intuition. The pre-paradigm period is characterized by confrontation between scientific schools. With the assertion of the paradigm and the transition to "normal" science, the situation changes, schools leave the scene. At the same time, a commonality of theoretical and methodological positions of all representatives of this discipline is established. However, the further development of science leads to the identification of facts that cannot be explained with the help of the dominant paradigm, a crisis sets in in "normal" science. And then, as in the pre-paradigm period, the scientific community again breaks up into schools. The scientific revolution puts an end to the dominance of the old paradigm; replaced by a new one.

Subsequently, under the influence of criticism, Kuhn abandoned the interpretation of the scientific school as an education incompatible with "normal" science and the paradigm. The term "paradigm" has taken such strong positions in all branches of knowledge that many followers of Kuhn and researchers of science began to call the paradigm the most important constructive criterion. The condition for the functioning of the paradigm Kuhn considers its acceptance by the scientific community, which brings together scientists who, as a rule, belong to the same scientific discipline, work in the same scientific direction, adhere to common theoretical foundations, principles, and methods for solving research problems. The concept of the scientific community was central to the concept of the paradigm. For Kuhn, the paradigm is what unites the members of the scientific community: those who do not recognize the paradigm cannot be members of this community. Representatives of the scientific community have similar education and professional skills, they have mastered the same educational literature and learned the same lessons from it. They read the same scientific books, have the same sense of responsibility for developing the goals they share. They may belong to different subgroups, such as solid state physics, molecular or atomic physics. They may approach the same subject from different angles, but they are united in their scientific activity by a system of generally accepted attitudes, values, motivations, and methods by which their scientific field is explored. This unity is a prerequisite for the development of this field of science. According to Kuhn, members of the scientific community can focus exclusively on the most esoteric phenomena that interest them. Once accepted, the paradigms free the scientific community from the need to restructure its basic principles. They are relatively isolated from the demands of non-professionals and everyday life.

8.5. Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl

The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) became the founder of phenomenology - one of the main trends in the philosophy of the twentieth century. The starting point of phenomenology is his book Logical Investigations (in 2 volumes, 1901). Husserl is also known as a sharp critic of skepticism and relativism in philosophy, the carrier of which he considered the so-called psychologism - the belief that every cognitive act is the result of the structure of empirical consciousness (sense experience), and this is associated with the absence of truth, depending on the knowing subject. Husserl believed that the sciences of nature and history needed some justification. Such a justification can only be given by philosophy as a rigorous science, in particular the science of the phenomena of consciousness - phenomenology.

Empirical consciousness, according to Husserl, always turns out to be distorted due to subjectivity, and therefore it needs to be cleansed with the help of reduction, understood as liberation from natural human subjective layers. Such a reduction "correction for errors" gives a pure structure of the object of knowledge, which Husserl calls the fruit of intentionality (lit. "to be directed at something"). Thus, Husserl, with the help of rationality, solves the main issue that worries him: about the transparency of the connection between subject and object - thanks to intentionality. Philosophy for Husserl begins with the discovery of a correlation between the ways in which various aspects of the world are given to man and consciousness about the world. This opens up the possibility of a special type of research aimed at studying not the substantive content of the human relationship to the world, but its appearance in consciousness - a phenomenon.

Phenomenological research focuses on the phenomenon of the objectivity of consciousness: being depends on how you look at it. Consequently, the most important characteristic and property of consciousness is, according to Husserl, intentionality, i.e. direction of consciousness to the object. For him, consciousness is always "consciousness about something." Intentionality means that any phenomenon of objects in consciousness corresponds to its own intentional structure, consisting of many similar correlated components. The organization of the phenomenological method is precisely to investigate the structure of consciousness in conjunction with its essential components. Structure analysis is carried out in a reflective way. In this regard, phenomenology distinguishes between a natural attitude and its own phenomenological attitude: in the world of everyday thinking - a natural attitude - our life flows anonymously, i.e. remains outside the experience of intentional focus on objects. The ascent to the intentional structure of consciousness, to its immanent activity is possible thanks to the method of phenomenological reduction. It is through this method that we deal with genuine phenomena. Reduction allows you to get rid of the naivety of the natural setting of consciousness, which lies in the fact that it is focused on the knowledge of external objects, it is primarily interested in objects perceived from the senses or through the senses. It allows you to switch your consciousness to the study of your own activity in constituting objects. And only the phenomenological setting, achieved with the help of this reduction, makes it possible for consciousness to turn to itself, therefore the phenomenologist brackets the entire real natural world, which has a constant existential significance.

The purity of phenomenological experience (discovery of "pure" phenomena) is carried out if the object of experience is not "polluted", if the object is isolated in its pure form, in the absence of the temptation to see the object of knowledge in a simple correspondence between external and internal experience: "The deep source of all delusions arises from the original seemingly self-evident equalization of immanent temporality and objectively real temporality. Immanent temporality is inherent in human consciousness as an image of external physical time. It captures the purity of the flow of mental experiences that are relevant or irrelevant.

The method of phenomenological reduction allowed Husserl to clarify the meaning of the various objects themselves - from inanimate objects to one's own "I" and "other". These complementary aspects of intentionality are called by the terms "noesis" - a modus of intentional consciousness and "noema" - an objective meaning, an objective correlate, representing the poetic structure of consciousness and its noematic structure, i.e. the subject matter of the object.

One of the sections of Husserl's philosophy is the consideration of the stage of the method of transcendental phenomenology. Revealing the content of his philosophical research, Husserl especially focuses on the method of research in relation to the methods of formation of philosophical knowledge and its role in comprehending the meaning of the world as a whole.

Husserl is also the author of a number of philosophical works, among which the "Crisis of the European Sciences" stands out (the first two parts were published in 1936; later titled "The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", 1954). Critics attribute such definitions as scale, depth, etc. to this work. The book was written in terrible years for Germany. Husserl associated the arrival of fascism with the crisis of European civilization. He was worried about the origins of this crisis; he saw them in the "womb of technogenic civilization", in the inability of science to give an intelligible answer to the challenges of the current situation on the continent. Save the world, in his opinion, could only philosophy. In search of a "panacea," Husserl turns to the creative heritage of Galileo, whom he calls "the most outstanding thinker of modern times." In particular, he is attracted by Galileo's idea that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. The meaning of this saying is that, considering the unity of mathematical ideas and empiricism, not to allow their unjustified confusion. The merit of Galileo is to give natural science a mathematical status; Galileo's omission is that he did not turn to the comprehension of the original semantic procedure, which, being the idealization of the entire soil of theoretical and practical life, affirmed this procedure as a direct sensory world, from which the world of geometric ideal figures arises. What is given directly does not become the subject of reflection. As a result, mathematical ideas have lost their vitality.

The world of human experience Husserl calls the "sensory world", which is correlative to the intentionality of the subject. In this world, all human life unfolds. Thus, starting his philosophy with a reflection on the status of arithmetic concepts in which he hears the call of truth, Husserl brings the search to ethical requirements, in which the main truth of life is hidden.

Part II. Philosophy of technology

Topic 9. Philosophy of technology and methodology of technical sciences

9.1. The subject, content and objectives of the philosophy of technology

The concept of "technology" (from the Greek. techne - skill, skill, art) means, firstly, a set of specially developed methods of activity; secondly, the totality of artificial material and clothing means of activity; thirdly, knowledge about the methods and means of activity; fourthly, a specific, culturally determined process of expression of will. The philosophy of technology is an emerging section of philosophical science, the main content of which is philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of technology. Thus, the philosophy of technology basically boils down to the question of the application of philosophy to technology, i.e. to the question of how theoretical models, laws of a universal nature, methods, ideas accumulated by philosophy are applied to technology as a special subject of study.

The origins of the philosophy of technology can be traced in the works of ancient philosophers, but a systematic philosophical study of the phenomenon of technology began only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The term "philosophy of technology" was introduced into scientific use by the German scientist Ernest Kapp, who in 1877 published the book "Main Lines of the Philosophy of Technology". E. Kapp, K. Marx developed the essential characteristics of technical means in line with the idea of ​​objectification. In Russia, the foundations of the philosophical understanding of technology were laid by N. A. Berdyaev and P. K. Engelmeyer. A. A. Bogdanov (Malinovsky) (1873-1928) in the book "General Organizational Science" (in 2 volumes; 1913-1917) for the first time in Russia and Europe considered the problem of equilibrium and chaos. For obvious reasons, his research was continued in the West. In our country, intensive development of the philosophical problems of technology began only in the 1950s-1960s. This work was carried out in the following main areas:

1) the ontology of technology associated with the development of the ideas of K. Marx (A. A. Zvorykin, S. V. Shukhardin, Yu. S. Meleshchenko, G. N. Volkov, etc.);

2) philosophy of the history of technology. Within this direction, two main versions have been developed. One of them (A. A. Zvorykin, S. V. Shukhardin, and others) was based on the application of the basic ideas of Marxist philosophy to history and technology. The second (GN Volkov) developed Marx's idea of ​​objectification of labor functions in relation to the main stages of technical evolution;

3) the sociology of technology, in line with which the specifics of the development of technology in various social conditions were discussed (G. N. Volkov and others);

4) technical futurology, focused on forecasting technical progress (G. N. Volkov, A. I. Cherepnev and others);

5) the epistemology of technology in the works of V. V. Cheshev, B. S. Ukraintsev, V. G. Gorohov, V. M. Figurovsky and others was considered as a specificity of technical knowledge (object, methodology, theory features, types of ideal objects, value settings).

Similar trends developed in Western philosophy of technology (F. Rapp, H. Beck, and others), sociology (E. Toffler, D. Bell, R. Iris, and others), and futurology (E. Toffler, D. Bell, G. Cann, J.P. Grant, J. Martino and others).

In the works of Aristotle, the concept of "techne" is included in the general classification of types of knowledge. It is quite typical for the classical philosophical tradition to comprehend general philosophical problems from technical positions. Philosophy has always strived for conclusions of a general nature, but the construction of ultimate abstractions was based on a variety of material supplied by various fields of knowledge and activity. In the works of Marx, we are talking not only about machines and machine production as such, but also about the changes that they cause in the life of society. N. A. Berdyaev considers technogenic elements of life, including spiritual life. Subsequently, the key provisions of his works devoted to technology were confirmed in relation to the modern situation by the works of H. Ellul. The philosophy of technology took shape as an independent direction under the influence of the works of M. Heidegger, who sought to discover the essence of technology outside of it - in instrumentality as such, attributively inherent in man in his activity. Technique as a way of reproducing living activity largely determines the formation of ideals, and hence culture; as a specific attitude to the world, it is included in the relationship of man to the world as a whole. In relation to classical philosophy, technology is: a) a means of positing (research, cognition) the subject of an object, and, consequently, a means of positing oneself as a subject; b) the boundary of subject and object in the Hegelian sense of "the other of both", which determines to a certain extent the interaction of essence. Technique determines historically specific options for solving eternal philosophical questions.

9.2. The main directions and patterns of development of the philosophy of technology

The main difference between man and animals, the ancient Greek philosopher Anaxagoras (500-428 BC) saw in the possession of man with his own hands. Aristotle (384-322 BC) clarified this judgment of his predecessor: the hands acquire their status thanks to the mind, which makes a person also a political animal. The Arab thinker Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) in his book "Mukaddimah" considered human nature as subject to the law of causality, in which a person, thanks to reason, labor and science, acquired "human abilities". At the same time, the main tool of a person, in addition to the brain, is his hands as tools of labor. The ancient Roman physician Galen (c. 130 - c. 200) in his classic work "On the Parts of the Human Body" gave the first anatomical and physiological description of the whole organism, including the hands.

In the philosophy of technology, in considering the historical processes of the transformation of a person as a worker (from Homo sapiens to Homo creans), two concepts have developed: the “tool” concept of L. Noiret and the “labor” concept of F. Engels. Let's consider them in a little more detail.

The "gun" concept of the formation of man in the works of Ludwig Noiret

Ludwig Noiret (1827-1897), continuing the traditions of Ibn Khaldun, A. Smith and B. Franklin, considers the ability of a person to make a tool as his essential difference from an animal. In his works ("The Origin of Language", 1877; "The Tool and Its Significance in the Historical Development of Mankind", 1880), Noiret substantiates the idea that only with the advent of tools does the true history of mankind begin. The tool of labor for Noiret embodies the principle of creativity. The creation and use of tools, in his opinion, are the main sources of the development of human consciousness.

In the tools of labor, a person "projects" his own organs, which until recently acted instinctively. Between the desire, the will of a person are tools that serve his will, desires, needs. Noiret puts forward a three-term causality: between the subject and the object, the instrument of labor mediating their interaction takes its special place (in this case, Noiret's thought coincides with Marx's position about machines as organs of the human brain). Later, the human brain acquires the function of anticipatory response: it speculatively anticipates practice, manifesting itself as a creative force, i.e. develops along with the tools of labor. However, we cannot forget about the role of human hands. In the course of tool activity, the hand undergoes significant changes, due to which it not only acquires universality, but also becomes a powerful factor in development. Hands act as a special tool ("tools of tools"), or, in the words of Noiret, "an organ of the external brain", and become a factor in the development of the mind! Simultaneously, they develop eyes, vision, the functioning of the entire human body, and primarily the brain. Noiret concludes: any objective cognition consists of two acts: movement, directed from the subject and determined by the will, and objective resistance, i.e. the resistance that the object offers to this movement. Opposing the point of view according to which a person is initially credited with the gift of abstraction, thanks to which he was able to think ahead, Noiret writes: “Thinking only later reaches what was already developed much earlier thanks to work, thanks to activity”, i.e. First there was the deed, not the word.

"Labor" theory of anthroposociogenesis by Friedrich Engels

Friedrich Engels (1820-1995), a well-known theorist of Marxism, an associate of the creator of this doctrine, published a work in 1876 entitled "The Role of Labor in the Process of the Transformation of a Monkey into a Man", in which he significantly expanded his understanding of the role of labor in human life. Labor, in his opinion, is not only a source of wealth. Its role is much broader: labor was the main and main cause of the emergence of man (i.e., the transformation of a monkey into a man), the source of all wealth, the main condition for all human life. The revolutionary moment in this process was the sudden acquisition of upright walking: in the life of a monkey, this acquisition became fatal. The release of the forelegs changed their previous functions (grasping when climbing trees, walking on the ground) and prepared them for other functions. So there was a hand! Having become free from its former functions, writes Engels, the hand "could now acquire more and more skills, and the great flexibility acquired by this was inherited and increased from generation to generation." One of the most significant consequences of this was the acquisition of skills in the manufacture of tools and their use. The human hand turns out to be not just an organ of touch, but also an organ of labor, an instrument of all instruments. Labor brings this human organ to such perfection that such perfections as Paganini's music and Raphael's paintings become available to him. But the hand is only one of the members of the whole, highly complex human organism, so everything that was good for the hand was good for the whole body. However, there was another circumstance that significantly contributed to the "march" of man to the expected transformations. He had a highly developed gregarious, i.e. social, instinct. And with this, as Engels writes, the awakening and development of the need to say something to each other is connected. But a person could say only with the gradual improvement of his larynx, which is so necessary for pronouncing articulate sounds.

Thus, three great acquisitions: an upright gait, which opened up a greater scope for a person to see; forelimbs that could be used for a completely different purpose; the evolution of the larynx, such an important organ for pronouncing sounds and communicating signals to relatives, led to qualitative transformations of the organ of thinking - the brain, sensory organs. Engels also writes about the presence of a factor of the reverse influence of these acquisitions, which supplemented the biological evolution of anthropoid apes. The social consequences of this biological evolution, the transformation of a monkey into a man, the author finds in the transformation of hunting into agriculture, the acquisition of a settled life, skills in the transformation of nature, habitat, metalworking, etc. Then there is science, culture, civilization. Man, therefore, is not limited to passive unintentional influence on nature, he actively changes nature, consciously adapting it to his needs. And he owes it to his work. Man is therefore likened to a technical animal.

9.3. The main stages and social consequences of the development of technology

A person lives in a technical environment created by him. By creating this "second nature" of his dwelling, man creates himself. This self-creative principle, according to Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), is the deepest thing in man. For the study of the philosophy of technology, such a characteristic of a person has a fundamental meaning. This means that techno-creativity is inherent in man from the very beginning.

The founder of the Russian philosophy of technology, PK Engelmeyer, interpreted technology as "the ability to expediently act on matter"; "the art of evoking desirable phenomena"; actions that embody some idea, plan; as "real art". Karl Jaspers considered technology as a means of liberating man from the power of nature, increasing man's dominance over it, by using nature against nature itself.

The first stage in the development of technology is characterized by chance (as J. Ortega y Gasset wrote, this is the “technique of chance”): tools were not specially invented, the finds were unintentional. So, for example, a fragment of an eggshell could replace the palms to quench thirst; a stone tied to a stick could increase the force of impact, etc. Imitating these accidental "rationalizations", man created tools of labor now deliberately. Ludwig Noiret identifies three circumstances in this process. First, the primitive instrument served to supplement physiological activity. Secondly, the tools were created by trial and error: rather, they found a person than vice versa. Thirdly, due to simplicity and scarcity, primitive technology was widely available: everyone could make fire, make bows and arrows, etc. Technique does not stand out from all kinds of activities. The natural division of technical labor existed only on the basis of age and sex differences. Man, writes J. Ortega y Gasset, "... does not yet feel like a Homo faber", technology for him is part of nature.

The second stage in the development of technology is characterized by some of its complication. The production of tools now requires sufficiently large skills, in connection with which there is a separation from the general population of craftsmen - experts in the "secrets" of making tools. There is a social stratum in society, according to Marx - the driving forces of technical progress. At the same time, technical progress itself was based not on science, not on theoretical calculations, but on a skill often inherited (from father to son) empirically, by trial and error. Technological progress was driven by brilliant craftsmen like Archimedes, who ideally combined technical talents with practical ones. This stage in the development of technology ends with the advent of the New Age and, accordingly, with the beginning of the so-called era of machine technology. This time went down in history as the Renaissance (Renaissance).

A characteristic feature of the Renaissance was the rehabilitation of the role of experimental knowledge, the symbol of which was the work of the great Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519). His saying "Science is the captain, and practice is the soldiers" has become a kind of slogan of the new era. In those days, the church still dominated the souls and minds of people, and the scientist had to defend himself. In particular, Leonardo wrote his works as if in reverse order, in a mirror image, so that no one else could read them except him. Implementation of his ideas into practice was difficult. He was persecuted by the church and Galileo Galilei (see also section 2.2). His laboratory was razed to the ground, teaching was banned, and he himself died in poverty. Galileo brought a mathematical principle to the foundation of science, introduced a thought experiment based on rational induction, and laid the foundation for the science of nature. He became the founder of scientific natural science, founded the principle of modern European thinking, and contributed to the oblivion of the principle of anthropocentrism. His works "On Motion", "Conversations and Mathematical Proofs" served as the methodology of science for a long time. From a philosophical point of view, experimental knowledge and all practical human activity were rehabilitated by one of the founders of the philosophy of modern times Francis Bacon (see also section 2.2). To this he dedicated his main work, The New Organon (1620).

Bacon divided the process of cognition into a number of components: the object of cognition; the task of knowledge; the purpose of knowledge; method of knowledge. He declared induction to be the main and shortest path to knowledge. The task of science, according to Bacon, is experience, its study on the basis of an appeal to the possibilities of the deductive method, however, after the first, initial axioms are derived from experience through induction. Bacon strongly demanded that theory and practice be united by stronger bonds. He believed that three great discoveries that were not known to the ancients, namely the art of printing, the use of gunpowder and the nautical needle (i.e. the compass), changed the face and condition of the whole world. They contributed to the cause of education, military affairs and navigation. The fundamental idea in Bacon's teaching is that science should give man power over nature, increase his power and improve life. The reason for the delusions of the mind, the philosopher considered false ideas, which he called "ghosts" or "idols". He distinguished four types of such ghosts:

1) ghosts of the genus are distorted reflections of all things that exist due to the fact that a person mixes his own nature with them;

2) ghosts of the cave - they arise from the individual characteristics of the subject of knowledge;

3) ghosts of the market are delusions resulting from the misuse of words;

4) ghosts of the theater - false teachings that lure a person like magnificent theatrical performances.

The true scientist takes his example from the bee, which extracts the juice from the flowers of the garden and the field and transforms it into honey with its own skill. Bacon's analysis of nature proceeded along two intersecting lines. First, referring to Democritus in search of principles and the beginning of matter, he was looking for an atomistic structure in things. Secondly, he was searching for the law of formation of forms of existence of matter (configuration, motion). He believed that "... the body is movement, distribution, difficulty, its inherent property." Bacon outlined his social views in "Experiences" and "New Atlantis", in which he defended the ideas of free enterprise. The classification of sciences proposed by the philosopher was accepted by the French encyclopedists.

Another founder of the philosophy and science of modern times was the representative of classical rationalism Rene Descartes (see also section 2.2). In his works "Discourses on Method", "Principles of Philosophy", he acted as one of the founders of the "new" philosophy and "new" science, proposing to revise all the old philosophical traditions. Descartes supplemented Bacon's concept of the need to reduce philosophical research to experience and observation with a proposal to base philosophical thinking on the principles of evidence, certainty and identity. Traditional forms of acquiring knowledge Descartes opposed knowledge based on the principle of doubt. Scientific knowledge in his interpretation appeared not as an accident, but as a single reliable system. He considered the principle of cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) absolutely certain. This argument, which goes back to Platonism, carries his conviction in the ontological superiority of the intelligible over sensory experience. However, he nevertheless “left” the final establishment of the truth to God. Following Bacon, Descartes believed that one can become the master of nature only by listening to it.

Descartes' contribution to science is enormous. In mathematics, he was one of the creators of analytic geometry, in which he owned a new concept of a function; developed an analytical way of expressing geometric objects and their relationships through the equations of algebra. Modern algebraic equations owe much of their origin to Descartes. In mechanics, he developed the principles of relativity of motion and rest, action and reaction; in optics, he substantiated the law of a constant ratio of sines during the refraction of light, developed the mathematical theory of the rainbow and unraveled the cause of its occurrence; developed the idea of ​​the natural development of the solar system, due to the properties of matter and the movement of its heterogeneous parts. Among the philosophical questions developed by Descartes, questions about the task and the method of cognition were of paramount importance.

In the knowledge of nature and its laws, he made significant progress Isaac Newton (1643-1727), who became the successor and fighter for the final approval of the Galilean traditions in science. The founder of classical and celestial mechanics, the creator of the system of differential and integral calculus, the author of the study "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy", he formulated the laws and concepts of classical mechanics, the law of universal gravitation, theoretically substantiated Kepler's laws, a scientific theory of the deductive type. The thesis formulated by him "I do not invent hypotheses" formed the basis of criticism of natural philosophy. With his works, Newton laid the foundations for a mechanistic picture of the world and a mechanistic worldview. In the work "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy" he wrote: "It would be desirable to derive from the principles of mechanics and other phenomena of nature." Newton came up with ideas about the independent existence of matter, space and time, which manifested his metaphysical way of thinking. He tried to make up for the shortcomings of the mechanistic explanation of the world by the mediation of God. Newton was not an armchair scientist. In his natural-philosophical studies, he sought to solve some practical problems. In this regard, it is interesting to note that he made a number of his scientific discoveries precisely in the course of solving similar problems, for example, in the field of shipbuilding and hydromechanics.

Widely known during this period were the works on mechanics of Newton's older contemporary Christian Huygens (1629-1695), the inventor of a pendulum clock with a starting mechanism, as well as the author of a number of works on the theory of a mechanical pendulum, although, we note, at that time it was not yet possible to talk about the creation of separate technical sciences. The invention played a significant role in the transition to machine technology. James Watt (1736-1819) the world's first steam engine. Europe was entering the era of machine production. This period was marked, as Marx wrote, by the transformation of the means of production from a tool into a machine. "As a machine, the means of labor acquire such a material form of existence that causes the replacement of human power by the forces of nature and empirical routine methods - by the conscious application of natural science" (Marx. Capital. Vol. 1). Marx saw the negative aspect of this process in the fact that the machine entered into competition with the workers, who were subject to layoffs and layoffs as unable to withstand the competition with it. Thus, the tendency to destroy machines (Luddism) was generated. At the end of the XVIII - beginning of the XIX century. the first spontaneous protests against the use of machines during the industrial revolution in Great Britain were recorded.

The demand for engineering activities has increased, which previously could still be satisfied with random offers. Now the era required the mass training of engineering and technical specialists. In 1746, a polytechnic school was opened in Paris with a new organization of the educational process, combining theoretical training with technical training. Later, such universities, operating on a new basis of education - on the basis of theoretical and applied natural sciences, are opened in the USA and in many European countries.

9.4. The main directions of the formation of the philosophy of technology

For the first time, the idea of ​​creating a philosophy of technology, more precisely, a philosophy of mechanics, was expressed by the English chemist and physicist Robert Boyle (1627-1691). In his book "Mechanical Qualities" (1675), he tried to formulate a mechanistic philosophical concept, turning mechanics into the basis of everything that exists. Another idea was also in circulation: the idea to create a philosophy of industry belonged to the German economist Johann Beckmann (1739-1811). In Scotland, the book of the economist and engineer Andrew Ure (1778-1857) "The Philosophy of Manufactories" (1835) was published, in which the author considered some philosophical aspects of manufactory production. As we can see, European philosophical thought has come very close to creating a truly scientific philosophy of technology. And yet in the West, the German philosopher Ernest Kapp is considered the true founder of this scientific discipline. Let's consider its concept in more detail.

The main provisions of the philosophy of technology Ernest Kapp

Ernest Kapp (1808-1896) is known as one of the deepest thinkers in the philosophy of technology. He combined the geographical concept in the philosophy of Karl Ritter with the philosophy of Karl Marx, having previously "transformed" Hegelian idealism into materialism. The result was a solid work "General and Comparative Geography". The historical process in his book was presented as the result of active interaction between man and his environment. With this interaction over the centuries, a person acquires the ability to adequately respond to the challenges of nature, to overcome his dependence on it. Having learned from Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) his anthropological approach to nature and man, Kapp outlined his observations in his next book, Legitimized Despotism and Constitutional Freedoms, which aroused the stormy indignation of the authorities in Germany. A trial took place, the author was accused of slander and expelled from the country. He shared the fate of K. Marx, with the difference, however, that he did not go to England, but to distant America. He settled there among his own, in a German colony in Texas, where he lived, farming, for twenty long years, combining physical labor with mental labor: he continued the research begun in Germany. Labor on earth gave him a practical opportunity for philosophical understanding of the connection between man and the object of labor through the tools of labor. These observations were embodied in his new book "Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology", which he published after his return to Germany. The reading public saw in this scientific work distinct traces of the influence of Feuerbach's anthropological concept. The connection with this concept allowed the author to take a closer look at the essence of the connection of human hands (anthropology) with tools of labor - the starting point for philosophical reflections on technology and its essence. Arriving at home "on a leave of absence", he stayed in Germany now forever, since his state of health did not allow him to take the long way back. And the subject of the study absorbed his everyday life in full.

Inspired by the ideas of the ancient Greek Protagoras that man is the measure of all things, Kapp became fascinated by the secret connection of the human body, hands with the activity of the brain. Distancing himself from the Hegelian "I", he focuses his attention on the entire bodily organism - on its closest connections with the "I", which only in connection with corporality and carries out the process of thinking; as an accomplice, thinks, existing. At the same time, both psychology and physiology merge together. And this process, as Kapp rightly notes, takes place in the field of the artificial environment created by man: "What is outside of man consists of the creations of nature and man."

Man is not satisfied with what nature has given him. He is self-creative. He "reforms" the environment for the sake of his essence, as if nature, creating it, did not foresee everything precisely relying on this self-creation: "you will finish it yourself", projecting your vision outward. Kapp writes: "The outer world of mechanical work emanating from man can only be understood as a real continuation of the organism, as a transfer outside the inner world of ideas." Kapp understands the "inner world" as the human body. From this follows the conclusion that the external is a continuation of the human body, more precisely, a mechanical imitation of its various organs. This is precisely what his concept, called organoprojection, consists of. Kapp emphasizes: "All the means of culture, whether they be grossly material or of the most subtle construction, are nothing but projections of organs."

Thus, Ernest Kapp has developed a holistic picture of organ projection, where he elaborately substantiates and formulates this concept as the main principle of human technical activity and all of his cultural creativity as a whole. Among the human organs, Kapp assigns a special place to the hand. It has a triple purpose: firstly, it is a natural tool; secondly, it serves as a model for mechanical tools and, thirdly, it plays a major role in the manufacture of material imitators, i.e. is a "tool of tools". It is from this natural tool that artificial tools arise: the hammer as an extension of the fist, the drinking cup instead of the palm, and so on. In the concept of organ projection, there was also a place for the likeness of human eyes, starting with a magnifying glass, optical instruments; acoustic technology has become like an organ of hearing, for example, an echo sounder that picks up the noise of the propellers of an approaching submarine, etc. But the human hand stands out among all these organs: it is, according to Kapp, "the organ of all organs."

In describing the concept of organ projection, three important features are distinguished[21] . First, by its nature, organ projection is a process of continuous, mostly unconscious self-discovery, individual acts of which are not subject to a simultaneous process of awareness. Secondly, it is necessary, since the connection between the mechanical function and this organic formation is strictly predetermined. This is how a magnifying glass and a human eye, a pump and a heart, a pipe and a throat, a hand tool and a hand, etc. "recognize" themselves in each other. Such a connection in technology is used in the most diverse way in a conscious transfer beyond the limits of the original relationship. Thirdly, organ projection in its rich content is realized as a process of active interaction between natural tools (all human organs) and artificial tools, during which they mutually improve each other. “In the process of interaction,” Kapp writes, “the tool supported the development of the natural organ, and in the latter, in turn, achieving a higher degree of dexterity, led to the improvement and development of the tool” (cited by: Al-Ani N.M. Decree op.).

A person makes his body a "scale" for nature and from his youth gets used to using this measure. For example, five fingers of the hand, ten fingers of both hands give the five and decimal systems, respectively. The observations and conclusions of Ernest Kapp are confirmed by the studies of other authors. In particular, Yu. R. Mayer (1814-1878), G. L. F. Helmholtz (1821-1894) made comparisons between a machine and a person, pointing out their similarities.

Technology and Praxeology as a Philosophy of Action by Alfred Espinas

French sociologist, author of the book "The Origin of Technology" (1890) Alfred Espinas (1844-1922) was concerned about the lack of "philosophy of action" in the system of philosophical knowledge. Espinas could consider himself a student or follower of the philosophy of organ projection. He had no objections to the already well-known teachings of Ernest Kapp in Europe. This is evidenced by his saying: "The tool is a whole with the worker; it is a continuation of the organ, its projection outside." Espinas fully agrees with Kapp that organ projection was originally unconscious. He sees its manifestations in Greek measures of length: finger, palm, span, foot, elbow - for Espinas they have a divine origin, a gift from God. Medicine, before becoming secular, also went a long way of existence under the auspices of religion. The disease was considered God's punishment, and therefore medicine was practiced in temples as a branch of art. Epidemics were considered a manifestation of God's wrath, and the sick were treated with rituals. The situation changes radically only thanks to the activities of Hippocrates, when diseases began to be explained by natural causes.

Espinas considers a person as a product of a psychological and sociological projection that personifies him. Applied arts are not inherited along with the characteristics of the body. As a product of experience and reflection, they are "inculcated" in the individual by "example and education"; thus they give rise to science. It is this process of transferring skills that the author calls the subject of technology.

Espinas introduces the concepts of praxeology (from the Greek praktikos - active) and technology (from the Greek techne - art, skill, ability and logos - word, teaching). The first, in his opinion, reflects the collective manifestations of the will, thoughtful and arbitrary, the most general forms of action. As for technology, he refers this concept to the "mature arts" that give rise to science and "generate technology." Espinas sees three essential features in technology, which should be considered from three points of view. First, it is supposed to produce an analytical description of the phenomenon, taking into account the specific conditions of its existence (time, place, society). Secondly, the regularities, conditions, causes that preceded the phenomenon should be studied from a dynamic point of view. Thirdly, it is necessary to apply a combination of static and dynamic points of view, which make it possible to study the phenomenon in time: its birth, apogee and decline, which constitute the rhythm of its existence. The combination of these three dimensions forms a common technology.

The philosophy of technology P. K. Engelmeyer: technology as "real creativity"

The son of a Russian nobleman of German origin, Pyotr Klimentievich Engelmeyer (1855-1941), was also a follower of the traditions of Ernest Kapp. His studies in the philosophy of technology gained fame after the publication of several articles in German publications, and he gained real popularity after delivering a report at the IV International Congress on Philosophy, held in Bologna in 1911. The main thesis of his report was that the philosophy of technology must have the right to exist. In Russia in 1912-1913. several of his works appear in separate editions under the general title "Philosophy of Technology". A historical overview of the development of the philosophy of technology in the interpretation of Engelmeyer became possible thanks to the works of B. Franklin, E. Hartig, F. Relo, L. Noiret, J. Cuvier, C. Linnaeus, M. Muller, F. Engels, K. Marx and others predecessors. Taking into account the achievements of European scientific thought, P. K. Engelmeyer consistently outlined his views on the philosophy of technology and its subject. In general, they can be reduced to the following.

1. Experience and observation are the source of our knowledge of nature, and therefore they serve as evidence of the truth of the laws of science.

2. Experience and observations of the use of technology to fight nature show that nature must be defeated by nature.

3. If without technology a person is lost, then without science there is no technology.

4. The definition of man as a "thinking animal" (J. Cuvier and C. Linnaeus) needs to be clarified, taking into account the position that the human mind developed in parallel with the development of language and tools (L. Noiret and M. Müller).

5. Man's ability to create tools lies in his very nature, in his creative nature.

6. Science is born from practical, i.e. technical, the needs of everyday life.

The latter position has been repeatedly confirmed by practice. So, for example, the Egyptians came to the invention of geometry from the need for land surveying after each flood of the Nile, alchemy turned into chemistry, astronomy was formed from astrology, etc.

Engelmeyer positively assessed the pragmatic theory of the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernest Mach (1838-1916), which limits the anthropomorphism of technology. According to Mach, a person sometimes builds thinking based not on the principle of anthropomorphism, but on a technical analogy. According to Engelmeyer, this provision does not cancel Kapp's ideas, but only supplements them. But the principle of economy of thought, formulated by Mach, exists, and this must be remembered in order not to reinvent the wheel once again. The principle of economy of thought is the most important in Mach's theory of knowledge; this is where his pragmatism manifests itself. Life itself dictates the necessary knowledge to technology and sets goals. For life, only that knowledge is valuable, which leads to practical results. In essence, pragmatism is the bridge that leads to the philosophy of technology. Thus, the philosophy of technology cannot stand "with its back" to life; it must help build life.

Enegelmeyer, considering the question of the essence of technology, builds a demarcation line between science and technology. When asked what is the difference between them, he answers as follows: science pursues the truth, technology seeks to benefit. The technician comes when the scientist has already said what the truth is: science knows, and technology does. Although, of course, this does not mean the termination of their relationship. Engelmeyer builds a set of requirements for technology, which she must comply with, being the foundation of culture. Speaking in favor of the existence in society of people with a "technical" mindset, he writes: "The cannon equally serves the one who owns it; the printing press indifferently issues both the Gospel and the obscurantist pamphlet; everything depends on the people in whose hands the machine works." In his opinion, technology should have a sense of responsibility based on the "formula of will", the components of which are "Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Benefit". And somewhere on the sidelines - the "devilish" will: "Lies, Ugliness, Evil and Harm"; this will captured Russia.

Engelmeyer's entire life path was connected with Russia. After the October Revolution, he did not accept the offer to emigrate to the West until the early 1930s. made great efforts to disseminate technical knowledge, played a decisive role in the creation of the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow. He was the initiator of many publications and actively published himself. However, with the tightening of the Soviet regime and the growth of repression, it was necessary to think about survival. Classes on the development of philosophical problems of technology Engelmeyer stopped. For some time, somewhere near Moscow, he was breeding horses. In 1941, little noticed, he quietly died in his Moscow apartment. Under the dominance of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, there was no place for the philosophy of science and technology.

Technique as a means of "truth" and a way of revealing the "hidden" (M. Heidegger)

In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger raises the question of the meaning of being, which he believes has been "forgotten" in European philosophy. Since "being" for a person is a temporary phenomenon, there is a tendency in philosophy to consign this phenomenon to oblivion. But for mankind, "being" is a phenomenon that is eternally repeated and therefore always has its actuality. At the personal level, the experience of the fact of the temporality of being for an individual is very burdensome, accompanied by fear, an understanding of one's temporality, uniqueness, one-timeness and mortality. Heidegger devotes himself to the study of this phenomenon. The past of culture with the present, according to Heidegger, is connected by a language that requires "reanimation": it has suffered from technization, has become largely "dead". The language of the past lives in culture, literature, art, architecture, and finally in technology, remaining a repository, a dwelling of "being". These problems (experiencing the temporality of being, the fate of language in history, etc.) were elucidated in his book On the Question of Technology (1954). The basis of this work was the materials of lectures given by him at the Munich Higher Technical School. Clarifying the etymological meaning of the concept of "technology", Heidegger draws attention to the fact that it is interpreted as a "means to achieve goals", or, in other words, as a "known human activity". Recognizing the correctness of these definitions, Heidegger at the same time notes that the correctness of a definition does not yet mean its truth. The task of the philosophy of technology is to seek the true definition. And the truth is hidden in the question "what is a tool?". In search of an answer to this question, the author comes to the conclusion that everything depends on what exactly we mean when we say "tool". Behind this definition, he sees causality, causality. Heidegger recalls the tradition, which goes back to Aristotle, to distinguish four types of causality in philosophy:

1) the material cause (causa materialis), it indicates the sources of artifacts, for example, such as a silver bowl for sacrifice;

2) a formal reason (causa formalis), it manifests itself when, for example, silver takes on an aesthetic shape;

3) the final cause (causa finalis), when the shaping satisfies the goal;

4) producing cause (causa efficiens), i.e. creating a finished product.

Based on this analysis, Heidegger concludes that the essence of technology as a means can only be revealed by reducing instrumentality to these four aspects of causality. These reasons, in his understanding, take on the sign of guilt ("guilty of something"), and they are all connected by a "feeling of guilt." They are "guilty" of the appearance of a thing, in particular - a silver bowl. Guilt can also act as a reason (in this case, four reasons). And this transition from the state of non-existence to the state of presence he calls "production." In the highest sense, the work is poiesis, i.e. craft plus art. Such a process of creation always represents the disclosure of the hidden, which turns into unhiddenness, openness. The Greeks called this transition the word "alateia", the Romans - veritas. Thus, in the final analysis, technology turns out to be both a form and a method of revealing the hidden, of bringing the real out of the hidden.

Heidegger puts the word techne next to the word episteme (knowledge): both of them serve to reveal hiddenness, and techne, respectively, is a kind of "truth". Both of these concepts are synonymous with knowledge, they help a person navigate the labyrinth of concepts, understand, reveal the hidden, that which has not yet been noticed. Hiddenness is not indifferent, it intrigues a person, constantly challenges him, gives signals, flirts ... And this intrigue prompts a person to pay attention, aim, set a task, which Heidegger calls "setting" (Gestell). Like Plato, he uses the word unusual, distinctive to designate this phenomenon. By the method of posing, he brings the real out of the state of concealment and transfers it to another state - "consisting-in-presence." The concept of "postav" for him is very capacious. It has four meanings. Firstly, it is a figurative synonym for the word "becoming", i.e. where it all starts. Secondly, it denotes the determination of the route to the hidden. Thirdly, the hidden, like truth, is in "intimate relationship" with the concept of freedom, which means freedom from the state of ignorance. Fourthly, the path to this freedom is always fraught with risk, danger (Gefahr). Speaking of danger, the author means that a person does not know everything, there always remains a "secret of essence." The voice of earlier truth can be drowned out by the euphoria of discovery. The knowledge of the "truly existing" is yet to come. Heidegger concludes: "The closer we come to the danger, the brighter the path to salvation begins to shine!"

Topic 10. Social and humanitarian direction in the philosophy of technology

10.1. Foundation of the humanitarian direction in the philosophy of technology

The recognized leader in the study of the social aspects of technological progress is Karl Marx (1818-1883). H. Stork, Gunter Ropol, Hans Lenk wrote about this, devoting entire chapters in their works to the analysis of Marx's views. In particular, H. Stork calls Marx a pioneer in the formation of the philosophy of technology as a special direction[22] . An influential philosopher of technology calls Marx and the modern German philosopher Hans Lenk[23].

In the fifth chapter of "Capital" Marx conducts a thorough analysis of human labor, since it is he who is "consumed" (that is, has a use value), and technical means are only his conductor. Although Marx supported the work of his friend F. Engels on the role of labor in the process of human development, his sympathies were still on the side of E. Kapp's organoprojection. The truth was dearer to him! Marx wrote: “The object that a person takes possession of directly ... is not an object of labor, but a means of labor. Thus, given by nature itself, it becomes an organ of his activity, an organ that he attaches to the organs of his body, thus lengthening, contrary to the Bible , the natural dimensions of the latter". For Marx, the tools of labor are "the materialized power of knowledge"[24] .

The displacement of manual labor by machine led to a revolutionary transformation of the labor process. Marx defined the nature of the new era through the progress of the means of labor, which are not only a measure of the development of the labor force, but also an indicator of social relations themselves. The consequences of the revolution in the development of the means of labor, which led to the displacement of manual labor and the consequent mass dismissal of those who were replaced by the machine, Marx examines in detail in the eighth chapter of Capital. During the transition from handicraft technology to machine technology, the dwarf tool of the human body, muscular energy were replaced by the forces of nature, and the traditional knowledge used in the process of manual labor was replaced by natural science knowledge of the exact sciences. Industrial labor displaces handicraft labor, thus the machine becomes the artisan's natural enemy. "Dead" (machine) labor completely dominates "live" labor and successfully competes with it, making it an appendage of machine production. In manufacture and craft, the worker makes the tool serve him, but in the factory he serves the machine, being its living appendage. These technical changes are followed by a second degree of dependence of the worker: he depends not only on the employer, but also on the means of labor, which gives his alienation a clearly technical dimension. Very soon it turns out that the employer no longer needs so many workers: many labor operations are done by "smart" machines. There comes a time of mass layoffs, millions of workers become unemployed. The machine becomes the blood enemy of the worker - the means of labor. Marx writes: "There can be no doubt that the machines themselves are not responsible for the fact that they 'liberate' the worker from the means of subsistence."[25] The reason, according to Marx, lies in the capitalist use of machines.

The machine is axiologically neutral! She is "hostile" to the craft, not in and of itself. It simply ended up in the wrong hands, and therefore it must be transferred to other hands: to the hands of unemployed workers. And expropriate the employer as an expropriator, giving political and economic power to the workers, the proletariat. Such is the logic of Marx's teaching.

One more important aspect in the techno-philosophical conception of Marx, relating to the assessment of the nature of technical progress itself, should be noted. Adhering to a firm dialectical concept in philosophy, Marx believes that any of the system-forming elements of this process must necessarily contain relative regression. We are talking about technical development as an important component of social progress. On this occasion, he writes: “In our time, everything seems to be fraught with its opposite. We see that machines that have the miraculous power to reduce and make human labor more fruitful bring people hunger and exhaustion. New, hitherto unknown sources of wealth, thanks to which "Some strange and incomprehensible charms, turn into a source of poverty. The victory of technology is, as it were, bought at the price of moral degradation. It seems that as humanity subjugates nature, a person becomes a slave of other people, or a slave of his own meanness."

10.2. An attempt to abandon the "power" of technology in favor of ethics

The French philosopher of technology and culturologist Jacques Ellul (b. 1912) rose to prominence with the publication of Technique (1954). All Ellul's works were devoted to the analysis and study of the technical society of his day. The author's main research credo boils down to challenging Marx's concept of the decisive role of the mode of production in the historical development of society. According to Ellul, the classification of historical epochs should be based on the degree of development of technology. These ideas were consistently covered in his books "Technical Society" (1965), "Political Illusions" (1965), "Metamorphosis of the Bourgeoisie" (1967), "Empire of Absurdity" (1980). Their subjects were the problems of modern technical society, technology, technical personality, politics, the position of social classes and art.

The central concepts in Ellul's theory are "technique" and "technophilosophy". He defines technology as "a set of rationally developed methods that have absolute effectiveness in every field of human activity." The "phenomenon of technology", according to Ellul, is characterized by such important features as rationality, artifactuality, self-direction, self-growth, indivisibility, universality and autonomy. These seven features, according to the author, form the characteristic content of technology as the main dominant form of human activity. Thus, it is technology that determines all other forms of activity, all human technology and all social structures - economics, politics, education, health care, art, sports, etc.

Ellul considers technology at the present stage of its development in a broad worldview as a type of rationality. It replaces nature with the technosphere, the technical environment, replacing the natural environment. Technique is a force imposed from outside, a given that a person has to reckon with; it imposes itself simply by what exists. Technique as a given, as something self-sufficient, is playing a very dangerous and risky game. In this game, a person must bet only on the actions that he takes in order to achieve his good goals and carry out his good intentions.

From the author's point of view, technology is designed to help people build their home here on Earth. The "claims" of technology to become an all-conditioning and all-generating principle, its striving for omnipotence must be actively resisted and given a serious rebuff. Ellul's ethical concept of renunciation of the power of technology claims to be such a counteraction. This concept is practically based on the direct and complete denial of the so-called "technological imperative", according to which people can, and therefore must, do everything that is technically available to them and fundamentally feasible. Ellul actually demands to abandon such an installation. The ethics of renunciation of the power of technology requires not just a restriction of the indicated imperative, but its complete denial. The initial principle of this ethical concept is the idea of ​​human self-restraint, which inevitably leads to the replacement of the "technological imperative" by the opposite setting, according to which people must agree among themselves, not to do everything that they are generally able to technically implement. This attitude can be called an "anti-technological imperative", it becomes both relevant and fateful, since against the backdrop of an exorbitant increase in the power of technology, a conviction comes in the complete absence of external forces capable of resisting technology and actively counteracting its omnipotence. However, there is still no real alternative to technology, so you have to "get along" with it. Under these conditions, one thing remains: to follow the ethics of rejecting the power of technology. Such an ethic requires not only self-restraint, but also the rejection of technology that destroys the personality. For this, according to Ellul, a revolution is necessary: ​​only it can turn technology from a factor of enslaving a person into a factor of his liberation. The philosopher calls this revolution "political and technical" - this is a kind of utopian model for the development of modern Western society.

The "political-technical" revolution is due to the need to solve five problems (aspects) of the development of society. First, it is necessary to provide gratuitous assistance to the countries of the "third world" in order to provide them with the opportunity to extract all the benefits from Western technology, to independently build their own history. Secondly, the use of force in "any form" and "military arsenals that suppress our economy" should be abandoned, as well as the "centralized bureaucratic state" should be completely eliminated. At the same time, the author believes that this will not lead to a drop in organization or confusion, since, in his opinion, there will be no one to create confusion, disorder and confusion. Next, we need to stop price increases and encourage small businesses. The decline in the standard of living should be compensated by an increase in its quality. Thirdly, it is necessary to achieve a comprehensive deployment of abilities and diversification of occupations. Associated with this is the flourishing of national talents, the recognition of all autonomies, the creation of a free and dignified life for small peoples, the provision of a rise in education for them, and not necessarily with the creation of their own statehood. Fourthly, it is necessary to achieve a sharp reduction in working hours, replacing the 35-hour work week with a two-hour daily work. In addition, it is supposed to carry out propaganda on the meaning of life, about a new culture, opening up space for a new range of creative abilities, etc. Finally, fifthly, it is proposed to consider the amount of time "saved" by a person as a criterion of progress. Remuneration of labor is supposed to be carried out not in money, but through the exchange of products, and regardless of the amount of labor invested.

The goal of the "political-technical" revolution is not recognized as the seizure of power, but the realization of the positive potentials of modern technology, oriented towards the complete liberation of man. The socio-utopian project of Ellul provides for the establishment of self-government at the level of communes. In general, one gets the impression that the author "copied" his ethics of renunciation of the power of technology from a brief history of the building of communism in the USSR. All these initiatives with the reduction of working hours, free rations, etc. were implemented in the activities of the CPSU, which led the USSR to its complete and final collapse. Nevertheless, history tends to repeat itself, as Marx wrote, "sometimes in the form of a farce, now in the form of a tragedy."

10.3. Revolution in Technology and Evolution in Society: Technological and Philosophical Searches of the Frankfurt School

The Frankfurt School of Philosophy of Technology is represented by the names of well-known Russian philosophers Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Theodora Adorno (1903-1969). The school under this name was established in the 1930s-1940s. around the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt am Main, headed since 1931 by Horkheimer. In connection with the coming of the Nazis to power, most of the employees of the institute were forced to emigrate. The theoretical heritage of the representatives of the Frankfurt School is connected with the development of the ideas of Max Weber, in particular with the development of a critical theory of society with the aim of making "the highest judgment on class suppression" in order to create a "society without injustices." The declared "critical theory of society" proceeds from the fact that a person as an active, creative and free being in the conditions of modern society is disappointed ("annihilated"), deprived of his "second dimension", which is his spirituality. At the same time, he loses both his selfhood and the spontaneity of his existence, alienates himself from himself, his true essence. Technology bears a certain share of responsibility for these processes. It acts as a generator of mass culture, devoid of spirituality, designed to average cultural patterns, i.e. their cheapening, on "mass deceit" (T. Adorno).

According to Theodor Adorno, in the so-called "mass" culture, the uniqueness and independence of a person is lost, there is a unification of all people, their transformation into a gray uncritical mass. Moreover, the entire culture is limited, a historical totality is projected, demands are made on a person that enslave him. At the same time, it is not technology that acts as an enslaver, but its owner. Adorno proceeds from the fact that in no way can one oppose technology and humanism: such an opposition is a product of false consciousness. It can be said that the very gap between technology and humanism, however incurable, is an example of the appearance created by society, writes Adorno. The philosopher is interested in the question, how should technicians be introduced to the philosophy of technology? Answering it, he rejects the idea that existed at that time that the subject was taught to them, as it were, from outside. He proposes to appeal to self-consciousness: "With the help of our conceptual means, we must induce them to this self-consciousness." But on this path we encounter difficulties, such as "professional limitations, patriotism," a feeling of rejection of humanitarian knowledge. Adorno notes that "technicians perceive culture more difficultly" because they prefer relaxation to deeds, "they do not allow themselves to be stuffed with mass products that the cultural industry supplies." On the other hand, technicians suffer because of the one-sidedness, dryness, inhuman nature of their rationality. In On Technology and Humanism, Adorno raises the question of the responsibility of technicians for the fruits of their labor. According to the philosopher, when solving this issue, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that each of us may not be ourselves, but only the bearer of specially prescribed functions. The area commonly referred to as ethics penetrates only indirectly into what is done at work. Adorno rejects the possibility of the existence of moral norms that impede cognition[26].

According to Adorno, the contradiction between social and technical reason cannot be ignored, it cannot simply be denied, it must be dealt with in detail. Ultimately, the question of whether modern technology will bring benefit or harm to humanity depends "not on technicians and not even on technology itself, but on how it is used by society." It may turn out that in determining the social role of technology, the clearest thoughts are contained in the Marxist evaluation of technology. In this aspect, Adorno's judgments concerning the problem of the "new ideal of education" are very interesting. He believes that this ideal has been destroyed, that culture has failed to create its own humanity. Culture pays for untruth, for appearances, for detachment from the humanistic idea that "people are throwing culture off themselves." Adorno concludes: "Today, only in the critique of education, in the critical self-awareness of technology ... there emerges hope for an education that no longer looks like a Humboldtian, which set itself the vague task of educating the individual"[27] .

Adorno was an excellent musician, writer, and sociologist. In the book "Negative Dialectics", without claiming to create a fundamentally new philosophical methodology, he tried to show the anatomy of life using the example of his creative interests. Adorno's main contribution to philosophy lies in his aesthetic views, in which he considers the experience of comprehending the individual, non-identical. In the philosophical and aesthetic concept of new music as a protocol fixation of "unenlightened suffering" as opposed to the harmonic transformation of passions characteristic of the classics, Adorno focuses on the work of composers of the "new Viennese school". The concept of "new music" is closely connected with the criticism of the mass standardized modern culture and the "regressive hearing" that is formed in its bosom, which dissociates perception into stereotypical elements. Adorno's works had a positive impact on the aesthetics, musicology, and ideology of the youth movements of his time.

The problems of the socialization of the individual in Germany were actively considered in the works of another representative of the Frankfurt School, a philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). A follower of T. Adorno, a supporter of early bourgeois educational ideas, an ideologist of the student movements of the 1960s, the formation of a rule of law state in post-war Germany, Habermas is considered a prominent representative of the "second generation" of Frankfurt school theorists. Based on the concept of "freedom and communicative action", he forms his negative attitude towards the Western philosophy of technology, prone to technocratic thinking. Habermas adheres to the concept according to which technology is declared a force that robs a person of his free creative spirit, depriving him of the possibility of free action, self-expression and self-organization, and ultimately turning him into a slave of his own creations. Habermas connects the emancipation of man with the displacement of "instrumental reason", its subordination to the human mind as an integrity that unites individual and social mind. He connects it with the establishment of a "communicative democracy" that combines scientific and technological progress with the values ​​and norms of human civilization, a "linguistic turn" in philosophy and the social sciences, which entails the rejection of a subjectivist phenomenology based on the analysis of the inner consciousness of time. Rationality is concentrated not in the sphere of reason, but in linguistic forms of mutual understanding.

Habermas contrasts the communicative paradigm with the production paradigm of Marxism. He conducts research on the theory of communicative action in five main areas. First, they propose a new theory of society, different from the project of Adorno and Horkheimer. Secondly, the concept of communicative rationality is being developed by means of hermeneutics, various theories of language. Thirdly, the theory of social (communicative) action is being developed. Fourthly, research is being carried out on the basis of new concepts of "life world" and "system" with an analysis of their relationship in a historical perspective. Finally, fifthly, with the help of these concepts, the trends and crises of modernity are analyzed.

Habermas' attitude to the theory of K. Marx changed over the years from enthusiastic to critical. Marx saw in capitalism the features of a politicized society based on collective labor. Socialism, according to Marx, must develop steadily through systemic management. However, according to Habermas, problems concerning the form of communication remained outside Marx's field of vision, but they provide the key to a rational reorganization of society. Habermas tried to correct Marx's theory with the help of his concept of "communicative action".

Habermas also criticizes the theory of T. Adorno as having a pessimistic coloring and unproductive, incapable of overcoming the contradictions existing in society. As Habermas writes, Adorno and Horkheimer tried to save the "instrumental reason" they invented with the help of the instrumental reason itself, i.e. to impose on him tasks that are obviously unbearable. In his two-volume Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas relies on the rules of communication in terms of speech action, conversation, discussion, and discourse. In his understanding, discourse is more than free conversation. This is a dialogue based on a normative statement at the level of high theoretical maturity, i.e. conversation of "adults" (Mundigkeit), with the participation of as many people as possible. Such a "mundane" dialogue, discourse, like communication between a doctor and a patient, should lead to a cure for ailments. According to the author, such a discourse is a model, a model for the development of communicative competence.

Topic 11. Humanitarian-anthropological direction in the philosophy of technology

11.1. Technophilosophy of Karl Jaspers: domination over nature with the help of nature itself

German existentialist philosopher, psychiatrist Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) was professor of psychology at Heidelberg University. In 1937, he was removed from office for political reasons. After the war, he taught at the University of Basel. Among his main works are "Philosophy" (in 3 volumes, 1932), "The Origins and Purpose of History" (1949), "Great Philosophers" (in 2 volumes, 1957), the monograph "Where the Federal Republic of Germany is Heading" (1969), "Modern technology" (Russian edition - 1989). We are mainly interested in his latest work. For the first time, from the standpoint of technophilosophy, it analyzes the works of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, devoted to the justification of the so-called axial time, which began with the emergence of Christianity. A distinctive feature of this time is the catastrophic impoverishment in the field of spiritual life, humanity, love and the simultaneous growth of success in the field of science and technology. The spiritual poverty of many natural scientists and technicians is characterized by their hidden dissatisfaction against the backdrop of a disappearing humanity. Jaspers considers technology as a set of those actions that a knowledgeable person performs with the aim of dominating nature, i.e. in order to give his life "such a shape that would allow him to remove the burden of need and acquire the desired form of the environment." Agreeing with Marx's assessment of the completed industrial revolution, Jaspers writes about changes in the relationship between man and nature, about his subordination to nature and the consequences of this "tyranny". The planet, as Jaspers writes, has become a single factory!

Jaspers concretizes his understanding of technology as follows. In his opinion, it is characterized by two features: on the one hand, reason, on the other hand, power. Technique rests on the activity of the mind, because it is part of a general rationalization. But at the same time, it is the ability, the ability to do, using nature against nature itself. It is in this sense that knowledge is power, Power! The main meaning of technology is the liberation of man from the power of nature. The principle of technology is the manipulation of the forces of nature to realize the purpose of a person, from the angle of his vision.

Jaspers identifies two main types of technology - technology that produces energy and technology that produces products, as well as three factors that affect the development of scientific and technical knowledge:

1) natural sciences, which create their own artificial world and are prerequisites for its further development;

2) the spirit of invention, contributing to the improvement of existing inventions;

3) organization of labor aimed at increasing the rationalization of scientific and industrial activities.

Human labor also appears in a three-dimensional dimension: as the expenditure of physical strength, as a systematic activity and as an essential property of a person. Collectively, labor is a systematic activity aimed at transforming the objects of labor with the help of the means of labor.

Man's own world - the artificial habitat and existence created by him - is the result of not individual, but joint human labor (after all, an individual person cannot do everything!). Jaspers, following Marx, concludes: "the structure of society and the life of people in all its dimensions and ramifications depend on the nature of labor and its division." In the course of human development, the social evaluation of labor has changed. The Greeks despised physical labor, considering it the lot of the ignorant masses. According to the Christian version, man was doomed to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, atoning for his fall into sin, i.e. labor is associated with punishment. An exception in this sense are the Protestants, who see a blessing in work, and in particular the Calvinists, who consider labor a charitable deed, proof of being chosen. However, the attitude towards technology is not so positive even among Protestants. "During the last hundred years," writes Jaspers, "technology has either been glorified, or despised, or looked upon with respect." But technology itself is neutral: it is neither evil nor good. It all depends on what can be achieved with it. In this, Jaspers relies on human consciousness. Thus, Jaspers succeeded in isolating a special philosophical faith-intuition: a philosophical idea is first revealed to us intuitively, and only then it seeks its expression in images and concepts. History ceases to be only the history of culture and civilization, presenting itself as a specific form of universal evolution. The main instrument of historical consciousness and social cognition is no longer "pure reason", but individual consciousness, feeling its involvement in universal life. The natural human sense of kind, coupled with rational-theoretical, scientific knowledge, gives man synthetic intuition as a fundamental advantage in the confrontation with the spontaneous nature of cosmic and historical processes.

11.2. The techno-philosophical concept of Lewis Mumford: the doctrine of the "megamachine"

American philosopher and sociologist Lewis Mumford (1895-1988), an adherent of F. D. Roosevelt's New Deal, later significantly transformed his ideas towards conservatism. His numerous works were devoted to the philosophy of technology: "Technology and Civilization" (1934), "Art and Technology" (1952), "The Myth of the Machine" (in 2 volumes, 1967-1970). Mumford is considered to be a representative of negative technological determinism. He saw the main cause of all social evils and upheavals in the growing gap between the level of technology and morality. He called the scientific and technological progress made since the time of G. Galileo and F. Bacon "intellectual imperialism", the "victim" of which humanism and social justice fell. Science is a surrogate for religion, and scientists are a class of new priests - this is how Mumford assessed science and its ministers.

On the role of technology in society, Mumford had serious disagreements with Marx. He believed that it is impossible to understand the real role of technology, considering man as "an animal that makes tools." Ancient man possessed the only tool - his body, controlled by the brain, the mind. His mental energy exceeded his needs, and weapon technology was part of the brain's biotechnology. Mumford sees the origins of this "additional mental energy" not only in labor, but also in other components of collective existence and communication, such as the playful, aesthetic and religious aspects of human life, other non-labor forms determined by the experience of obtaining a livelihood. He divides the history of European civilization into three main stages. The first stage (from 1000 to 1750) is characterized by the cultivation of the so-called intuitive technique associated with the use of the power of falling water, wind and the use of natural materials: wood, stone, etc., which did not destroy nature, but were in harmony with it . The second stage (XVIII - XIX centuries) is based on paleotechnics (i.e. fossil technology); it is an empirical technique of coal and iron. This stage was characterized by a departure from nature and an attempt to dominate man over nature. Mumford calls this period the "mine civilization". The third stage (from the end of the 1969th century to the present) is the final phase of the functioning and development of Western civilization, within which the restoration of the harmony of technology and nature disturbed in the previous phase takes place on a strictly scientific basis. Mumford devoted his analysis of this period to the books The Myth of the Machine (1970, 1950), Man as Interpreter (XNUMX) and other works. Distancing himself from definitions such as "homo faber" that have become popular, he defends the concept of "homo sapiens", since the essence of man, in his opinion, lies in thinking, and the basis of humanity is the spirit - mind. Man is mainly an interpreter. This quality of a person is revealed in self-creation: a person projects himself and creates himself.

Mumford's approach to the history of the development of technology is noteworthy. He distinguishes its two main types: biotechnology and monotechnology. Biotechnology is a type of technology that is focused on meeting the needs of life and the natural needs and aspirations of a person. Monotechnics focuses mainly on economic expansion, material saturation and military production. Its goal is to strengthen the system of personal power, and therefore it is authoritarian in nature. It is hostile not only to nature, but also to man. Its authoritarian status dates back in its origins to the early period of the existence of human civilization, when the "megamachine" was first invented - a new type of social organization machine capable of enhancing human potential and causing changes in all aspects of existence.

The human machine from the very beginning of its existence combined two factors: 1) negative, coercive and destructive; 2) positive, life-giving, constructive. Both of these factors acted in conjunction. The concept of a machine, coming from Franz Reuleaux (1829-1905), means combinations of "strictly specialized parts capable of resisting, functioning under human control, for the use of energy and the performance of work." In this regard, Mumford writes: "The great labor machine remained a true machine in every respect, especially since its components, although made of human flesh, nerves and muscles, were reduced to purely mechanical elements and rigidly standardized for the performance of limited tasks."

All types of modern machines are labor-saving devices. They are supposed to do the maximum amount of work with the minimum amount of human effort. In ancient times, there was no question of saving labor, and, as Mumford writes, in ancient times machines could be called labor-using devices. For the normal functioning of the "human machine" two means were necessary: ​​a reliable organization of knowledge (natural and supernatural) and a developed system of return, execution and verification of the execution of orders. The first was embodied in the priesthood, without whose active assistance the institution of the monarchy could not exist; the second is in the bureaucracy. Both organizations were hierarchical, with the high priest and the king at the top of the hierarchy. Without their combined efforts, the institution of power could not function effectively. (By the way, this condition remains true today.) Therefore, the first of the two means indicated - knowledge, both natural and supernatural - had to remain in the hands of the priestly elite, i.e. be a priestly monopoly or priestly property. Only under such a condition, and therefore, under strict total control over information and its dosage for the general population, it was possible to ensure the coherence of the work of the megamachine and save it from destruction. Otherwise, i.e. when the "secrets of the temple" are disclosed and "secret information" is discovered, the "megamachine" will inevitably fall into decay and eventually collapse and die. In this regard, Mumford draws attention to the fact that the language of higher mathematics in the face of computerization has today restored both secrecy and the monopoly of knowledge, with the subsequent resurrection of totalitarian control over them. Memford also points to another feature of the "megamachine": the merger of the monopoly of power with the monopoly of the individual. The author dreams of destroying such a "mega-machine" in all its institutional forms. From this, in his opinion, depends whether technology will function "in the service of human development" and whether the world of biotechnology will become more open to man.

11.3. The philosophy of technology by J. Ortega y Gasset: technology as the production of excess

Philosophical views of the Spanish publicist, public figure and philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) were formed under the influence of the concepts of the Marburg school. The decisive role in this was played by the ideas of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), Paul Natorp (1854-1924), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Nikolai Hartmann (1882-1950). The purpose of the Marburg school was to analyze the philosophical categories, concepts of ethical socialism. Ortega y Gasset was fascinated by the thesis of the self-positing of the cognizing subject in the process of cultural development. He had a positive attitude towards the theory of experiencing spiritual experience as listening to life (M. Heidegger), was concerned about the problem of disunity between the creators of culture and its "consumers", the negative results of culture, manifested in the form of social disorientation in the system of "mass society". His pen belongs to the book "Reflections on Technology" (1933).

Considering life as a "need of needs," Ortega y Gasset defended the autonomy of the individual in relation to his own destiny as a repertoire of life action. In this peculiar list are both natural, organic, biological needs, as well as actions that satisfy these needs. In fact, in this assortment, both for animals and for humans, everything is the same. The difference, however, is that a person takes certain actions - he himself produces something that does not exist in nature. This is his repertoire. But this is not its most important action: having freed itself from the deficit of vital needs, a person has the opportunity to expand the range of his needs, i.e. expand your repertoire. From this property of human nature, the author draws a conclusion about the inconsistency of human needs. The repertoire of human needs does not coincide with the menu of vital needs. It is his present desire to act according to the second (extended) repertoire and constitutes what is called the activity of transforming nature. In order to satisfy his needs, in order to please them, a person imposes his desires on nature, if she is not yet ready to serve them. In this service, Ortega y Gasset observes how nature itself is transformed. It makes demands on man in the form of natural needs. A person responds to them by imposing changes on her, transforming her with the help of technology. Through this transformation, technology supports human desire. And this connection, which connects nature with man and vice versa, is a kind of intermediary - supernature built on top of the "first" nature.

To the animal its own nature is predetermined. It is a non-technical being - precisely because of the absence of an active principle in it. Man, thanks to his natural technical gift, creates the missing, creates new circumstances, adapting nature to his needs. Man and technology merge. Technical actions are intended, firstly, to invent something, secondly, to provide conditions, and thirdly, to create new opportunities. The task of technology is to make efforts for the sake of saving efforts. According to the author, it is then that a person has a problem of how to manage the freed time after he has overcome that animal life. Thanks to technology, human life goes beyond nature, man weakens his dependence on nature. But a new problem arises before him: how to live on!? Ortega y Gasset answers this question in the following way. The reality is that the world both provides a person with conveniences and puts up obstacles for him. It is in such a world that man lives; its existence is surrounded by both conveniences and difficulties. This is what gives human existence an ontological meaning. Man is destined to be a being "supernatural" and at the same time natural - an ontological centaur!

Thus, the human "I" is a continuous striving to realize a certain project, a program of existence, including what does not yet exist, as well as what we must create for ourselves. Circumstances are given to man as a "raw material" and a mechanism. A man-technician is trying to discover a hidden device in the world that is necessary for his life. For the author, the life program has a non-technical, i.e. pre-technical origin. Its roots go deep into the era of pre-technical invention. Consequently, the probability of technocracy is extremely low: by definition, a human technician cannot manage, be the highest authority, his role is secondary. Technique presupposes, on the one hand, a being who has a desire, but does not yet have a project, idea, program, and, on the other hand, the existence of a connection between the development of technology and the way of being of a person. In this context, Ortega de Gasset considers the Indian bodhisattva, the Spanish hidalgo, and the English gentleman of the 1950s. A Bodhisattva reduces his material needs to a minimum and is indifferent to technology. Only the English gentleman is active, who strives to live in the real world to the fullest. In the description of the author, the gentleman is self-confident, honest, he has a sense of justice, sincerity, self-control, a clear understanding of his rights and the rights of others, as well as his duties towards others. Such an analysis was needed in order to determine the periodization of the history of technology, where the relationship of man to man and man to technology is essential. The author identifies three significant stages in the historical development of technology:

1) the technique of chance is historically the first form of the existence of technology, inherent in primitive society and characteristic of prehistoric man. It is distinguished by simplicity and scarcity of execution and extremely limited technical actions (L. Noiret and others wrote about this);

2) craft technique is the technique of ancient Greece, pre-imperial Rome, the European Middle Ages. During this period, the set of technical actions is significantly expanded, the assimilation of which requires special training, and engaging in technical activities becomes a profession and is inherited;

3) human-technique technique is a machine technique with technical devices, which originates from the second half of the 1743th century, when Edmund Cartwright's mechanical loom was invented (XNUMX).

The machine significantly changes the relationship between man and tool. The machine "works", and the person serves it. He is an appendage of the machine. A side effect of this process is the "crisis of desires", lack of spirituality. Ortega y Gasset calls his doctrine rationalism, although he is close to existentialism.

Topic 12. Technological determinism and technophobia

12.1. The concept of determinism

Determinism (from Latin determino - I determine) is the doctrine of the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of reality. He considers questions about the laws of nature, about the interaction of nature and society, about the driving forces of social development, the influence of society and its individual subsystems on art, science, morality, on the formation and activity of human individuals. The central problem of determinism is the question of the existence and operation of laws. The recognition of laws, in essence, means the possibility of scientific knowledge of nature and society, the possibilities of science, scientifically oriented adaptation of a person to various processes. The denial of laws, on the contrary, stimulates the view of nature and society as completely uncontrollable and unpredictable processes. In relation to society, such a view often arose from attempts to identify the specifics of social processes in comparison with natural ones, to emphasize the significance of people's activities, individual creativity for social history. This tendency has not been completely overcome, although the simplification of social laws is stimulated not by mechanics, but mainly by biology.

A special methodological difficulty is the interpretation of the laws derived from the interaction of human relations. So, K. Marx believed that the hand mill is a reflection of the model of society with the overlord at the head, the steam engine corresponds to the society of industrial capitalism (although these analogies do not continue, which indicates the limitations of such a determination). According to the concept of technological determinism, a different picture emerges. Such determinism gives technology and technical activity an absolute status as the basis for the functioning and development of society. As a philosophical attitude, he elevates technology to the rank of the main cause that determines all aspects of social and cultural life, from economics, politics to art and philosophy.

In the philosophy of technology, two main forms of technological determinism are distinguished: technological eudemonism (from the Greek eudaimonia - bliss) and technological alarmism. The first direction eliminates ("deletes") all the negative consequences of human technical activity and therefore sees only positive aspects in technological progress: it idolizes technology, absolutizes its significance as a source of well-being. The second direction shows a skeptical attitude towards technical innovations: "everything is bad" for it; everything promises disaster and destruction of a person's spirituality, alienation from his own essence, etc. Both of these directions have their followers and apologists, and in each of them there are grains of truth.

12.2. The theory of technocratic transformation of society

Norwegian-born American economist Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) is known as the founder and theorist of institutionalism, a supporter of the technocratic transformation of society, taking into account the influence of the cultural traditions of social institutions. The concept of institutionalism (from the Latin institutio - instruction) goes back to institutions - textbooks of Roman lawyers, giving a systematic overview of existing legal norms. In the nineteenth century institutions existed as a complex of various associations of citizens (family, parties, trade unions, etc.) fighting to raise traditions and customs to the rank of law, fixing them in the form of institutions. Analyzing the nature of this social phenomenon, Veblen comes to the conclusion that people's views lag behind changes in technology and production.

In his Leisure class theory, Veblen analyzes the antagonism between productive labor and conspicuous consumption in modern society, which he sees as an institutionalized "perversion" of the inventive instinct inherent in people. He presents history as the result of the struggle of entrepreneurs in the sphere of treatment with entrepreneurs in the sphere of production, of which the former are the most reactionary. Business gives rise to private property, nationalism, religious ignorance, therefore Veblen calls for the establishment of a dictatorship in society, headed by the technical intelligentsia. According to Veblen, capitalism sharply contrasts business and industry with each other. He does not like the business motive based on the principle of "purchase and sale." In The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) he writes: "The customs of the world of business have developed under the guiding and selective action of the laws of predation and parasitism." The upper class of capitalist society is essentially a "parasitic" class. The author opposes the property factor, which allows the "parasitic" layer to bathe in luxury without taking part in the creation of material wealth. Veblen charges this class with the following accusations: first, possession of the means of production; secondly, non-participation in the production process; thirdly, an idle way of life; fourthly, parasitism and money-grubbing; fifthly, conspicuous consumption and waste. To overcome such social "parasitism" Veblen proposes a technocratic revolution and the establishment of the power of the scientific and technical intelligentsia (technocracy), however, not allowing the working class to power, which, according to Veblen, has its contraindications. He offers his own scenario for this technocratic revolution. In his opinion, a powerful strike of engineers would paralyze the old order and force the "idle class" to voluntarily give up its monopoly on power in favor of the scientific and technical intelligentsia. In the "technostructure", which includes engineers, scientists, managers, shareholders, the author saw the driving force of such a technocratic revolution, the purpose of which is to seize property from the owner and transfer it into the hands of the technocracy.

Intellectuals in European countries liked this Veblen's fantasy so much that even such a prominent ideologist of technocracy as J. Gilbraith, the author of the book "The New Industrial Society", supported it. In general, the ideas are consonant with the external criticism of political economy by Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904). The followers of Veblen's technocracy were J. Gilbraith, D. Bell, W. Rostow, E. Toffler and others.

12.3. "Post-industrial" and "information" society

The concept of a post-industrial society was put forward by an American sociologist and political scientist Daniel Bell (b. 1919), professor at Harvard and Columbia Universities. In his book "The Coming Post-Industrial Society", the size of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was put as a criterion for classifying the state as such a society. Based on this criterion, a historical periodization of societies was also proposed: pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial. Bell considers "axiological determinism" (the theory of the nature of values) to be the ideological basis of such a classification. A pre-industrial society is characterized by a low level of development of production and a small amount of GDP. This category includes most of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. European countries, USA, Japan, Canada and some others are at the stage of industrial development. The post-industrial stage begins in the XNUMXst century.

According to Bell, this stage is mainly connected with computer technologies and telecommunications. It is based on four innovative technological processes. Firstly, the transition from mechanical, electrical, electromechanical systems to electronic ones has led to an incredible increase in the speed of information transfer. For example, the operational speed of a modern computer is measured in nanoseconds and even picoseconds. Secondly, this stage is associated with miniaturization, i.e. a significant change in magnitude, "compression" of structural elements that conduct electrical impulses. Thirdly, it is characterized by digitalization, i.e. discrete transmission of information by means of digital codes. Finally, modern software allows you to quickly and simultaneously solve various problems without knowing any special language. Thus, post-industrial society is a new principle of the socio-technical organization of life. Bell singles out the main transformations that were carried out in American society, which entered the era of post-industrial development: a) new industries and specialties (analysis, planning, programming, etc.) were included in the service sector; b) the role of women in society has changed radically - thanks to the development of the service sector, women's equality has been institutionalized; c) there was a turn in the field of knowledge - the purpose of knowledge was the acquisition of new knowledge, knowledge of the second type; d) computerization has expanded the concept of "workplace". Bell considers the main issue of transition to a post-industrial society to be the successful implementation of the following four equal factors: 1) economic activity; 2) equality of social and civil society; 3) ensuring reliable political control; 4) ensuring administrative control[28] .

According to Bell, a post-industrial society is characterized by the level of development of services, their predominance over all other types of economic activity in the total GDP and, accordingly, by the number of people employed in this area (up to 90% of the working population). In this kind of society, the organization and processing of information and knowledge is especially important. These processes are based on the computer - the technical basis of the telecommunications revolution. According to Bell, this revolution is characterized by the following features:

1) the primacy of theoretical knowledge;

2) availability of intellectual technology;

3) growth in the number of knowledge carriers;

4) transition from the production of goods to the production of services;

5) changes in the nature of work;

6) changing the role of women in the labor system.

The concept of a post-industrial society was also discussed in the works of E. Toffler, J. K. Gilbraith, W. Rostow, R. Aron, Z. Brzezinski and others. In particular, for Alvin Toffler (b. 1928) post-industrial society means the entry of countries into the Third wave of their development. The first wave is an agrarian stage that lasted for about 10 thousand years. The second wave is associated with the industrial-factory form of organization of society, which led to a society of mass consumption, the massization of culture. The third wave is characterized by the overcoming of dehumanized forms of labor, the formation of a new type of labor and, accordingly, a new type of worker. Bonded labor, its monotony, and sweatshop character are a thing of the past. Labor becomes desirable, creatively active. The Third Wave worker is not an object of exploitation, an appendage of machinery; he is independent and inventive. The birthplace of the Third Wave is the USA, the time of birth is the 1950s.

In the era of post-industrial society, the concept of capitalism has also undergone a significant transformation. The characterization of capital as an economic category that measures various forms of social reproduction is historically conditioned by the formation of an industrial-type society. In a post-industrial society, the economic forms of capital as a self-increasing value are revealed in a new way in the information theory of value: the cost of human activity and its results is determined not only and not so much by labor costs, but by embodied information that becomes a source of added value. There is a rethinking of information and its role as a quantitative characteristic necessary for the analysis of socio-economic development. The information theory of value characterizes not only the amount of information embodied in the result of production activity, but also the level of development of information production as the basis for the development of society. Socio-economic structures of the information society are developed on the basis of science as a direct productive force. In this society, the actual agent becomes "a person who knows, understands" - "Homo intelligeens". Thus, the economic forms of capital, as well as the closely related political capital, which played an important role before, are increasingly dependent on non-economic forms, primarily on intellectual and cultural capital.

D. Bell names five main problems that are being solved in a post-industrial society:

1) the merger of telephone and computer communication systems;

2) replacement of paper by electronic means of communication, including in such areas as banking, postal, information services and remote copying of documents;

3) expansion of television service through cable systems; replacement of transport by telecommunications using video films and indoor television systems;

4) reorganization of information storage and systems of its request based on computers and interactive information network (Internet);

5) expansion of the education system based on computer learning; the use of satellite communications for the education of rural residents; use of videodiscs for home education.

In the process of informatization of society, Bell also sees a political aspect, considering information as a means of achieving power and freedom, which implies the need for state regulation of the information market, i.e. the growing role of state power and the possibility of national planning. In the structure of national planning, he highlights the following options: a) coordination in the field of information (needs for labor, investment, premises, computer service, etc.); b) modeling (for example, following the model of V. Leontiev, L. Kantorovich); c) indicative planning (stimulate or slow down by the method of credit policy), etc.

Bell is optimistic about the prospect of world development on the path of transition from a "national society" to the formation of an "international society" in the form of an "organized international order", "spatio-temporal integrity, due to the global nature of communications." However, he notes that "...US hegemony in this area cannot but become the most acute political problem in the coming decades." As an example, Bell cites the problems of gaining access to computerized systems developed in advanced industrial societies with the prospect of creating a global network of databanks and services.

Daniel Bell called himself a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics and a conservative in culture, and was one of the prominent representatives of American neo-conservatism in politics and ideology.

12.4. Technophobia as a means of demonizing technology

Technophobia, or fear of technology, is an attitude according to which technology is seen as the main reason for the alienation of man from nature, from himself. Such a position expresses a negative attitude towards technology: all troubles, misfortunes - from it, from technology. Technophobia originated in the year of the birth of technology, and this was due to the ability to use technology both for good and for harm. Elements of the demonization of technology can be found in primitive myth; in biblical texts, such as the Tower of Babel, the forbidden fruit and the fall; in the legend of Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and gave it to people, for which he was cursed and punished; in the image of the lame-footed god Hephaestus, who, with his clumsy gait, caused "the uncontrollable laughter of the gods." Bacon's Daedalus, "a remarkably talented man, but vile," combined both good and evil genius. Similarly, modern philosophy in technology notes both good and evil beginnings: technology is ambivalent! On the one hand, technology acts as a factor in the liberation of man, on the other hand, it causes his death when he dares to cross a dangerous line in his relationship with the "gods" (forces of nature). As you can see, it simultaneously turns out to be both a boon for a person and his curse.

In medieval Europe, technophobia receives a strong impetus in the form of the idea, actually encouraged by the church, of the satanic origin of technical innovations. Talented inventors, architects, builders and other people engaged in genuine creative activity were openly or tacitly accused of conspiring with the devil, to whom they allegedly sold their souls. Their generalized image subsequently receives a vivid expression in the hero of the book "The Story of Doctor Faust" - a German folk tale that tells of a wizard who made an alliance with the devil and was eventually taken away by him. In the era of the primitive accumulation of capital in Europe, technophobia takes on a new dimension that can be characterized as socio-economic. The guild form of labor organization, common at that time, could survive only by resisting technical progress, since the free development of technology would inevitably lead to the destruction and liquidation of traditional production. Therefore, technical innovations were allowed only to the extent that they did not pose a threat to the existence of the workshop organization. Otherwise, they were destroyed or banned, and their creators were punished. It is known, for example, that the inventor of the tape machine was drowned at the direction of the city authorities of the city of Danzig (now Gdansk), and his machine was banned for two centuries. In the United States, technophobia in the form of machine phobia manifested itself even during the years of the Great Depression (1920-1930s).

French encyclopedist Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) wrote that technology, like science, reveals and actualizes those secrets of nature that are inherently evil for man. He warned: “Know, once and for all, that nature wanted to protect you from science, just as a mother snatches a dangerous weapon from the hands of her child. All the secrets she hides from you are the evil from which she protects you, and the difficulty of studying is one of her considerable good deeds. People are spoiled, but they would be even worse if they had the misfortune to be born scientists "(" Emil, or On Education ", 1762). In modern philosophy, the uncontrolled development of technology is considered as one of the main factors that suppress human individuality and really threaten its existence. Daniel Bell predicted that "the train of history must go off the rails in the future, because, having finally exhausted all energy resources, humanity will no longer be able to solve the ever-growing problems and respond to the challenge of the future." Alvin Toffler argued that the United States, having overcome the crisis of the Second Wave, at the turn of the 29st century. enters the era of the Third Wave: "... We live in a world that has lost control and is confidently moving towards a catastrophe ... only the post-industrial level of technological development can provide a solution to all the problems of the existence of modern humanity and the further normal development of human society." The author elaborates: "The decaying industrial society depends entirely on fast, targeted and efficient information, on energy resources and a reliable monetary system, which outdated structures can no longer provide"[XNUMX] .

First Wave civilization rewarded certain qualities and abilities, especially naked muscular strength. Industrial civilization, or Second Wave civilization, paid for various professions. A Third Wave civilization will also pay more for certain traits and abilities than others. These transitions from one wave to another are historically accompanied by increased international competition, dumping, and unexpected declines in production. As the level of technology rises, fewer workers are needed to keep the industry running, i.e. It's time for technological unemployment. Modern qualification requirements require more complex professional information. Since this takes time, a situation of so-called informational unemployment is created. The restructuring of economic sectors during the transition from the Second Wave to the Third Wave creates structural unemployment due to structural transformations in the technological process.

Massive unemployment, without any form of subsidy or other form of income, creates dangerous political instability. This situation gives rise to a desire to support and preserve the old economy of the past wave. Alvin Tofler in his book "Flash with the Future" in this regard writes: "We cannot go back. We must put the main emphasis on the development of the Third Wave sector, even if this creates a serious struggle with Second Wave industries and unions." Toffler's scientific recommendations are reduced to the following main points. First, it is necessary to rethink such terms as "workplace", "employment", "unemployment". Secondly, it is necessary to prepare the basic sectors of the Second Wave (telecommunications, biotechnology, programming, computer science, electronics, etc.) for a smooth transition to new working conditions. Thirdly, it is necessary to create encouraging conditions for the formation of these basic industries. Fourth, efforts must be focused on the invention and dissemination of services that are the new foundation and key to future employment. Fifth, continuous learning is essential. It can be a major employer in itself, as well as a giant consumer of video equipment, computers, games, films, and other products that also provide employment. Sixth, the system of mass education should be fundamentally changed. Modern schools are turning out too many factory-style workers for jobs that will no longer exist. Seventh, care must be taken to create additional jobs for those who will not find a place in the Third Wave system. Finally, eighthly, it is necessary to provide everyone with a minimum guaranteed income (through families, schools, businesses, and other possible channels). The economy of the Third Wave must comply with the requirements and principles of humanism and morality.

Western futurologists, who are engaged in forecasting the prospects for the development of a post-industrial society, believe that the crisis of modern civilization is not local, but universal, and in addition, its sources have a technical component. In their opinion, humanity is rushing in the direction of certain and, perhaps, total catastrophe. Technique, based solely on science and its achievements, has acquired the character of a dominant and practically independent element, has turned into an absolutely uncontrollable, anarchic factor that can put an end to the existence of mankind. Today man faces an alternative: either change as an individual and as a part of the human community, or disappear from the face of the earth. Concepts are being developed to save at least a part of humanity, if it is impossible to save everyone. The doctrine of global ecological catastrophism is supported by such researchers as D. Meadows, J. Forrester, Paul Ehrlich and others. A less dramatized form of technophobia can be traced in the works of L. Mumford, J. Ellul, G. Marcuse, T. Adorno and other reputable researchers in the West . In their opinion, the way to salvation lies through a change in the authoritarian social reality, through the destruction of the authoritarian "monotechnique", the destruction of the "megamachine" (L. Mumford). There is also such a recipe: to subordinate the further development of technology to the principle of rationality and usefulness, harmlessness for the present and for the future, in accordance with the motto of J. J. Rousseau "Back to nature!"

Theodor Adorno wrote about the costs of the technization of consciousness. In his opinion, on the one hand, the work of technicians is extremely strict and rational. On the other hand, they especially suffer because of the one-sidedness, dryness, inhuman nature of this rationality. Therefore, it is especially important for them to try to throw off the "ballast of reason and criticism" in all those areas that are not directly such technical work. However, they should not put up with the split of existence into a "reasonable" half, which is associated with the profession, and an "irresponsible" half, which is associated with free time. I. Weitzbaum in his book "On the power of the computer and the impotence of the mind" reflected on the massification of irresponsibility, on responsibility due to duty, on the need for accountability of moral, ethical responsibility. A. Jonas in the book "The Principle of Responsibility. Experience of Ethics for a Technological Civilization" writes about the need to move from a past-oriented responsibility to a future-oriented self-responsibility, which is determined by the ability to control and the ability to wield power. According to Friedrich Rap, the achievements of technology require inevitable retribution for them. This technical inevitability can be mitigated, but cannot be eliminated in principle, since it has its own basis. It should be borne in mind that Bacon's "natura non nisi parendo vincitur"[30] is still valid today. Truly: technology is dead without people who have mastered technology...

Topic 13. Features of non-classical scientific and technical disciplines

13.1. Nature, specificity and essence of modern scientific and technical knowledge

Determining the nature of science is connected with the answer to the question of where it begins. According to K. Popper, "science begins with problems and then continues to develop from them to competing theories that are critically evaluated." But H. G. Gadamer does not agree with such a judgment. He believes that the problems boil down to alternative opinions, too general questions. For Gadamer's hermeneutics, science begins with the question of its social significance, i.e. with the resolution of a certain situation that reveals a lack of information, when there is a question, but there is no answer to it. Popper suggests going to the truth from problems. Mastering this path requires knowledge of traffic rules: signs and terms. V. A. Kanke, using the example of dental practice, explains this as follows: "if toothache is intermittent and occurs only when eating, then it indicates the presence of a carious cavity in the tooth." A mathematician can explain this situation with a formula. The humanist will explain with the help of logical reasoning: sharp, dull, unbearable, slightly disturbing pain. It can be concluded that for all sciences, regardless of their specifics, the same feature is inherent to one degree or another - the unification of the general and the individual through scientific reasoning.

Another line of reasoning is also possible: yesterday at the disco it was as good as never before, i.e. we are talking about a state that is unique, inimitable and seemingly has nothing to do with the general. One can object: the speaker actually compares his emotional states that happened at different times, and here he cannot do without highlighting the general and its gradation (“as never before”). The particular is known against the background of the general! Such an equation promises great benefits, since many similar, similar phenomena are covered by one scheme.

According to the nominalist, who denies the ontological significance of general concepts (universals), the postulation of the reality of the general is based on a misunderstanding of the operation of the abstraction of identification. In defense of his position, he can refer to the discrepancy between theoretical calculations and experimental data - this is the nature of mental idealization that distorts reality. Idealizations are, for example, the concepts of a point, an absolutely rigid body, an ideal gas, and communism. In reality, there are no point objects, absolutely solid bodies, ideal communism. But as scientific idealizations are productively used, "damned" difficult questions arise. Understanding the essence of the idealized reproduction of the phenomenon under study turned out to be an intractable issue. In idealization, there is a share of coarsening of reality, although idealization in science contributes to the development of accurate theoretical knowledge. Idealization is the mental construction of concepts about objects that do not exist and are not feasible in reality, but those for which there are prototypes in the real world. A sign of scientific idealization, which distinguishes it from fruitless fantasy, is that the idealized objects generated in it, under certain conditions, are interpreted in terms of non-ideologized (real objects.) The problem of idealization in science has been standing since the time of John Locke, who loved abstraction. V. V. Kudryavtsev explains: "If an abstract object has at least those properties that are reflected in the concept of it, then an idealized object has only these properties." V. A. Kanke believes that "scientific idealization is a form of singling out the general, and, which is also essential, in a certain range of abstractions ... Idealization does not coarsen or even "wash" reality, but allows you to highlight it ... common aspects " [31].

As a criterion of scientific character, V. V. Ilyin considers the following set of conditions: in modern science, “a result obtained on the basis of a constructive procedure, a mathematical experiment, a natural experiment, the ordering of scientific information” [32] is considered truly accurate, rigorous. It is noted that the main task of science is to obtain objective socially useful knowledge. The cognitive plane of science is mental work based on search, experimental, technical and analytical activities. Scientific activity is characterized by the following features:

1) universality - it proceeds as a general cultural cooperation of contemporaries and predecessors;

2) uniqueness - innovative procedures of expanding synthesis are unique, exclusive, irreproducible. Thought is born not from thought, but from the motivated sphere. Creativity, imagination have no rules, they contain only hints of history;

3) non-value productivity - creative actions cannot be assigned cost equivalents;

4) personification - free spiritual production is always personal; creative techniques are individual; the "collective personality" in science arises in very routine contexts of substantiation and certification;

5) discipline - civil ethos regulates science as a social institution, epistemological ethos regulates science as research;

6) democracy - protection of criticism and freedom of thought;

7) communality - creativity is co-creation, knowledge crystallizes in a variety of contexts of communication, meaning-setting (partnership, dialogue, discussion), focused on a worthy, equal and equal consciousness. Such a sphere as the "republic of scientists" is made up of all sorts of "invisible" colleagues", salons, lodges, associations, laboratories, departments, editorial offices, and other small and large forms regulating the regulation of the easy exchange of knowledge[33] .

The specificity of scientific and technical disciplines is still at the stage of clarification. They have a comparative independence in relation to natural science, although sometimes they are identified. The technical sciences are not a continuation of natural science. The methods of natural science and technical sciences differ significantly. The technical sciences provide a picture of human actions, the construction of technical artifacts, and ensure the effective use of these artifacts in accordance with human preferences. Natural science answers the question of what nature is. Technical sciences are exploring the question of what a person can make from natural material in order to alleviate his lot. In natural science, technical rationality is purposefulness, which is characterized by pragmatic orderliness.

The German philosopher of technology Günter Ropol, in search of an answer to the question of whether technology is a philosophical problem, turned to the creative heritage of his compatriot Immanuel Kant. As you know, Kant, in his introduction to the Logic, argued that the field of philosophy is four questions to which it must answer:

1) What can I know?

2) what should i do?

3) what can I hope for?

4) what is a person?

Modern philosophy, writes Ropol'l, justifies its name only if and when it also includes technology in the sphere of its reflections. And the problems of technology can be considered very fruitfully in answering Kant's questions. So...

What can I know? This question is addressed to the problem of truth, to knowledge, which, as a reflection of the world, is the result of contemplative perception: "to understand is to produce" (this was said even under Descartes). The problem, as you can see, rests on knowledge! Pragmatic order acts as a step-by-step design approaching the achievement of the goal, which can be both the theory of manufacturing a technical artifact, and the theory of ensuring its effective, optimal functioning. Natural science is built according to the laws of correspondent truth, technical sciences - according to the laws of efficiency and utility. In the technical sciences, and not in natural science, the pragmatic method dominates. Unfortunately, this circumstance is often misunderstood.

What should I do? The answer to this question is connected with the possibility of moral justification, with legitimization. Technology, as you know, can also become a source of evil, not only good. It is about morality, about the responsibility of man to humanity. There are many possibilities in technology that should be consigned to oblivion. Ignoring the specifics of the technical sciences does not pass without a trace, engineers and technicians are turned into physicists, the technical field will become impoverished. In the technical sciences, they never confine themselves to describing one or another technical artifact or technological chains; interest in the usefulness, efficiency, reliability, safety, and expediency of continuing the operation of technical devices invariably dominates here.

What can I hope for? There was a time when they trusted in God. But in our time, this is not enough. There is no need to shift our responsibility to divine providence while the poorly controlled development of technology continues to pollute the earth, air and water, our entire planet, expanding the ozone hole, causing climate warming with all the sad consequences that follow from this. Technological advances are breathtaking! They also threaten human sovereignty. Human hopes, as it turns out, can be justified with the help of technology, but you can also fail with the help of the same technology.

What is a person? The answer to this question is related to the previous three. It is aimed at self-understanding of a person, i.e. on his self-consciousness, in which the phenomenon of responsibility is implicitly present. In this self-consciousness and self-understanding, a very thin layer belongs to technical self-consciousness. This equally applies to morality, self-consciousness of entire collectives, nations, peoples. The field of moral factors tends to expand. As can be seen, the philosophy of technology is not alienated from its anthropological aspects.

13.2. Socio-philosophical features of theoretical research in scientific and technical disciplines

The system "science - technology" includes the totality of fundamental scientific disciplines, knowledge about the direct applications of their results, the totality of technical sciences, and finally, technology itself. Technical disciplines initially include, for example, electrical engineering, mathematics, the theory of mechanisms and machines, etc. The technical aspect is also seen in those sciences that previously had no technical application, in particular in the biological sciences: in works on genetic engineering, on the rearrangement of the cell of a living organism and a number of other studies, in the development of biotechnology. The technical equipment of the geological sciences has grown sharply. If in the past they were mainly aimed at studying the earth's surface, and their practical application was limited to the search for minerals, today the complex of geological sciences is closely connected with the problems of changing nature under the influence of human activity. Such branches of geology as geochemistry, geophysics, etc., are directly used in the active transformation of nature and in the development of ways to overcome the negative consequences of human impact on nature.

J. Ortega y Gasset rightly noted the existence of a connection between technology and the creative transforming nature of man: “Technical actions do not at all imply the direct satisfaction of the needs that nature or circumstances make a person experience. On the contrary, the goal of technical actions is the transformation of circumstances leading, if possible, to a significant reduction in the role of chance, the destruction of the needs and efforts associated with their satisfaction" [34] . Man adapts nature with the help of technology.

Science in its deepest essence is a means of mastering the world. She strives for the truth. And truth, as Aristotle wrote, is "the correspondence of our knowledge about things to the things themselves." Knowing the truth is not an end in itself! It becomes a stepping stone to the creation of technical devices. To become the master of nature, one must know it. Nature is conquered by obeying it.

It should be noted that the period of time between the moment of making a theoretical discovery and the creation of new technical devices on its basis has a steady tendency to decrease. For example, the English physicist, atomic researcher Ernest Rutherford (1871-1937) believed that his research was purely cognitive in nature and practical results should not be expected from them. In 1933 he said: "Anyone who expects to obtain energy from the transformation of atoms is talking nonsense." But ten years later, the production of atomic energy was transferred to a practical plane! The discoverer, apparently, may not be aware of the consequences of his discovery. Reducing the time from invention to its implementation actualizes the problem of social responsibility of a scientist.

In theoretical research on the philosophy of technology, there is an interest in identifying the differences between science and technology. It has been noted that not all branches of technology are close to science, although the existence of a relationship is obvious. In particular, there is a debate on the definition of the philosophical and scientific status of biology as a model of technology.

Discussions about the social responsibility of science do not stop either. In this regard, the principled approach to social problems, demonstrated by Albert Einstein, remains relevant. In the 1930s he wrote to his friend the physicist Max von Laue: “I do not share your point of view that a man of science in political, i.e. human, affairs in the broadest sense should remain silent. It is in the conditions of Germany that you see where such self-restraint leads. Doesn't this lack a sense of responsibility? Where would we be now if people like Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Voltaire, Humboldt thought and acted in this way?" The development of science has repeatedly generated and will continue to generate ethical problems of responsibility. The technological power of man, which has grown to infinity, can lead to such a risk that new ethical views on the problem of the interaction between man and nature will be required. For example, the German philosopher of technology Hans Lenk, considering such a development of the situation, proposes to move to the concept of preventive responsibility with a focus on self-responsibility as the ability to control the situation.

13.3. Development of systemic and cybernetic ideas about technology

As you know, a system is an integral object consisting of elements that are in mutual relations (see Section 3.2). English philosopher and sociologist, one of the founders of positivism Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) used functional analogies between the processes of an organism and society. Considering that "society is an organism," he proceeded from the organic interconnection of parts and the relative independence of the whole and parts both in the organism and in society. As a result of his consistent analogy, he comes to the conclusion that progress in structural differentiation is accompanied in both cases by progressive differentiation of functions. Spencer's ideas were developed in structuralism (A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, C. Levi-Strauss, M. Foucault, J. Lacan, etc.) and in functionalism (E. Durkheim, B. K. Malinovsky, R. Merton) .

If structuralism analyzes the structure as an invariant characteristic of relations with the system (the functionality of the elements acts only as an initial prerequisite), then the functionality is based on the consideration of a part of the structure, based on its functional significance. The emergence of a general theory of systems (the term was introduced by L. von Bertalanffy in 1933) leads to the creation of methodological prerequisites for the formation of a new system of concepts ("system", "whole", "integrity", "element", "structure", "function ", "functioning", "purposeful behavior", "system goal", "feedback", "integral effect", "balance", "adaptability"), for which the main distinction is no longer "part - whole", but " the system is the environment. The adoption of a new distinction in systems theory leads to the fact that the problems of open systems, in particular their external differentiation and conservation of boundaries, become the main ones. Within the framework of the general theory of systems, a new field of science arises - cybernetics, designed to study the behavior of open systems with feedback. The basic principles of general systems theory and cybernetic ideas found the greatest expression in the structure of the functionalism of the American sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902-1979).

According to Parsons, a system is a universal way of organizing social life. Any social system has a physical basis, in the role of which individuals act. They perform certain functions, in the process of interaction they organize and combine to form collectives, and these latter, in turn, are governed in accordance with ever higher orders of generalized and institutionalized norms. At the top of the system is society as a single system, organized as an integral political collective and institutionalized on the basis of a single or more or less integrated system of values. By including in the system standardized norms and values, as well as the activities of individuals in the form of prescribed roles, the researcher is able to consider individual activity as determined by the characteristics of the system. Structures appear as a product of social interactions and are realized in the activities of individuals as role performers.

Structural functionalism emphasizes the integration of individuals into the social system and the subordination of their functional integrity in order to maintain its balanced and sustainable self-preservation. Therefore, the analysis of a social system is associated primarily with the identification of basic functional requirements that give the totality of elements the property of integrity. Parsons proceeded from four functional conditions: adaptation, goal orientation, integration, maintenance of the sample. Compliance with these conditions is a guarantee of system stability.

With the development of second-order cybernetics, autopoiesis was put forward as a fundamental feature of the system, i.e. the ability of a system to reproduce itself. Autopoiesis emphasizes the autonomy of living systems in their relationship with the environment. Such systems are characterized by the ability to constantly self-renewal. Since they perform only the functions required by the structure of the system itself, they are usually called self-referential. The leading difference for autopoietic self-referential systems is the identity difference. In particular, the German sociologist and philosopher Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), based on the biological theory of self-reference by U. Maturan and F. Varela and the mathematical theory of information, developed the theory of self-referential systems. According to Luhmann, social systems, unlike physicochemical and biological systems, are constructed on the basis of meaning. And this latter is understood as the processing of differences. Social systems consist of communications and are constituted through their meaning, therefore, the concept of communication must be put at the basis of the production and self-reproduction of society. Society, considered as social communication, as a flow of self-reproducing messages, reflects the specifics of the social system, which appears to be self-reproducing and self-observing. Irreversible processes are the source of order. Under highly non-equilibrium conditions, a transition from disorder, chaos, to order can take place. New dynamic states of matter can arise, reflecting the interaction of a given system with the environment. Ilya Prigogine called these new structures dissipative, since their stability rests on the dissipation of energy and matter.

Theories of non-equilibrium dynamics and synergetics set a new paradigm for the evolution of a system, overcoming the thermodynamic principle of progressive sliding towards entropy. From the point of view of this new paradigm, the order, balance and stability of the system is achieved by constant dynamic non-equilibrium processes. Cybernetic optimism is based on a number of assumptions:

a) ontological - reasonable behavior can be represented in terms of a set of well-defined independent elements;

b) epistemological - people act according to heuristic rules, unconsciously performing a certain sequence of operations that can be formalized and reproduced on a computer;

c) psychotechnical - manifestations of the spirit and soul are epiphenomena of experiencing semantic information processes that are completely encoded and reproducible;

d) biological-evolutionary - the human brain is a control device, a large computer for processing information. Thanks to a long evolution, the brain has received a number of advantages, such as continuity, associativity, systemic thinking, but they can also be technically implemented.

Philosophical and intra-scientific critical analysis of the attitudes discussed above in the 1980s-1990s. led to a significant reduction in optimistic expectations. So, in one of the theorems of J. von Neumann (1903-1957) it is stated that there is a complexity threshold, above which any model of a control system is obviously more complicated than the modeled system. Therefore, the construction of such a model becomes meaningless. There are also arguments external to science aimed at criticizing the above assumptions of cybernetic optimism about human thinking and activity (aspects of psychology, ethics, ideology and political science). In the middle of the twentieth century. the founders of cybernetics raised the question of the autonomy of cybernetic technology, the possibility of violating the autonomy of the human will, the determinism of human life by artificial intelligence. At the same time, the American sociologist, Nobel Prize winner, Herbert Simon (b. 1916) in his "Science of the Artificial" (1969) showed the limitations of cybernetic rationality. He proved that the philosophical questions of cybernetics are only a special case of the philosophy of technology.

From the history of the development of technology, we know that it has gone through three stages - from the imitation of natural forms, through the design of the organs of the human body, to the mastery of information processes and the cybernetic construction of models of thinking and the psyche. In the future, cybernetics may belong, as F. Dessauer writes, to solve more fundamental problems that are moving the world towards an information society.

Topic 14. Social assessment of technology as an applied philosophy of technology

14.1. Scientific and technological policy and the problem of managing scientific and technological progress

Scientific potential and its structure. The real opportunities that a society has to carry out scientific research and use their results in social policy is its scientific potential. The world community periodically tries to determine the level of scientific potential in the world as a whole and in individual states. For example, in the 1960s such attempts have been made in the documents of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in the materials of UNESCO in order to take into account the scientific resources of countries. A calculation method has also been developed. In accordance with it, the scientific potential includes the totality of resources that a country has sovereignly for scientific discoveries, as well as for solving national and international problems put forward by science. The criteria for assessing the scientific potential are quantitative and qualitative indicators and achievements. The study of the scientific potential of society from a philosophical standpoint is a step towards deepening the socio-philosophical reflection of science. Philosophy needs this for a more complete knowledge of science and the development of more advanced forms of managing scientific and technological progress. Science is one of the important social resources of society, scientific knowledge is its information resource. But knowledge tends to age. The presence of relevant knowledge (background) directly affects the state of its potential, so science tends to have a kind of "stash" - secrets (for a rainy day!). This mainly applies to fundamental research.

The bearers of scientific potential are people, scientific personnel, together with the system of their training. The second component of the scientific potential is the material and material elements of science, which form its material foundation: buildings, equipment, auxiliary services, instruments, computers and computer technology, without which modern science is unthinkable. The third element of the scientific potential is money, that is, the amount of funding. The fourth factor "working" to maintain the potential of science is clear planning, determination of the current direction in the development of science, organizational factors, etc. A special role in science is played by the information support of scientific activity, its organization and management.

The importance of scientific potential for the development of society. Sometimes there are temporary difficulties in society, a decline in production, and so on. To overcome these negative phenomena in different countries, there are my own empirically proven recipes. For example, in 1965-1968. In Japan, the task of educating creative individuals was put forward. Government experts in those years argued that in order for Japan to maintain high growth rates, a technical education system should be created that provides for the cultivation of creative abilities instead of the cultivation of the ability to perceive or copy the technical achievements of other countries. It was believed that higher education in this regard has its own specifics, which cannot be ignored in the educational and pedagogical process. A significant part of the subject of higher education has an abstract content of a high and highest spiritual, intellectual and cultural level. From such a "subject" it is difficult (and sometimes impossible) to expect an immediate practical effect and material return. It is possible to replace material interest with spiritual-emotional one only if, in addition to a sufficiently high level of general and special culture, students also have an appropriate level of respect for the very culture of mankind. And this, in turn, is impossible without proper development ("fill the lamp") and understanding ("light the lamp") of the phenomenon of culture as a super-complex systemic non-linear phenomenon. The achievement of precisely this goal is served by the modern philosophy of technology as an academic discipline, which includes, among others, the concept of synergetic culturology, which is actively developed in the system of universities in Western countries.

English economist Friedrich von Hayek (1898-1993) wrote: "Most of the steps in the evolution of culture were made by individuals who broke with traditional rules and introduced new forms of behavior. They did not do this because they understood the advantage of the new. In fact, new forms were fixed only in if the groups that adopted them prospered and grew ahead of others"[35] . Hayek believed that the civilizational process is possible only due to the subordination of innate animal instincts to irrational customs, unconsciously, spontaneously arisen memes, as a result of which orderly human groups of ever larger sizes are formed.

The promising goals of the state include improving the quality of life of the population, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the individual, social justice, social and cultural progress in society as a whole. It should be noted that, in solving these problems, the state is constantly improving the forms of public administration, meaning the creation of the most favorable conditions for the realization of human and civil rights. These problems are solved by bringing power as close as possible to a person through the use of modern means of communication. The reverse side of this social policy is the "availability" of a person for power even in the most territorially remote regions from power structures.

The practice of management in the system of the scientific and technical process makes Bogdanov's concept of system engineering relevant. Domestic philosopher and politician A. A. Bogdanov (Malinovsky) (1873-1928) gained fame thanks to the criticism that V. I. Lenin subjected him to in the book "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" (a textbook during the years of Soviet power). Even at the beginning of the twentieth century. Bogdanov predicted the development of technology in the direction of cybernetics and systems engineering (according to Bogdanov - "tectology"), which provides for the transfer of the rules for managing technology to managing society. This trend, it was believed, would eventually lead to the abolition of the state and politics, as a result of which the technocracy would win, without bureaucratic arbitrariness, without bureaucracy and adventurism. There is some difference between cybernetics and technocracy. It consists in the fact that under technocracy state administration is equated with the operation of a machine, with the subsequent alienation of legal and moral norms. Although some elements of technocratic management do not contradict the principle of efficiency, the disadvantage of this type of management is the elimination of self-government, the erasure of levels of management, self-government, election, public opinion, which are related to the institution of democracy. These problems are of a pan-European, not to say universal, character. Equally, they are also the problems of modern Russia.

14.2. Engineering ethics and the responsibility of a scientist

Ethics is the concept of a shared culture; one of the oldest branches of philosophy. It regulates the mutual duties of people in relation to each other. From ethics, individuals receive moral instructions about how to live, how to be guided, what to strive for (see also section 7.5). The professional-applied definition of ethics in relation to the engineering profession means that nothing human is alien to an engineer. The term "ethics" was introduced by Aristotle in his fundamental book "Nicomachean Ethics", meaning that the Greek word ethika means disposition, character, human virtues related to the character of a person, his spiritual qualities. In classifying the sciences, Aristotle placed ethics between politics and psychology. His ethics contained moral instructions, teachings for various occasions. Thus, the goal of ethics is not only knowledge, but also actions: it is studied not only for knowledge, but also for virtue.

As a philosophy of morality, ethics has come a long way in development. Thinkers of all times have tried to expand its content. For example, Immanuel Kant emphasized the concepts of duty, obligation, and responsibility. As man penetrates the secrets of nature, his responsibility for the possession of these secrets increases. With the synergistic interaction of many people, it becomes difficult to personify responsibility in the case when the development of technology overflows the threshold of responsibility. For example, who is responsible for acid rain? For climate warming? Melting polar ice caps, rising sea levels and associated floods? When everyone is responsible for everything, when each individual is responsible for the whole world, then no one is responsible for anything.

What does it mean to "be responsible"? This means - to be ready or to be obliged to give an answer to someone and for something. Research in the philosophy of law notes causal responsibility for actions by virtue of duty, according to which someone is responsible for an undesirable or detrimental state of affairs. There is responsibility for the ability to perform a task or role, the ability to solve an issue, understand, plan, implement, evaluate events, possess appropriate cognitive and managerial qualities, qualifications, and, finally, accountability to the appropriate authorities. Moral responsibility is always individual, it is not set in a strict framework, it is not controlled by external norms. The bearer of moral responsibility can be an individual, it cannot be meaningfully attributed to associations and formal organizations, although it is not isolated from the collective. Ethics usually points to conscience, before which a person holds an answer - the last resort for responsibility. But its private nature makes it difficult to deal with it intersubjectively.

Responsibility has ethical dimensions. This is something more than the voice of conscience as a "fact of moral reason" (I. Kant). For example, in the ethics of an employee of the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), the ideas of relativism, pluralism, and tolerance in the system "personality - society", "good - evil" are affirmed. The very setting of the goal of a paramilitary collective presupposes the mutual adaptation of general civilizational and professionally specific cultures that remain relevant in a changing world. In relation to the professional culture of an employee of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, such qualities as justice, patriotism, the ability to recognize the priority of the common over the personal and the idea of ​​service arising from it, mercy, the ability to empathize, tolerance for other people, peoples, cultures, the priority of the spiritual and moral principle over material and pragmatic. These values ​​can be compared with the established values ​​of world civilization, which include humanism and anthropocentrism, freedom of conscience, individual freedom, human rights, respect for property, material well-being, etc. The point is that in the global aspect, not only the values ​​of Western civilization, but also the values ​​of Russian culture and the cultures of other peoples of Russia can and should be in demand. In the new system of values, the priorities should be sustainable development, a healthy lifestyle, intelligence, natural talent, professionalism, compromise and social partnership, honesty and commitment, mutual trust, tolerance and pluralism, law abidance, etc.

In the context of the realities of the modern world, such judgments, of course, can be perceived as utopian, but there is no reasonable alternative to this approach. And if we recognize the possibility of a mental influence on the evolutionary process, then we cannot fail to see the enormous role that special higher education is called upon to play in the formation of a new system of values. In its development, it is faced with an exorbitant growth and complication of the technological and information environment. The rapid growth of the education system, its transformation into one of the largest spheres of human activity, the separation of education from its historical roots, the immaturity of the socio-cultural policy in the field of education - all this is a disease of the times.

The problems of engineering ethics go back to the contradictions of higher education. Its formation is directly connected with the formation of the Soviet scientific intelligentsia. Everything that happened to the scientific intelligentsia in Russia in the Soviet era fits into the concept of formation, not formation (in this case, it means "not yet present", not formed). During the years of Soviet power, as is known, the scientific intelligentsia, experiencing the impact of modernization, more than once found itself on the verge of losing self-identity, identity. Scientists were considered creators of the dominant ideology of the working class, but at the same time they were led by the working class, without their own voice, often serving their sentences before committing a crime. They were at the same time in the position of a specialist and a pest, a communist and an enemy of the people, a Soviet scientist and a rootless cosmopolitan, a Michurinist and a Darwinist. The requirements dictated by modernization recognized dependence only on the institute of science, but engineering ethics was suppressed by the ignorance of the "hegemon". Conflicts more often occurred at the individual level, but were also not uncommon at the collective level: let us recall the fate of Russian geneticists in the 1930s-1940s, philosophers (1950s-1970s), sociologists (1920s-1930s; 1960s). .). All this was with the Soviet intelligentsia, and it was quite recently. And there doesn't seem to be a return to that.

There is no impassable line between civil ethics and engineering ethics, since engineers are recruited from among the citizens. There are no written rules of engineering ethics yet (perhaps because they have not had time to write them yet). But the program of the philosophy of technology course presupposes the existence of ethical norms of engineering activity. And it really exists. As you know, the book of nature is written in precise, economical language - the language of mathematics. Thus, mechanics reveals the principle of the least action or the least path. The principle of "Occam's razor"[36] is confirmed, where the number of elements in the construction of a theory should be the smallest. The textbook by G. G. Skvornyakov-Pisarev "Statistical Science, or Mechanics" (1722) defines the content of the concepts introduced into everyday life: invention, body, core, nut, etc., and the unity of the verbal and modal aspects of thought and action reveals significant connections object.

We can also talk about a more complex process of formation of a special type of modern man with a scientific and technical orientation. It is here that the question arises about the theory of two cultures - technical and humanitarian. At present, the impact of technological development on man and his way of life is less noticeable than the impact on nature. Nevertheless, it is significant. Uncontrolled changes in nature entered the category of the most closely studied subjects, when it turned out that man and nature do not have time to adapt to the rapid development of technical civilization. Unexpectedly for many, it turned out that engineering activities, natural scientific knowledge and technology significantly affect nature and man, changing them. In this regard, D. I. Kuznetsov writes: “Modern human thinking has begun to perceive nature differently than, say, two hundred years ago. Modern man already thinks of nature as a technique. Therefore, it is very important to change the traditional scientific and engineering picture of the world, replacing it with new ideas about nature, technology, methods of solving problems worthy of human existence. In order for technology not to destroy, cripple humanity, people must be aware of both the nature of technology and the consequences of technical development. However, without a comprehensive humanitarian and legal education, it is impossible to solve this problem "[37] .

Technique reveals the humanitarian image of an engineer, reveals the hidden being of a person in the world of images, patterns, rhythms and meanings, therefore it is so important to focus not only on cognitive procedures, but also on the axiological aspect of evaluating technology, where the highest human capabilities and behaviors are an example of devotion to the truth. The enrichment of technical knowledge with the content of philosophy, psychology, economics, technical aesthetics, and ergonomics expands the impact of technical activity on social and spiritual life. At the same time, technological progress gives rise to many problems that require a new application of ethics in order to avoid a situation of risk. Hans Lenk, Vice-President of the European Academy of Sciences, summarizes these trends in the following order.

1. The number of people who have received side effects from technical interventions is increasing.

2. The scale of the destruction of the natural system under the influence of human activity continues to grow, acquiring a global scope.

3. The deterioration of the medical, biological and environmental situation actualizes the problem of responsibility for the unborn generations.

4. A person is increasingly experiencing manipulations of a social and medical-pharmacological type. As a consequence of this kind of experiments on humans, the ethical problems of such studies are exacerbated.

5. As a result of intervention in the genetic code, a person is threatened with transformation into an "object of technology".

14.3. Social assessment of technology and social and environmental expertise

The social assessment of technology is the definition of qualitative changes in its development, which capture the entire technosphere. This kind of evaluation is similar to the concept of revaluation, the consequence of which is a leap in the development of its material elements. Technology, energy, information systems are changing. The history of technology knows several stages of such a reassessment. The most significant in the material-technical sense were the transitions from gun technology to machine technology, and from it to automated technology. The starting point for such changes, which are of a revolutionary nature, is energy: the mastery of the power of steam, electricity, and atomic energy. All these changes are periodic changes in the force of influence on nature: from muscular energy to technical energy. The transitions between them marked technical and scientific revolutions. There were two big leaps in the development of man's ability to influence nature: 1) the Neolithic revolution, associated with the transition from gathering to agriculture, provided with appropriate means of labor; 2) a revolution caused by the advent of machine production, during which the scale of society's impact on nature has increased in leaps and bounds thanks to fundamentally new technical means and has become comparable to the scale of geological and even cosmic processes. In social terms, these transitions constituted a technical revolution, the meaning of which is that it served as the basis for the qualitative transformations of society. Mastering the technology of iron production in European countries was tantamount to mastering the irrigation system in Asia, with the difference, however, that the latter did not accelerate development, but conserved it. The basis of the technical revolution is changes in technology: the machine production of a London or Manchester urban craftsman gave birth to capitalism. Behind all this stands a man who cannot stand technology, because it displaces him everywhere, and man himself (as E. Kapp wrote - homo sapiens technicus) finds himself in technology. All social revolutions have occurred as a result of technical stagnation, thus pushing the revolution in technology and science. Such stagnation occurs as the adequacy of the organization of the technosphere, social and political organization is achieved in this or that society. Characteristic signs of stagnation are: a) extensive development of technology, rejection of the fundamentally new in the technosphere; b) technical gigantomania.

The current stage in the development of technology is often called the scientific and technological revolution (NTR). Most domestic sources state that the main feature of scientific and technological revolution is the transformation of science into a direct productive force. Let us note, however, that this sign, firstly, is a figurative expression, since science cannot be a productive force literally. Secondly, it does not testify to the revolutionary nature of the present stage, since the development of technology on a scientific basis began in the era of the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. In this sense, we can talk about strengthening the existing trend in the development of technology, and not about a radical change. Rather, the revolutionary nature lies in the fact that the emergence of industrialism in the technical sense implies a qualitative change in the organization of labor, during which the traditional for machinism assignment of a narrow partial operation to each worker gives way to relatively integral labor, which includes a number of operations, and thereby restores the value and attractiveness of living labor .

The rejection of technology and its condemnation stem from various sources, such as the love of nature and the simple life; the need for a clear idea of ​​the state of affairs; economic considerations regarding stocks of raw materials and waste disposal; a sense of justice that protests against the fact that certain groups of people live much better than others, as well as the desire for changes in the system that could lead to a fundamental transformation of the social structure. All this has an impact on the attitude towards technology, on the requirements to establish the principle of zero growth, while the authorities, on the contrary, are concerned about the slow growth of the economy and the development of technology. The German anthropologist of technology Hans Sachse explains this situation as follows.

1. There is a certain inevitability of growth. Desired incomes are planned for the years to come. To do this, money is invested, investments, taking into account the expected income. Stopping this process, keeping the economy at a constant level is tantamount to its collapse: stagnation will turn into collapse.

2. Demands of the poor - to equalize the level of income. However, it is believed that redistribution will not lead to a significant improvement in the situation of the poor. In the US, for example, when electricity consumption is equalized, the rich would have to give up 5/6 of their consumption, while the poor would receive only 1/6 of the current level. Is the game worth the candle?

3. The ability of nations to assert themselves depends almost exclusively on their technical and economic potential. If some nation (state) unilaterally stopped its growth, that nation would certainly become dependent on other nations. Calls for limiting growth are justified by environmental concerns. But this argument is seen as a ploy by the industrialized countries to keep the poor countries out of technological progress. There are, however, natural limiters of technical growth - the lack of raw materials. The conclusion is unequivocal: it is impossible to stop technological progress, just as it is impossible to stop time.

On the other hand, there is the threat of overconsumption. "Welfare" states are countries that provide for insurance in case of illness, an increase in free time, a great migration of peoples to sunny beaches, an abundance of information on television, etc. All this ultimately becomes a brake on further progress, since a person is already deprived initiative, autonomy. Complete satisfaction of his primitive needs leaves a feeling of emptiness, meaninglessness of existence, gives rise to indifference, frustration or aggressiveness. The problem arises: how to use the valuable tool of technology for new tasks that lead even further? The way out is to use the principle of intensive development of technology by intensively raising the living standards of the poor. According to Sakse, this will expand the range of consciousness, increase the liveliness, intensity of life and lead to true existence. However, such a bright prospect will become a reality only if: 1) the working population is provided with opportunities for educational and professional growth; 2) to increase the level of scientific research along the entire perimeter of scientific knowledge; 3) to increase the level of technical equipment of the learning process; 4) to ensure the streamlining and improvement of the level of communication technology to deepen interpersonal relations throughout the world.

Social and environmental expertise of scientific, technical and economic projects is associated with an expert assessment of processes and phenomena that cannot be directly measured. It is based on the opinions of specialists and is mediated by the problem of the responsibility of a scientist, science to society. The foreseeable past shows that the situation has not changed for the better in the system of the human environment, focused on maintaining its active longevity. The social changes of recent years have given rise to or deepened pre-existing negative tendencies. Thus, the deterioration of the ecological environment has led to an increase in risk factors for human life. Attention to environmental issues that adversely affect human health has been lost. The essence of the ecological crisis has not received a scientific explanation in terms of the impact on human health.

14.4. Scientific and technological progress and the concept of sustainable development

Scientific and technological progress (STP) cannot be understood without tying it to spatio-temporal dimensions, i.e. by the time of its postclassical or postnonclassical stage of development. Daniel Bell viewed it as a cliché of the "third technological revolution" with its possible social consequences. W. Dizard, following Arnold Toynbee, presented it in terms of the "information age", linking scientific and technical progress with the evolution of an electronic information network capable of connecting the whole world together. Bell studied the phenomenon of scientific and technological progress as the onset of the era of "eggheads". But the "eggheads" (Peter Sterns, Michael Harrington and others) dispute this judgment from the standpoint of Lewis Mumford, the most perceptive critic of the industrial society of the XNUMXth century. The United States is considered the only country to have made a three-stage transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one, and from it to one whose name is still not clearly defined. But the main feature of this society is that it is mainly engaged in the production, storage and dissemination of information. R. Darrendorf, who studied this trend, calls the USA post-capitalist, A. Etzioni - post-modern, K. Boulding - post-civilization, G. Kahn - post-economic, S. Ahlstrom - post-Protestant, R. Soydenberg - post-historical, R. Barnet proposes to call the USA "post-oil society" . Such is the assortment of definitions, where each has its own basis and claims to be self-sufficient.

D. Bell, who adheres to the concept of a post-industrial society that unites all "eggheads", does not show optimism about the future of this society. L. Mumford advanced even more in his critical assessment of the modern United States, seeing a dangerous tilt towards the military-industrial establishment, which monopolized the entire sphere of information, and the repressive system of bureaucracy. The so-called information society is the fruit of modern technological progress, but its theorists refuse to characterize it clearly. Computer pioneer John von Neumann notes that this society systematically expands its influence into political, economic and cultural areas. But there is clearly a progressive movement towards the production and distribution of information, the expansion of information services for industry and governments, and the creation of a wide network of information media on a consumer basis. It is considered useful to be vigilant about this trend.

In Russia, the theme of scientific and technological progress, which we have declared, is most fully explored in the monograph by VV Ilyin "Philosophy of Science"[38] .

According to Ilyin, the development of science is a permanent increase in its content potential: instrumental, categorical, factual, from which, as a result, adequate penetration into the nature of things, evidence-based mastering of the truth is made. There are two ways of knowledge development: evolutionary (extensive) and revolutionary (intensive). Evolutionary development does not imply a radical renewal of the theoretical fund of knowledge. It is carried out as a result of adapting the general theory to the solution of particular problems by adding appropriate assumptions, merging with the specific theory of mathematical formalism, by introducing new assumptions (Kepler's improvement of heliocentrism), etc. The principal characteristic of evolutionary development is the presence of a deductive connection between the basic and derivative theories. The revolutionary development of science presupposes a significant renewal and modification of its conceptual arsenal. It consists in deepening previous ideas about the essence of the phenomena under study. The reasons for the revolution in science are as follows: on the one hand, any evolutionary development is accompanied by restructuring of logical foundations that exhaust the immanent possibilities of self-development; on the other hand, there is an inability of the current theory to assimilate the available empirical facts. What happened to her is what is called "saturation" (saturation with carbon dioxide). As a result, the theory loses its predictive potential. The operational use of the theory becomes impossible. The prerequisites for a revolution in science are, firstly, self-exhaustion, lack of heuristic potential, description, prediction of phenomena; secondly, the "fatigue" of the theory, its inability to solve intra-theoretical problems; thirdly, contradictions, antinomies, and other imperfections that discredit the traditional algorithms for posing and solving problems.

These are the preconditions. But this is not enough for a revolution. We need reasons! A new idea must arise, indicating the direction of the restructuring of existing knowledge, even if it is in its infancy. A new theory cannot be obtained as a logical consequence of an old one. The relationship between the old and the new can only be described in terms of the correspondence principle (N. Bohr). Summarizing the evolutionary development models proposed by K. Popper, I. Lakatos and T. Kuhn, the Austrian methodologist of science E. Ezer came to the conclusion that four main types of phase transitions are realized in the history of science: 1) from the pre-theoretical stage of science to the primary theory; 2) from one theory to an alternative one (paradigm shift); 3) from two separately emerged and parallel developing particular theories to one universal theory; 4) from a visual theory based on sensory experience to an abstract non-visual theory with a total change of basic concepts[39] .

Sustainable development concept. In everyday usage, the concept of "development" is closely related to the concept of progress. But in the sphere of philosophical and scientific word usage, it captures the existence of a system as a unity of progress and regression, renewal and destruction, self-affirmation and self-destruction. Philosophical understanding of development is initially based on the traditional oppositions of movement and rest, variability and stability, transformation and preservation, systemicity, non-linearity and inconsistency of development. The concept of sustainable development involves the preservation, reproduction of the system, self-change, its co-change with other systems. The system is not driven by man, he adapts to it.

The nature of the development of scientific knowledge is considered by VV Ilyin as a process of accumulation of knowledge. His concept echoes the theory of T. Kuhn, K. Popper, and to a lesser extent P. Feyerabend. There are conceptual, categorical differences in these approaches. The theory of the progress of science, proposed by V.V. Ilyin, is distinguished by the depth of argumentation and greater detail of presentation and evidence.

Topic 15. The problem of responsibility in the philosophy of science and technology

In life, there have always been contradictions between what should be and what is. This ailment of everyday life also affects the problem of responsibility associated with the functioning of technology, with the solution of the issue of benefit and harm. German physicist, Nobel laureate Max Born (1882-1970) emphasized that real science and its ethics have undergone changes that make it impossible to maintain the old ideal of serving knowledge for its own sake. We were convinced that this could never turn into evil, since the search for truth is good in itself. It was a beautiful dream from which we were awakened by world events. American physicist Robert Oppenheimer (1904-1967), the creator of the atomic bomb, was even more intolerant, declaring that physicists after the American atomic bombings of Japanese cities in 1945 lost their innocence and for the first time knew sin. Feelings of guilt forced him to abandon the idea of ​​creating a hydrogen bomb. The US authorities reacted to this decision by removing him from all scientific activities and depriving him of access to classified information. The German sociologist and economist spoke about the need for a proactive assessment of the various consequences of technological development. Werner Sombart (1883-1941). In his book "German Socialism" in the section "Reining Technology", he put forward the idea that the introduction of new technology will always be accompanied or even preceded by a value analysis of its possible consequences. This position, supported by many of his followers, became one of the most important theses of the philosophy of technology, and the realization of the vital importance of its practical implementation led to the creation in 1972 at the American Congress of the first official structure for evaluating technology "Office of Technology Asseement" ("Office of Technology Assessment"). technology"). Later, similar organizations appeared in Sweden (1973), Canada (1975) and a number of other developed countries.

The "father" of cybernetics Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) in his scientific activity was not limited to refusing any kind of cooperation with the US military-industrial complex, but also urged his colleagues to follow his example. In Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine (1948), he, fully aware of the fact that this new science "leads to technological advances that create ... great possibilities for good and evil," called for their colleagues to abandon research in cybernetics. Wiener put forward the principle that it was necessary (a) to make sure that the general public understood the general direction and significance of these studies and (b) "confine their own activities to such non-war areas as physiology and psychology." We cannot cite similar examples from Soviet reality because of its secrecy. We believe, however, that they took place. Although there are other examples when charlatans in science were in favor.

In 1945, in the United States, a group of atomic engineers wrote to their Secretary of Defense, Henry L. Stimson, in which they warned that nuclear energy was fraught with infinitely greater dangers than all previous inventions, and that they could not evade direct responsibility for how humanity uses their disinterested inventions. In 1957, the III Pugwash Conference in Vienna issued a declaration calling on scientists to contribute to the education of people and to disseminate among them an understanding of the dangers that are fraught with the further development of science and technology. In 1974, the "Mount Karmel Declaration on Technology and Moral Responsibility", supported by world scientists, stated the moral and ethical inconsistency of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. In the 1970s a group of geneticists and microbiologists imposed a moratorium on some experiments and research when it turned out that the hybrid molecules they had obtained could be used to interfere with the genes of a living human organism. In 1975, a group of scientists led by Paul Berg organized an international conference in Asilomar (USA) with the participation of 150 geneticists from all over the world. A system of precautionary measures was developed to guarantee the safety of this line of research for human life.

Such active initiatives became possible due to the fact that the times of a lone scientist have already passed. Scientific discoveries and implementations were the result of a collective search for knowledge. Fundamental scientific research requires the concentration of efforts in related areas of scientific research. Against the background of these processes, the philosophy of technology could not be limited to third-party observations. Karl Jaspers was one of the first to pay attention to the situation of the time. He proclaimed technology ideologically neutral in the system of struggle between the two world systems and suggested that the responsibility for the consequences be placed entirely on the people themselves. He declared technology to be a derivative of the social system, placing all responsibility on the latter. His thesis "There is no really existing technology that would be value neutral" became the motto for science and technology. Jaspers developed the problem of communication in connection with the problems of freedom and truth. Communication of the individual, his connection with others constitutes the structure of his own being, his existence, the philosopher claims. Human being in the concept of Jaspers, like that of Heidegger, is always "being with" (others). There is no and cannot be freedom outside of communication. The rejection of existence lies in the possibility of objectifying oneself and thus gaining a being that has universality. Jaspers distinguishes free existence from blind will by the possibility of communicating with others, the opportunity to be "heard". Existence cannot be defined, cannot "communicate" with other existences, and this is enough for it to exist as a reality and not as a subjective illusion. Communication is a way of creating a mind that introduces comprehension, "enlightenment", on the one hand, and an existence that introduces the very being that must be comprehended, on the other. From the point of view of Jaspers, communication is communication in which a person does not play the "roles" prepared for him by society, but discovers what the "actor" himself is. The existential concept of Jaspers is the opposite of "mass communication", in which the individual is lost, dissolving in the crowd. Jaspers also considers truth itself in connection with communication: communication is a means of acquiring truth, communication "in truth". Following Jaspers, M. Heidegger, A. Huning, S. Florman confirmed the idea of ​​the independence of technology from social and political systems.

As you know, intentionality (ie, aspiration) is a concept inherent exclusively in human consciousness. This concept is positively considered in the research of J. Searle. However, it began to be questioned after the appearance of a computer capable of learning and adapting to the external environment, and, consequently, of changing the very program of its behavior when the changing environmental conditions require it (as if computers have some desires of their own). As a result, the responsibility for the actions of technology began to be shifted from the person to the system. The social background of such logic is understandable, but very dangerous.

Conclusion

Certain methodological requirements have always been imposed on a textbook as a type of literature: clarity and clarity of presentation of the material, its structure, general validity and validity of the main provisions, compliance of its content with certain standards of a certain discipline adopted in the professional community. We hope that the necessary level of compliance with these requirements in the training manual has been achieved. Although, of course, the methodical, literary and meaningful stylistic features of the book did not escape the attentive reader in comparison with the textbooks of other authors. This is due only to our desire to present the educational material in the most accessible way and convey it to the reader.

Outlining the main provisions of the philosophy of science and technology as a whole, we adhered to the domestic traditions of building a course, which was reflected in the works of P. P. Gaidenko, V. V. Ilyin, T. G. Leshkevich, T. T. Matyash, V. P. Kokhanovsky, T. V. Fathi, N. M. Al-Ani and other authors. Of particular methodological importance in our study were the fundamental works of Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. S. Stepin. In the interests of the reader, we would consider it expedient to reproduce some of the ideas of the academician as a pioneer in this area of ​​the philosophy of science, set forth in his monograph "Theoretical Knowledge"[40] .

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Notes

1. Cogito, ergo sum.
2. In general, mythology is a form of social consciousness, a way of understanding nature and social reality in the early stages of social development. The basis of mythology was the inability of a person to isolate himself from the environment, the inseparability of thinking, his inseparability from the emotional sphere, and as a result - such phenomena as metaphorical comparisons of natural and cultural objects, humanization of the natural environment, animation of fragments of the cosmos.
3. Eleatic philosophy arose as a result of the fusion of the Pythagorean system of categories, which, in fact, is a transformed structure of myth, with the scientifically designed and also mythologized Pythagorean mathematics (mainly arithmetic).
4. See: Polanyi M. Personal knowledge / M. Polanyi. - M., 1985.
5. For more details, see: Noiret L. Tool of labor and its significance in the history of human development. Kyiv, 1925.
6. Kanke V. A. Basic philosophical directions and concepts of science: textbook. allowance / V. A. Kanke. M., 2004. S. 242-243.
7. Ibid.
8. For more details, see: Porus, V.N. Nauka. Culture / V. N. Porus. M., 2002.
9. Leshkevich, T. G. Philosophy of science / T. G. Leshkevich. M., 2006. S. 137.
10. Bell, D. Social framework of the information society / D. Bell // New technocratic wave in the West. M., 1986. S. 333.
11. Ibid.
12. Feyerabend, P. The structure of scientific revolutions / P. Feyerabend. M., 1977. S. 109.
13. See: Popper, K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge / K. Popper. M., 1983. S. 332.
14. Berdyaev, N. A. The fate of Russia / N. A. Berdyaev. M., 1990. S. 248-249.
15. Fayol, A. Management is a science and art / A. Fayol, G. Emerson, F. Taylor, G. Ford. M., 1992. S. 12.
16. Gadamer, H. G. Truth and Method / H. G. Gadamer. M., 1988. S. 419.
17. In the same place. S. 586.
18. Kanke, V.A. Basic Philosophical Directions and Concepts of Sciences / V. A. Kanke. M. : Logos, 2004. S. 89.
19. Heidegger, M. Being and Time / M. Heidegger. M., 1997. S. 128.
20. Kuhn, T. The structure of scientific revolutions / T. Kuhn. M., 1977. S. 63.
21. See: Al-Ani, N. M. Philosophy of technology: textbook. allowance / N. M. Al-Ani. SPb., 2004. S. 34.
22. See: Stork, H. Einfuhrung in die Philosophie der Technik / H. Stork. Darmstadt, 1977.
23. See: Lenk, H. Reflections on modern technology / H. Lenk. M., 1996.
24. Marx, K. Capital / K. Marx. T. 1. S. 171.
25. In the same place. S. 173.
26. For more details, see: Philosophy of technology in Germany: [collective monograph]. M., 1989.
27. In the same place. S. 370.
28. For more details, see: Bell, D. The Third Technological Revolution and Its Possible Socio-Economic Consequences / D. Bell. M., 1990.
29. See: Toffler, E. New technocratic wave in the West / E. Toffler. M., 1986. S. 97.
30. Nature is conquered only by submitting to it (lat.).
31. Kanke, V. A. Decree. op. S. 219.
32. Ilyin, V.V. Philosophy of Science / V.V. Ilyin. M., 2003. S. 73.
33. In the same place. S. 84.
34. Ortega y Gasset, X. Reflections on technology // Ortega y Gasset X. Selected works / X. Ortega y Gasset. M., 2000. S. 172.
35. Hayek, F. A. Society of the Free / F. A. Hayek. M., 1990. S. 309.
36. Ockham (Ockham, Occam) William (c. 1285-1349), English scholastic philosopher, logician and church-political writer, the main representative of nominalism of the XIV century, a Franciscan monk. According to the principle of "Occam's razor", concepts that are not reducible to intuitive and experimental knowledge should be removed from science.
37. Kuznetsov, D. I. Crisis of classical engineering and humanistic ideals of technical education // Philosophy and the future of civilization. Vol. 4 / IV Philosophical Congress. M. : Publishing House of Moscow State University, 2005. S. 497.
38. Ilyin, V.V. Decree. op. M., 2003.
39. See: Ezer, E. Logic of the history of science // Questions of Philosophy. 1995. No. 10. S. 37-44.
40. See: Stepin, V. S. Theoretical knowledge / V. S. Stepin. M., 2000. S. 703-714.

Authors: Khabibullin K.N., Korobov V.B., Lugovoi A.A., Tonkonogov A.V.

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